

# **Seeking Peace in the Horn of Africa**

## **Solutions for Somalia**

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# I. Introduction

This report is the work of 18 high school students who attended the Duke University Talent Identification Program's International Affairs Institute at Wake Forest University in June-July 2007. The International Affairs Institute takes as its core premise the idea that education's foremost purpose is to study and offer practical solutions for the urgent challenges facing the world today. With that principle in mind, each year the program seeks to gather together gifted educators, students, and leading guest lecturers for cooperative, intellectually challenging sessions that explore a current global problem of international significance. The goal of the session is a collaborative student-written document that proposes a practical solution to the session's theme, to be shared with the public at the end of the session. This year's theme was titled "The Ethics of War".

The opinions expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Duke University Talent Identification Program or its staff.

We offer this report with great hope for the future.

## **Students**

David Arnold  
Trevor Bedford  
Scott Chambers  
Rhett Dixon  
Carissa Fleming  
Jeremy Gerlach  
Augustus Henninger  
Juliana Kleist-Méndez  
Camille McAvoy  
Michael Montgomery  
Arianna Pineiro  
Katie Porter  
Braveen Raganathan  
Matthew Samples  
Michael Shammass  
Paul Spellings  
Jillian Taylor  
Andrew Thrash

## **Faculty**

Noah Bopp  
Matt Fehrs  
Megan Erickson  
Paddy McShane  
Sonal Pandya

## **For more information**

Duke TIP International Affairs Institute  
c/o Noah Bopp  
1717 19th St. NW #B  
Washington, DC 20009  
noah.bopp@schoolforethics.org

## II. Executive Summary

Somalia's history can be characterized by the inability of factions, both politically and ethnically based, to work together – these deep-rooted divisions inform the current Somali conflict. Throughout the colonial era, starting in 1884, Somalia was divided among Italy, France, Britain, Kenya, and Ethiopia. In 1960, Somalia gained its independence. Despite strong pan-Somali nationalism, clan divisions persisted. The strict rule of the dictator Said Barre began in 1969. When Barre was overthrown in 1991, he left the nation in a state of turmoil. The following years were anarchical, and UN intervention only resulted in small improvements. It is imperative that we turn our attention to Somalia, a country that has been engulfed in conflict for over 16 years.

The origins of conflict in Somalia are the disputes among clans, which are the building blocks of Somali society. Each clan seeks to gain control over Somalia by forming alliances with the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) or the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The UIC is supported by several Arab states and extremist organizations. TFG was established to provide order in 2004, but has failed to gain full control of Somalia. In order to bring peace to the region, negotiations must occur so that a clan based parliamentary government can be instituted that will fairly represent all groups in Somalia. However, before these talks occur, the UIC must sever all ties with terrorist organizations.

While the incursion of Ethiopian troops into Somalia in December 2006 was intended to oust the UIC and bring stability to the country, the intervention only fueled ongoing violence. Economic, social, and political trends in Ethiopia along with the increasingly radical movements of the UIC, gave Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi justification for sending troops into Somalia. However, Zenawi engaged in a preventive war, breaking the last resort clause of the Just War Theory. To alleviate the current problems in Somalia and Ethiopia, the Zenawi administration must withdraw all troops. This must in concert with an intervention force of African Union and United Nations peacekeepers. Nations who are currently providing wartime economic aid to Ethiopia must continue to provide assistance after the withdrawal. Finally, to promote goodwill and trust throughout the East African region, Ethiopia should promise not to contribute military forces to any peacekeeping effort.

External intervention is essential to solving the conflict in Somalia. A ceasefire is necessary and UN missions to the area should follow. The first UN mission should monitor the ceasefire, and the second mission should support the TFG. Nations and organizations must provide financial and logistical support in order for these missions to be successful. After these missions are complete, gradual infrastructure improvements and micro-loans will be necessary to ensure the long term stability of Somalia.

Inefficiency hinders the distribution of humanitarian aid in Somalia. In order to promote aid efforts, it is necessary to increase communication between humanitarian organizations. Armed convoys should protect aid transportation throughout Somalia. Further, to ensure that aid is delivered equitably and securely, international distributors should take the place of local officials. To combat the issue of malnutrition, aid organizations should supply nutrient-enriched foodstuffs.

Social stability should be supported by addressing mental health issues. We are hopeful that these aid efforts will improve the success of humanitarian intervention in Somalia.

Somalia has been in a state of turmoil since the coup of Barre in 1991, but we believe a peaceful resolution is possible. We call for the deployment of African Union forces already promised to Somalia to replace the existing Ethiopian troops. Also, there should be a contingent of private military contractors. To remedy deep-rooted political turmoil, it is necessary that the TFG seek to incorporate all prominent Somali politicians. Once this is accomplished, more peacekeeping troops should be deployed to Somalia. To address the crisis in Somaliland and Puntland, there should be an immediate cessation of hostilities and a demilitarization of the Sool and Sanaag provinces. The people of Sool and Sanaag should then decide whether they want to be a part of Somaliland or Puntland provinces through elections. Once the southern Somali government is fully functioning, the independence of Somaliland and Puntland should be considered.

Admittedly, the conflict in Somalia is complex. However, after sixteen years of unrest, the time has come for the international community to seek solutions for Somalia.

### III. The History of the Somali Conflict

The current conflict in Somalia has its roots in the very base of Somali culture: the clan system. Clans have fought each other throughout Somali history, and as a result, today almost every group is split along clan lines. However, this history of Somalia will begin in the colonial period, where two other major factors, radical Islam and pan-Somali nationalism, begin to play a role. The anarchy today has its roots in the following themes: clan differences, pan-Somali nationalism, militant Islam, and the disastrous reign of Said Barre. United Nations (UN) interventions have failed because of lack of funding and the inability of factions to work together. The current anarchy is characterized by the inability of different factions to work together and by governments that have no authority. The largest problems in Somali history have been the multitude of factions and the inability of those factions to work together.

#### Colonialism in Somalia

The Somali people constitute the largest ethnic group in Africa.<sup>1</sup> During the colonial period starting in 1884, the Somali people were completely divided between colonial powers. By 1897, the British ruled most of the northern region, the French controlled the very northwest tip, the Italians controlled the southern region, and the Ethiopians controlled the western Ogadeni region. This partition caused a large pan-Somali nationalist sentiment to arise, which would cause conflicts with Somalia's African neighbors later in Somali history. Colonialism also led to the appearance of militant Islam in Somalia.

In the late 19<sup>th</sup> century Islamic fundamentalism began to cause conflict in British Somaliland. In 1899, Sheik Muhammad Abdille Hassan led an army of 3,000 men in a guerilla war against the British and Ethiopian "infidel" colonizers.<sup>2</sup> Estimates say that the conflict killed a third of the population in northern Somalia.<sup>3</sup> The conflict raged until Hassan's death in 1920. Islamic fundamentalism still exists in Somalia today as the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), a militant Islamic group, is one of the most powerful factions in Somalia.

In World War II, the Italians took over the entire Somali region as part of their African military campaign. The British took back the territory and ruled it under military administration for a period of time. The British returned the Ogadeni region of Somalia, which contained many ethnic Somalis, to the Ethiopians. This angered many Somalis, who would try and take the region back later. In November 1949, the UN voted to turn southern Somalia into a trust territory under Italian supervision, which would gain its independence in 1960.<sup>4</sup> At that point, northern Somalia was being governed by the British and southern Somalia was governed by the Italians; the two countries would be united in 1960. During the transition period, the Italians took a large interest in their Somali holdings, while the British largely neglected theirs. As a result, when the

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<sup>1</sup> I.M. Lewis, *A Modern History of the Somali*, Fourth ed. (Oxford: James Currey, 2002).

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> *A Country Study: Somalia* (Library of Congress, 2005 [cited July 5 2007]); available from <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/sotoc.html>.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

north and the south united, they were basically two different countries, ultimately leading to distrust and unrest.

In 1960 Italian Somaliland gained its independence. There were immediate nationalist calls for the joining of the two Somali regions. On June 1, 1960, after 63 years of imperial partition, the Somali Republic was formed, headed by President Aadan Abdullah Usmaan.

## **Independent Somalia**

During the first few years of its independence, Somalia looked as if it could be a bastion of Western democracy in Africa. By 1963 all adult men and women could vote, and the percentage of political participants surpassed most western countries.<sup>5</sup> However, there were several problems. First of all, the regions had been divided for a long time and had been treated very differently by their colonizers. Secondly, clan conflicts intensified as northern and southern clans started competing. The north resented the political power in the south; for instance, the constitution passed in June 1961 had almost unanimous support in the south, but less than 50% of northern votes.<sup>6</sup> In December 1961, Somali army units rebelled and called for the separation of the north and south.

Despite these clan divisions, one of the most important features of Somali politics was the huge pan-Somali nationalist movement, which led to two wars with Ethiopia, one in 1964 and one in 1977. In addition, from 1960 to 1964, the Somali government was accused of supporting Somali rebels in Kenya looking to secede. Kenya and Ethiopia responded by agreeing to a mutual defense pact against Somalia. This animosity has seriously complicated the international approach to the Somali crisis.

Nationalism, however, seemed to be holding the country together until June 1967 when Mahammad Ibrahim Igaal was elected prime minister. He took a moderate stance on pan-Somali issues and started an African détente, establishing commercial air and telecommunication links with Ethiopia.<sup>7</sup> Without Ethiopia as a common enemy, clan divisions intensified. In addition, the clan structure led to widespread corruption and nepotism in the government as people were hired based on clan connections, not ability. Because of corruption and Somalia's failure to reclaim the Ogadeni region in Ethiopia, the army became dissatisfied with the Somali government in the late 1960s. On October 21, 1969, Major General Mahammad Said Barre took control of Mogadishu and Somalia in a bloodless coup and assumed the presidency of the Supreme Revolutionary Council.

## **The Barre Era**

Barre controlled Somalia as a dictator from 1969 to 1991. He ruled with an iron fist, dealing with critics by suppressing them, detaining them, or bribing them.<sup>8</sup> Barre built up a power base from

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<sup>5</sup> Library of Congress, *A Country Study: Somalia*.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Samuel Makinda, *Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia*, *International Peace Academy* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993).

his own Marehan clan, part of the Daarood clan family. Barre's favoritism upset rival clans, leading to violence after his fall from power. In the last years of his reign, Barre was known as the "Mayor of Mogadishu" because the capital was the only part of the country he actually controlled.

Barre tried to reduce clan distinctions with little success, partly because Barre's government consisted almost entirely of Daarood clan members. This caused the other clans to distrust his administration. In 1977 he invaded Ethiopia but failed to take back the Ogadeni region. This failure severely eroded his popular support. In 1986 Barre was injured in a car crash and tensions within his family over the issue of succession if he were to die developed. In addition, there was unrest in the large Ogadeni portion of the army over what they saw as the abandonment of their Ogadeni brothers in Ethiopia.

Opposition grew until the late 1980s when Somalia erupted into civil war. Barre's soldiers bombed civilians, killed livestock, poisoned wells, and dropped mines. The Africa Watch Committee estimated that 50,000 to 60,000 civilians were killed.<sup>9</sup> During the civil war, a plethora of resistance groups sprang up, including the Somali National Movement (SNM). The resistance groups were mostly located within clan boundaries. The SNM was the largest group and received support from Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia. In 1988 the SNM commanded 10,000 troops.<sup>10</sup> Realizing his imminent downfall, Barre called for a multi-party system and reforms, and on January 9, 1991, a UN peace plan was proposed. Barre would remain head of a government voted in by UN-supervised elections. However, the United Somali Congress (USC) rejected the plan and fighting continued. On January 23, 1991, Barre was officially deposed. With the removal of Barre, all that remained was a large number of militant groups with no common aim except Barre's downfall. Barre's regime and the civil war had weakened the infrastructure of the country considerably, and the country descended into the anarchy in which it remains today.

## **UN Intervention**

UN intervention in Somalia began as an effort to allow humanitarian aid to reach Somali people threatened by disease, famine, and civil war. In November of 1991, conflict broke out between General Mohamed Farah Aidid's Somali National Alliance and the appointed interim president Ali Mohamed Mahdi's forces. By 1992, 4.5 million people were endangered by starvation, malnutrition, and disease, 300,000 were dead and 2 million people were displaced. On April 24, United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) was established. This program's functions included monitoring the March 3 ceasefire, protecting UN workers, and safely escorting humanitarian aid supplies. UNOSOM I soldiers also helped to deliver a large amount of food to the civilian population, provide basic health care (including the mass immunization of measles), make available a clean water supply, provide shelter, clothing, seeds, and tools, and prevent outflows of refugees to the surrounding countries. However, of the \$82.7 million requested by the Secretary-General, only \$67.3 million was received for the mission. The incomplete funding of this program was one of the major reasons the success of UNOSOM I was limited. Despite the

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.



efforts of the UNOSOM I forces, conflict arose. In response to violent attacks on UN soldiers, on December 3rd the Security Council unanimously adopted United Task Force (UNITAF), a program that would allow the U.S. to use all necessary means to create a secure environment. Despite some progress made by the UNITAF forces, the Security Council submitted recommendations for a transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II on March 3, 1993. It was recommended that UNOSOM II forces would be given the power to create a safe environment and help the Somali people rebuild their country by uniting politically and socially. When UNITAF was replaced, there was still no effective, functioning government, no civilian police force, and no national army.<sup>11</sup>

UNOSOM II was established on March 26. Like the first UNOSOM mission, funding fell short when donors pledged only \$130 million of the needed \$166.5 million. The mandate of UNOSOM II included the disarmament of unauthorized factions which was intended to reduce violence in Somalia. On March 24, 1994, Mahdi, the leader of the interim government, and Aidid, the leader of the Somali National Alliance, signed the Declaration of National Reconciliation. Their signatures committed them to declaring a ceasefire and disarmament. Accordingly, major troop reductions began in February of 1995. By March 28, 1995 the withdrawal of UNOSOM II troops concluded, leaving UN agencies and NGOs to continue their humanitarian operations without access to proper protection. The UNOSOM missions were not successful in the rebuilding of Somalia's infrastructure due to the overall inability of the UN to completely put an end to the fighting between political factions. However, there was great success in the humanitarian aspect of the missions, with about 250,000 lives saved.<sup>12</sup>

## **Post-Barre Anarchy**

There is one prevailing theme in the post-Barre period: the inability of different factions to work together, and the resulting anarchy. After the fall of Barre, anarchy descended on Somalia. Ali Mahdi, head of the United Somali Congress, was named interim president, but he was head of a government with no army, no police, only clan militias and therefore no ability to rule. In May of 1991, the northern portion of Somalia, Somaliland, seceded. Up to this point the international community does not recognize Somaliland as a sovereign nation. A National Reconciliation Conference from July 15 to July 21, 1991 recognized Mahdi as president, but he continued to lack power. By October of 1991 he no longer controlled the whole of Mogadishu. Djibouti, Egypt and Italy all tried to resolve the conflict, but disputing parties could not agree on a plan. In 1993, the UN Secretary-General sent a team to Somalia to try and decide how to train a police force that could support Madhi's government. Discussing the state of anarchy, he remarked:

National reconciliation is a difficult process in the best of circumstances; it is particularly difficult in Somalia because of the multiplicity of parties, factions, and other leaders, and the total absence of law and order in all parts of the country.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> *Somalia-Unosom I* (1997 [cited July 4 2007]); available from <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm>.

<sup>12</sup> *Somalia-Unosom II* (1997 [cited July 4 2007]); available from <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosom2b.htm>.

<sup>13</sup> Makinda, *Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia*.

Humanitarian aid workers and peacekeepers came to the country's aid, but there was no security for them. In June 1993, troops under the command of General Aidid, Mahdi's main rival for power, fired on UNOSOM II units, killing 23 soldiers.

The U.S. army had a disaster of its own on October 3rd and 4th, 1993 in the infamous incident known as "Black Hawk Down." General Aidid's forces shot down two Black Hawk helicopters after U.S. forces took twenty-four prisoners including two of Aidid's top aides. In this disaster, eighteen U.S. soldiers died and eighty-four were wounded. The U.S. mission was later abandoned and the twenty-four prisoners were released.

Anarchy continued to rage throughout the 1990s. The UN peacekeepers left in 1995, their mission having failed. General Aidid died after sustaining wounds from a firefight in 1996, and his son Hussein took over. In 1998, following the lead of Somaliland, the northern region of Puntland also declared its independence, but neither has been recognized by the international community.

By 2004 the country was on its fourteenth attempt to restore the government, and elected Abdullahi Yusuf as the new president in a ceremony in Kenya. In the same month, tsunami waves hit the Somali coast, killing hundreds and displacing thousands. The new government did not actually enter Somalia until June 2005, and by November there was an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Prime Minister Ali Ghedi. The parliament did not meet until February 2006, in the town of Baidoa.

## **The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism**

In 2006 another faction rose to power and almost succeeded in controlling all of Somalia: the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). They first appeared in 1999, and by 2000 they were receiving aid from several Arab and African states. The United States, in response to what they saw as an Islamic fundamentalist threat, formed the Alliance for Restoration for Peace and Counter-Terror in February 2006.<sup>14</sup> This very weak organization of Somali warlords only served to galvanize the UIC into action. In the heaviest fighting in Mogadishu since 1991, the UIC took control of the capital in June 2006. They were the first group to control Mogadishu since Said Barre. From there the UIC quickly expanded their influence over the rest of Southern Somalia. They restored order in Somalia to people who had lived 15 years in anarchy. However, the hard liners called for harsh Islamic law and Jihad against Ethiopia. Actions like these alienated the U.S. and prompted Ethiopia to invade Somalia on December 24, 2006.<sup>15</sup>

The Ethiopian troops quickly decimated the UIC's militant wing. For unknown reasons, the UIC opted to fight the Ethiopian army, one of the largest and best-trained in Africa, on open territory where the conventional Ethiopian troops had huge advantages. Later, instead of a Baghdad-like insurgency, the UIC fled Mogadishu and again decided to fight the Ethiopians on open ground. In five months the Ethiopian troops had more or less decimated the UIC's military power, if not all of its influence in the region.

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<sup>14</sup>Kenneth Menkhaus, "The Somali Catastrophe: Bigger Than the Horn- and Not over Yet," *Current History* (2007)

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

## **The Situation Today**

Today Somalia is still a melting pot for unfriendly factions. The Transitional Federal Government is weak and relies on Ethiopian Support. Somaliland and Puntland continue to declare themselves autonomous, and there is currently no UN peacekeeping mission in what is the worst failed state in modern history. In the following sections, this paper will outline what should be done about the Somali crisis.

## IV. Internal Combatants

Somalia is a country divided. Clan allegiances, the Union of Islamic Courts, and the Transitional Federal Government fight for power in a persistent state of anarchy. Violence erupts daily as a result of the tension among the three groups. To successfully confront the Somali conflict, each internal component must be analyzed and a plan for Somalia must address each combatant in order to achieve peace and stability across the region.

### Clans

After the fall of dictator Said Barre in January 1991, clan warfare tore Somalia apart. What began as a united effort to overthrow Barre descended into fighting within and between clans. A US State Department official described the situation:

You stop an old lady on the street and ask her if she wants peace and she'll say, 'Yes, of course, I pray for it daily.' Then ask her if she would be willing for her clan to share power with another, in order to have that peace, and she'll say, 'With those murderers and thieves? I'll die first.' People in these countries don't want peace, they want victory.<sup>16</sup>

Although the situation in Somalia has changed since that time, clans still play a crucial role in the conflict. Today, tensions between clans play out at different levels. On June 30, 2007, two sub-clans began fighting in the southwestern village of Odom over a dispute about shallow wells and seven were killed.<sup>17</sup>

Somalia is made up of four major clans, the Daarood, the Hawiye, the Isaaq, and the Rahanweyn, and many minor clans. These clans are additionally divided between sub-clans. Based on the most recent estimates by the CIA, the Daarood clan makes up 20% of the population and is found primarily in the southern-most and northwestern areas of Somalia, and the Hawiye clan, in central Somalia, makes up 25% of the population. The Isaaq clan, 22% of the population, makes up much of Somaliland, and the Rahanweyn clan, which mostly inhabits an area to the northwest of Mogadishu, makes up 17% of the population. The remainder of the population is divided between other clans, such as the Dir, the Digil, and ethnic minorities.<sup>18</sup>

### Clans and the Current Conflict

According to many experts, one of the biggest challenges that clans and their leaders present is that clan leaders' power is based on their ability to protect their clan in times of warfare and tension. In a peaceful climate, clan leaders are sometimes considered unnecessary by their clan. But in times of trouble, they are respected as protectors of their people. Therefore, it is in their interest to continue conflict or create a "cold war," standoff based on mutual distrust. In one case

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<sup>16</sup> Lansana Gberie, "Somalia: Endgame or New Crisis?," *Africa Analysis*, no. 495 (2006): 15.

<sup>17</sup> Agence France-Presse, "Seven Killed in Somalia Clan Feud," June 30, 2007.

<sup>18</sup> CIA, "Somalia: Ethnic Groups (as of 2002)," (<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/doc404?OpenForm&rc=1&cc=som>, 2002).

during the late 1990s, General Mohamed Said Hersi ‘Morgan’ was unpopular and not trusted within his own clan, the Mijerteen, but by fostering hatred between his own clan and the Absame, he created a state of tension and was able to remain in power until 1999.<sup>19</sup>

Additionally, conflict between the clans has led to many war crimes, including the targeting of civilians, rape being used as a war tactic, widespread looting by militias, the destruction of property, and intentional displacement of civilians. Members of weaker clans, including minority and low status clans, are not protected by their clans and are susceptible to abuse.<sup>20</sup> In the Marehan-dominated Gedo region, weaker clans have little representation and are “subject to loss of farmland, pasture, [and] wells.”<sup>21</sup>

Clans are a major factor in this conflict, and without taking their influence into account, it will be very difficult to establish a lasting peace.

While every Somali has an allegiance to his clan, very few have any allegiance to their government. The Transitional Federal Government was created to bring all the clans together into a cohesive working government.

## **The Transitional Federal Government**

### **A Brief History of the Transitional Federal Government and Its Struggle for Power**

When first created, the Transitional Federal Government located itself in the small town of Jowhar, 50 miles from the capital city of Mogadishu. Eventually, the fledgling government was able to extend its support and power far enough to move to the Baidoa, 10 miles from Mogadishu. The TFG was never able to move to the capital city because of powerful warlords there. These warlords typically represented one of the four major clans in Mogadishu; the Haiwye, the Daarood, the Dir and the Issaq. Then, in June of 2006, these warlords were thrown out of power in Mogadishu by the UIC, a large group of armed Islamic extremists. The UIC seeks to enforce Islamic Law, or Sharia, and turn Somalia into an Islamic state.

However, the reign of the UIC was short. In December 2006, the Ethiopian army invaded and the small, Ethiopian-backed TFG army was able to oust the UIC and seize control of Mogadishu. This move, however, did not take place without a severe sense of distrust and even anger from most of the Somali people. Joyce Mularma, who has written many articles on the current conflict in Somalia stated that, “[The] government's reliance on forces from Ethiopia has put it at odds with many Somalis, who have a deep distrust of the neighboring state.”<sup>22</sup> As a result of both the 1964 and 1977 wars between their nations, Ethiopians and Somalis have a history of distrust and animosity towards one another.

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<sup>19</sup> Kenneth Menkhaus, *Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism*, vol. 364, *Adelphi Paper* (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2004), 42-43.

<sup>20</sup> Kenneth Menkhaus, "Warlords and Landlords: Non-State Actors and Humanitarian Norms and Somalia," in *Curbing Human Rights Violations by Armed Groups* (University of British Columbia: 2003), 4-9.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.

<sup>22</sup> Joyce Mularma, "Somalia: Bloody Clashes Dampen Hopes for Reconciliation," *Global Information Network* (2007).

## **Tactics and Choices made by the Transitional Federal Government**

The TFG has faced many difficult ethical challenges since its creation in 2004. Some of these challenges were met positively, and the decisions made helped to bring more stability and credibility to the TFG. Others were met poorly and usually resulted in the deaths of civilians.

One among the decisions made by the TFG, the election of the first president was both an ethical and unethical decision. Abdullahi Yusuf was chosen by the TFG parliament as the first president. Yusuf is a strong leader, an ally of the United States and a hard-liner against militia violence. However, Yusuf was, prior to being selected president, an Ethiopian-backed warlord. Yusuf, being a member of the Daarood clan, has turbulent relations with the three other major clans in Mogadishu. Yusuf is also an opponent of Islam. He reportedly said, "The Islamists do not represent most Somalis and they could have taken Mogadishu only with the help of extremists from around the world."<sup>23</sup>

The Somali people are in desperate need of international aid and assistance. The TFG made the decision to allow foreign aid workers and organizations into Somalia. It also actively reached out for humanitarian aid for its people. For one example, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has nearly 800 staff members in Somalia.<sup>24</sup> The Somali Poverty Relief and Rural Development Organization works to provide community health, water and sanitation, educational, agricultural programs.<sup>25</sup>

The TFG has taken several steps towards ensuring stability and peace in Somalia. The government announced a Reconciliation Conference between all clans, Islamic militants and the TFG.<sup>26</sup> However, the peace accord between the Daarood and Dir clans and the Ethiopian Army, was not recognized by the government and was declared dead.<sup>27</sup>

In its occupation of Mogadishu, on April 26, 2007, the Ethiopian army used heavy, indiscriminate artillery and mortar fire and fired into civilian neighborhoods in an attempt to destroy Islamic militants. During the attack, 58 civilians were killed. The TFG supported and praised this action taken.<sup>28</sup>

## **Needs, Wants and Recommendations for the Transitional Federal Government**

The TFG needs and wants peace and stability. Also, the TFG and the people of Somalia need genuine aid from the international community, not other nations using Somalia to advance their own interests. This shows a fear of Somalia becoming a proxy battleground for Eritrea and Ethiopia. Both nations are purported to have troops in the country<sup>29</sup> and a history of dislike of one another. This dislike can be demonstrated by the beating and kidnapping of 8 Ethiopian

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<sup>23</sup> The Economist, "Now for the Whole Country," (2006).

<sup>24</sup> Doctors Without Borders, "Somalian News," ([www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news/somalia.cfm](http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news/somalia.cfm), 2007).

<sup>25</sup> Communi-gate, "Somali Poverty Relief," ([www.communigate.co.uk/london/somalipovertyrelief/index.phtml](http://www.communigate.co.uk/london/somalipovertyrelief/index.phtml), 2007).

<sup>26</sup> Chris Tomlinson, "Somali Elders Search for Peace", Associated Press (2007).

<sup>27</sup> Alisha Ryu, "Somali Elders Demand Cease-Fire before Reconciliation Conference," *VOA News* Associated Press (2007), and Denise Youngblood-Coleman, *Somalia: Country Review* (Country Watch Incorporated, 2007)

<sup>28</sup> "World Briefs", *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, April 27, 2007, pg. A-6

<sup>29</sup> "Eritrea Denies Its Troops in Somalia," *Sudan Tribune*, February 16, 2007.

troops by Eritreans.<sup>30</sup> The TFG needs to work hard to regain power and influence over the people. As of today, very few Somalis put faith in the TFG.<sup>31</sup>

The TFG needs to be all-inclusive, consisting of clan leaders and elders, militia leaders, current government officials and Islamists.<sup>32</sup> The TFG needs to take and hold onto a non-expansionist position. Somalia cannot afford to be pressed into a situation where it could be invaded and disorder returned to the country. Some of the reasons that Ethiopia invaded Somalia in the first place were a fear of being surrounded by a “sea of enemies,” and the threat of Islamic expansion at the hands of the UIC.<sup>33</sup>

In order to assure that the TFG can adequately protect and represent its people, the government must prepare to follow the recommendations we will lay out later in this section. However, the government must also prepare to negotiate and accept peace with its largest opposition force, the UIC.

## **The Union of Islamic Courts**

### **Who are the Courts?**

The UIC is a coalition among fourteen different Islamic Courts, in which each court is local and clan-based. In each Islamic court, the clerics and clan leaders preside over a single clan or sub-clan and interpret Sharia. Each court interprets and enforces Sharia in various forms of severity and punishment. The Alliance among the courts provides the UIC with a network of courts working for a shared goal of bringing order to a nation that remains in a consistent state of anarchy. The Haiwye clan, which is dominant in Mogadishu, has especially strong ties with the courts and provided the UIC with a strong base in the capital city. Although the UIC works under Sharia and is technically an Islamist organization, Mohamed Nur Gutale, former U.S. ambassador to Somalia stated that, “Very simply, even though there is an Islamic component, the courts are clan-based organizations which are imposing discipline among themselves.”<sup>34</sup> The UIC is comprised of a majority of moderate Islamic clerics as well as Sufi Muslims and nonviolent Salafists.<sup>35</sup> The UIC gained financial strength from Somali businessmen who sought order so that they could remain in business. However moderate the UIC seems, it also possesses a small, militant wing of jihadists called the Shabab. Founded by Aden Ayro in 2004, the Shabab desire an Islamic nation run by the UIC. Although the Shabab is extremist, Chairman Sharif Sheikh Ahmed denies any connection to terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda.

### **What do the Courts Want?**

The UIC ultimately seeks to unite the Somali people under a new Islamic state that would impose Sharia. Sharif Sheikh Ahmed has contacted the African Union, United Nations, and

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<sup>30</sup> Reuters, “Ethiopia Says Eritrean Troops Beat Hostages,” April 27, 2007.

<sup>31</sup> Mohamed H. Mukhtar, “Trampling the Grass,” *World Today* 63, no. 2 (2007).

<sup>32</sup> Alem G., “The Horn of Africa at the Crossroads,” *Awate.com* ([www.awate.com/portal/content/view/4438/5/](http://www.awate.com/portal/content/view/4438/5/)), 2007 [cited July 4, 2007].

<sup>33</sup> Jeffery Gettleman, “Somalia's Islamists, Cornered, Vow Never to Surrender,” *New York Times*, December 21, 2006.

<sup>34</sup> Lara Santoro, “Islamic Clerics Combat Lawlessness in Somalia,” *Christian Science Monitor*, July 2 2007.

<sup>35</sup> Kenneth Menkhaus, “The Somali Catastrophe: Bigger Than the Horn--and Not over Yet” (*Current History*, 2007).

European Union in attempts to have an Islamic state of Somalia recognized by the international community. The UIC would like to create a government that can keep the Somali people safe and peaceful by presiding under a common Sharia, and by looking at one another under the brotherhood of Islam instead of by conflicting clans. In a statement made by the UIC to the public, the courts explained that “a civil war among our people must be avoided.”<sup>36</sup>

### **The Strengths of the Courts**

The strength of the UIC depends heavily on its public favor. Since the Courts were the only party to control the capital in the past fifteen years, they came into favor by instilling a sense of peace among the Somali people after a constant state of anarchy. By bringing order to the capital, the UIC demonstrated the respect and influence they had over Mogadishu and Southern Somalia.

However strong public favor may have been for the UIC, it was not the only strength of the courts; foreign aid was also a major factor in the rising power of the UIC. In order to gain momentum before overtaking the capital, the courts received aid from several Arab and African countries including Eritrea, Djibouti, Iran and Syria. According to *Time Magazine*:

On at least two occasions, Iran has supplied the UIC with arms, including a shipment on July 25 [2006] of 1,000 machine guns and grenade launchers, an unknown quantity of mines and ammunition, and 45 shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles.<sup>37</sup>

Without this aid, the UIC would not have been able to sustain the militia needed to seize the capital. The UIC has greatly improved its public favor and influence within Somalia. Ahmed, who pays his soldiers an equivalent of seventy American dollars a month in addition to food and shelter, provides a means for thousands to survive. To promote a safer society, the courts outlawed the sale, use, and distribution of khat, which is a stimulant drug that causes excitement and euphoria when chewed. Another Islamic Court went one step further and outlawed cigarettes as well.<sup>38</sup> In a statement delivered to the public by the UIC, the clerics declared:

it [the TFG] reflects and changes its bad behavior and became a government that works for what the people are expecting from it, which is freedom, unity, safeguarding their existence and avoiding serving the enemy.<sup>39</sup>

Although the courts are criticizing the government, they also displayed the ideals that the UIC would want in their government: freedom, safety, and unity. Recently, the UIC took a more moderate stance by stating that, “We declare that we are ready for negotiations and anything which can take the country out of the dark abyss that the country has been put in by others.”<sup>40</sup> By allowing negotiations and peace talks to occur, the UIC validates their claim that they want the Somali people to unite and prosper and that they are not looking to become an oppressive regime like the Taliban.

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<sup>36</sup> "Somali Islamic Courts Statement Calls for Resistance against 'Invaders'," (BBC Monitoring Africa 2007 ).

<sup>37</sup> Sam Dealey, "Terror's Playground " *Time Magazine* (2006).

<sup>38</sup> Lara Santoro, "Islamic Clerics Combat Lawlessness in Somalia " *Christian Science Monitor*, July 2 2007 1999.

<sup>39</sup> BBC, “Somali Islamic Courts Statement Calls for Resistance against 'Invaders'.”

<sup>40</sup> "Somali Islamic Courts Statement Calls for Resistance against 'Invaders'."



## **The Shabab**

Aden Ayro, a man who has never been photographed and spent the early 1990s in Afghanistan, established the Shabab in 2004.<sup>41</sup> The Shabab sect of the courts has proven to be both beneficial and detrimental to the UIC. When battling against the warlords to take Mogadishu, the Shabab used conventional military tactics to control the capital, which resulted in quick and effective military success. However, in late December when the Shabab were crushed by the Ethiopian offensive, they were forced to resort to unethical methods of warfare. Today, the Shabab use Iraqi-insurgent-style tactics that resemble terrorist acts.<sup>42</sup> In order for the Shabab to validate their existence, they would have to be used solely as a peacekeeping force in Somalia. However, the Shabab's jihadist and extremist ties do not extend a friendly or peacekeeping method and should be eliminated from the UIC in order for the Courts to gain the respect of other nations.

## **The Weaknesses of the Courts**

The attempted assassination of President Yusuf on September 18, 2006 and the murder of an Italian nun and her bodyguard in response to the Pope's speech about Islam in November 2006 do not help the courts demonstrate a beneficial public image abroad. In the past the UIC was vehemently opposed to foreign influence in Somalia. However, recently the UIC made a public statement declaring that it would be open to negotiation. Thus, the past opposition that discredited the organization has been mitigated. If the UIC wants to remain influential in Somalia, negotiations with the TFG must occur to ensure positions in the government for the UIC.

The UIC is hugely unpopular within the international community, especially with Western powers such as the United States because they have an extremist, militant wing of jihadists (the Shabab) and they are believed to be linked to terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah. However, in an interview, Chairman Sharif Sheikh Ahmed vehemently denied any links to Al-Qaeda, stating "There is no Al-Qaeda in Somalia. The UIC does not have any relationship with Al-Qaeda [...] the UIC was founded on a clear vision and continued along the same lines. These are rumors serving the Ethiopian plan inside Somalia."<sup>43</sup> Although Ahmed denies any links to Al-Qaeda, several suspicious activities have been reported that provide evidence toward the United States' claim. When journalist Stewart Bell interviewed Shaifullah, a 19 year old Shabab member, he stated, "We used to watch videos from Chechnya, from Afghanistan."<sup>44</sup> Other links and suspicious activity were reported in *Time Magazine*: "[UIC] sent approximately a 720-person strong military force to Lebanon to fight alongside Hezbollah against the Israeli military."<sup>45</sup> If the UIC in fact sent military aid to Hezbollah and the Shabab is linked to Al-Qaeda, then the UIC must eliminate the Shabab from their organization and become more moderate in order for them to be seriously considered by the international community.

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<sup>41</sup> "Ethiopia: Former Shabab Member Expose Eritrea's Active Role in Disseminating Terror in the Horn " (US Fed News, 2007 ).

<sup>42</sup> "Somalia Government Holding Eritrean Army Prisoners " *Financial Times*, July 2 2007

<sup>43</sup> BBC Monitoring International Reports, "No Al-Qa'idah in Somalia, Says Islamist Leader," April 17, 2007.

<sup>44</sup> US Fed News, "Ethiopia: Former Shabab Member Expose Eritrea's Active Role in Disseminating Terror in the Horn," January 11, 2007.

<sup>45</sup> Dealey, "Terror's Playground ".

## **Recommendations for the Internal Combatants in Somalia**

- The government should establish a clan-based parliament as an alternative basis for power for warlords whose power was formerly based on conflict. This would not be land-based, due to the fact that boundaries could not be redrawn after potential clan divisions.
- Committee to study and research recent clan activities to predict and moderate clan conflict effectively.
- Immediate peace talks and negotiations among the TFG, the UIC, clans, and other militias in Somalia held by the international community must take place order for the groups to come to an agreement on peace terms.
- UIC must sever all ties with terrorist organizations so that it can gain validity as a part of the Somali government and so the UIC can be recognized by the international community as a peaceful organization.

## V. Ethiopian Involvement in Somalia

On December 24<sup>th</sup>, 2006, Ethiopian troops moved deep into Somali territory, aiming to oust the Islamic Courts in power in Somalia at the time. The Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, claimed that the rule of the Union of Islamic Courts posed a threat to both the stability of Somalia and the safety of his Christian-led government in Ethiopia. Zenawi claimed that with the proper use of conventional force, his Ethiopian troops could disband the UIC and their militants within two to three weeks.<sup>46</sup> However, the situation spiraled into a long, costly guerilla conflict that many have compared to U.S. involvement in Iraq. To this day, Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia places a huge burden on the economy and peoples of Ethiopia. While Zenawi justifies the incursion as a preventive strike aimed at keeping Somalia from becoming a politically unstable "pariah" state, Ethiopia is itself threatened by myriad internal economic, social, and political problems, making any incursion into another nation impractical. According to Just War Theory, Zenawi's preventive war is not only irresponsible, but also unethical. Therefore, immediate Ethiopian withdrawal, in favor of a more multilateral course of action, is the most practical and effective policy for Somali stability.

### Brief History of Ethiopian-Somali Relations

Ethiopia has always been a hegemon within the East African region; its strong military tradition is rooted in a strong sense of national pride. Ethiopia is the sole African nation never to have been colonized. It is also an anomaly in the East African region due to its strong Orthodox Christian tradition, which has its roots in the Ethiopian Socialist Revolution of 1974. The Marxist "Derg" regime that came into power as a result of that revolution institutionalized Christianity and was not tolerant of the Muslim minority groups living in Ethiopia. This policy of religious intolerance continues to alienate the government from both its own people and its Islamic neighbors.<sup>47</sup>

Somalia, one such Islamic neighbor, has a long history of conflict with Ethiopia that goes back long before the present war. In 1964, Ethiopia fought off a Somali attempt to capture territory inhabited by Somali-speaking people in eastern Ethiopia. The same conflict boiled over again in 1977, with Ethiopia again fighting off the Somali invasion. Hostilities did not cease until 1988, when a peace accord between the two nations was signed. The peace lasted until 1991, when radical Islamists, known as the Al-Itihaad, took control of southern Somalia, instituted Sharia-based rule, and encouraged Ethiopians of Somali ethnicity living in the Ogaden region (in eastern Ethiopia) to rise up against their Christian Ethiopian government in open revolt. Ethiopia responded in 1996, using military force to destroy the Al-Itihaad headquarters in the Somali town of Luuq.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Stephanie McCrummen, "Ethiopian Premier Admits Errors on Somalia," *The Washington Post*, June 29 2007.

<sup>47</sup> Donald L. Donham, *Marxist Modern: An Ethnographic History of the Ethiopian Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

<sup>48</sup> BBC, *Timeline: Ethiopia and Somalia* (January 25 2007 [cited July 5 2007]); available from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6159735.stm>.

## **Ethiopian Economic Motivations in the Conflict**

Most inhabitants of Ethiopia, as in Somalia, live in poverty. Somali refugees in Ethiopia seem to suffer the most in the nation, due to desperate conditions, which further fuels their opposition to Ethiopian intervention in Somalia.<sup>49</sup>

The military presence Ethiopia maintains in Somalia is also an economic drain. Despite the fact that Ethiopia is receiving an increased amount of economic aid, the deficit created by the war is larger than the sum of aid money that is funneled into the nation. The longer Ethiopia remains in Somalia, the more dire their economic situation, as well as Somalia's, will become.

An increasing amount of economic aid has been flowing to Ethiopia from several nations, including the United States and Israel. These nations view Ethiopia as a valuable ally in the effort to combat the developing terrorist networks in Somalia.<sup>50</sup>

Ethiopia's economic problems played a key role in its government's decision to intervene in Somalia. Unlike Somalia, Ethiopia is landlocked, with access only to a few ports for trading in Somaliland, a portion of Somalia seeking independence.<sup>51</sup> Prime Minister Zenawi realized that if a moderate government was installed in Somalia, his country would have easier access to the ports in the region.

## **Ethiopian-Somali Social Tensions**

Social tensions in Ethiopia from the 1990s until the present day have caused numerous problems for Zenawi's government and have drastically altered Zenawi's policies, including those concerning Somalia. First, the many different tribes scattered throughout Ethiopia, including the Amhara, Tigray, Oromo, Ogaden, and Somali, are often in conflict since no one ethnicity has a majority in the nation. The most pressing of these conflicts is the threat of secession of the Ogaden region, home to many Somali-speaking peoples. The Oromo Liberation Front and the Ogaden National Liberation Front, who represent these peoples, claim that they are underrepresented in the Zenawi government. Any such act of secession would be encouraged and aided by the UIC.<sup>52</sup>

The most troubling social trend for the Zenawi government is the rising influence of radical Islam. While allowing Muslims to obtain seats in parliament proportionate to their population does not unsettle the Zenawi administration, the growing radicalization of Ethiopian Islam creates major problems. With encouragement from the Saudi Arabian Wahhabi movement, and more recently from the UIC, radical Islam poses an increasing threat to Zenawi's Christian administration.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Euromonitor, *Ethiopia*, vol. 1, *The World Economic Factbook* (London: Euromonitor, 2002/2003).

<sup>50</sup> Berhanu Abegaz, "Aid and Reform in Ethiopia," *Aid and Reform in Africa Project of the World Bank* (2007).

<sup>51</sup> Robert Kilborn, "Zenawi Responds to Northern Eritrean Threat," *Christian Science Monitor* (2007).

<sup>52</sup> Donald L. Donham, *Remapping Ethiopia: Socialism and After* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

<sup>53</sup> Haggai Erlich, *Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia: Islam, Christianity, and Politics Entwined* (London: Lynne Rienner, 2007).

## **Meles Zenawi's Political Interests in Somalia**

Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, while not a “political strongman,” has always taken a hard-line stance against nations and organizations he sees as a threat to his administration. Ethiopia is a nation threatened by major movements towards secessionism by many different political factions. To truly understand the complexity of Ethiopia's political situation and how it influences Zenawi's policy regarding Somalia's instability, one needs to take a broad look at all internal Ethiopian conflicts before drawing any conclusions about Somalia.

Zenawi, a former Marxist, now favors democracy and modernization. The Prime Minister heads the EPRDF, (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front) a large political party that includes many smaller political factions. Though this front includes a wealth of different minorities and religious factions, its political opposition claims that the mostly Christian factions in the EPRDF and current administration have tried to limit the proportional influence of Muslim people in the parliament by setting up “puppet parties” that do not truly support the interests of the minorities that they claim to represent.<sup>54</sup>

Prime Minister Zenawi, while supposedly a strong supporter of democracy, has used many questionable methods of dealing with his political opposition. In the 2005 elections, Zenawi was responsible for the arrest of several Muslim opposition party leaders on charges of “treason.”<sup>55</sup> Because of Zenawi's alleged mistreatment of the Muslim minorities, his administration is not viewed favorably by Muslims in his country and by Ethiopia's Islamic neighbors.

Zenawi saw the rule of the UIC in Somalia as a possibility for the creation of a radical Islamic state that would threaten Ethiopian hegemony in the east African region by using Islamic militants against Zenawi's Christian-led administration. The current Ethiopian administration, which already has low public approval for losing sea access through the secession of Eritrea, cannot afford Somalia to become a radical Muslim state bent on exploiting the political conflicts in Ethiopia itself.

## **Zenawi's Justification for War**

Certain actions of the UIC throughout 2006 provided Zenawi with justification for the invasion of Somalia. Prior to the official invasion of Somalia, the Zenawi administration was already offering support to the Transitional Federal Government, shown by the presence of Ethiopian “military advisors” in Baidoa, the refuge of the TFG at the time.<sup>56</sup> Throughout 2006, the hardliners of the UIC, specifically Sheik Aweys, progressively adopted a more radical policy, leading the government in Addis Ababa to believe that the UIC intended to open up a “third front” in a new jihad against Ethiopia.<sup>57</sup> This threat gave Zenawi more credibility in pleading for military and economic aid, especially from the United States.

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<sup>54</sup> Donham, *Marxist Modern: An Ethnographic History of the Ethiopian Revolution*.

<sup>55</sup> Mark Mazetti, "Ethiopians Detain 41 Islamic Suspects," *The New York Times*, April 11 2007.

<sup>56</sup> Kenneth J. Menkhaus, "The Somali Catastrophe: Bigger Than the Horn - - and Not over Yet," *Current History* (2007).

<sup>57</sup> Jeffrey Gettleman, Yussuf Maxamuud, and Mohammed Ibrahim, "Ethiopia Hits Somali Targets, Declaring War," *The New York Times*, December 26 2006.

Zenawi was also seeking to prevent his landlocked state from becoming cut off from access to the ports in Somaliland by a hostile Islamic government. He hoped that by installing a moderate government, obtaining access to ports would be easier, allowing perhaps for a greater role in trade. An alliance with the transitional Somali government in trade would thus greatly strengthen the economic position of Ethiopia in the region, while building more trust among the true countries.<sup>58</sup>

The Prime Minister justified his use of a preventive war by stating that Islamic radical groups in Somalia, if left unchecked, would create an imminent threat to Christian-led Ethiopia. Zenawi had evidence of Islamic militants pouring into Somalia from nations such as Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.<sup>59</sup> Through a preventive war, he hoped to demonstrate Ethiopia's strength in an unstable region, as well as the power of his own government to an Ethiopian populace, ready to break apart due to secessionism. He also hoped to appease the AU's and UN's calls for stability in Somalia. Thus, Zenawi chose to instigate a conflict, hoping for a quick resolution to problems posed by potential external and internal threats to Ethiopia.

## **Ethiopian Involvement and the Just War Theory**

While the reasoning behind Zenawi's justification for intervention in Somalia holds some truth, he clearly violates the last resort clause as outlined in the *jus ad bellum* part of Just War Theory. Although Zenawi claimed that the threat posed by the Islamists and the UIC was imminent, a closer examination of the situation clearly reveals that war was avoidable. None of the surrounding countries possess the military strength necessary to pose a serious threat to Ethiopia in a conventional war.

Zenawi's use of preventive warfare amounts to nothing more than a forceful demonstration of Ethiopian hegemony in the region. If Zenawi's main justification for his country's intervention in Somalia was to stabilize the East African region, then this reasoning is discredited in light of the fact that he is, if anything, contributing to the rise of Islamic extremism in Somalia by allowing Islamic radicals to more easily assume the label of nationalists fighting against invaders.

## **Conclusion**

Ethiopia faces too many internal problems to be able to effectively help Somalia. The Ethiopian government, by placing an economic strain on its own country, is weakening its ability to respond to its public's needs. A weak Ethiopian government provides more of an avenue for secessionism and Islamic extremism to thrive in Ethiopia, thus creating even more instability in the region. When this fact is combined with the realization that Ethiopia has already alienated its Islamic neighbors (and its domestic Muslim population) through Zenawi's policies of religious intolerance, any sustained Ethiopian intervention actually contributes to the instability of East Africa rather than helping the peace process.

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<sup>58</sup> Kilborn, "Zenawi Responds to Northern Eritrean Threat."

<sup>59</sup> Mazetti, "Ethiopians Detain 41 Islamic Suspects."

## Recommendations

- Zenawi must immediately withdraw his troops from Somalia, since his use of force is both unjust and impractical.<sup>60</sup>
- It is crucial that the African Union and the United Nations send a large peacekeeping force into the region, to replace Ethiopian troops that are supporting the fledgling transitional government in order to prevent a power vacuum from developing.
- To fully convince the Somali people of the Ethiopian commitment to Somalia's stability, no Ethiopian troops should be part of the peacekeeping forces.
- The international community must pressure the Arab League to encourage the departure of Islamic jihadists from Somalia.
- In order to promote greater stability in East Africa, Ethiopia must also receive economic aid from the United States and other nations involved in the peace process.

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<sup>60</sup> Gregory H. Winger, "Get Ethiopian Troops out of Somalia," *Christian Science Monitor*, September 25 2006.

## VI. External Forces and Foreign Interest in Somalia

### Introduction

The current crisis in Somalia demands attention from nations around the world and international organizations. The existing Somali government is in disarray and stabilization of the country depends on outside assistance. Using diplomacy, intervention and economics, a coalition of nations built around international organizations (such as the AU, EU, and UN) can bring peace, safety and stability to the broken land that is Somalia.

### African Union (AU)

One of the most important groups with interests in Somalia is the African Union. At the moment the AU has roughly 1,700 soldiers, all Ugandan, in Somalia.<sup>61</sup> Some countries have promised more troops, but they have yet to arrive.<sup>62</sup> The peacekeepers promised by other nations have not been deployed because, as Somali Prime Minister Mohammed Gedi said, “The necessary logistical and financial support was not given to deploy forces in Somalia.”<sup>63</sup> The nations neighboring Somalia such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea and Djibouti are concerned about the refugee problem and violence spilling over into their countries, so through the AU these nations are lobbying for more troops.<sup>64</sup> Since the AU is heavily invested in Somalia, they can be relied upon to help in executing most of the policies we recommend, especially if Western nations offer their support.

### European Union (EU)

The European Union supports the AU and its goal of bringing peace to Somalia. The EU does not have a long history of dealing with Somalia, but is willing to work with the country.<sup>65</sup> The EU Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid has also stated that, “The EU is in favor of an international peace force.”<sup>66</sup> In addition, the EU wishes to, “[b]ring together all those who represent the Somali people.”<sup>67</sup> The EU has financially supported the AU and is willing to provide further assistance for future missions.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>61</sup>The Associated Press, "Blast Targets African Union Peacekeepers in Somalia; No Injuries Reported," *International Herald Tribune*, July 2 2007.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> Aweys Osman Yusuf, "Africa: Premier Says Lack of Funding Hampers the Deployment of Au Peacekeepers," *Shabelle Media Network* July 4 2007.

<sup>64</sup> Aweys Osman Yusuf, "Somalia: Au Commissioner Calls for Urgent Deployment in Volatile Somalia," *Shabelle Media Network* April 28 2007.

<sup>65</sup> EU Policies and Declarations on UN-Related Issues (July 4 2007); available from [http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/articleslist\\_s17\\_en.htm](http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/articleslist_s17_en.htm).

<sup>66</sup> Louis Michel, *Somalia Should Have an International Peace Force* (2007 [cited July 5]); available from [http://ec.europa.eu/commission\\_barroso/michel/speeches/docs/articles/2007/article\\_somalie.pdf#zoom=100](http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/michel/speeches/docs/articles/2007/article_somalie.pdf#zoom=100).

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Aweys Osman Yusuf, "Somalia: International Community Funds Peacekeeping Mission," *Shabelle Media Network* July 3 2007.



## France

France wishes to maintain peace and a neutral stance in the region in order to protect its interests in Djibouti. During the 1980s, France supplied aid to Somalia to support education and provide political and economic stability. France also brokered peace talks between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1988, making it a power respected by all parties, as well as gaining some political leverage in the region.<sup>69</sup> These past interventions show why France fully supports the African Union's peacekeeping plan for Somalia.

## Italy

Italian interest in Somalia dates back to the colonial era when Italy's desire to establish a colonial empire led to the acquisition of Somalia. Ever since, the Italian government has attempted to provide political, economic and humanitarian support in Somalia. The aid provided by Italy has focused on humanitarian and economic needs. According to David Rawson, former U.S. Ambassador to Somalia, "Italy did not regard Somalia as a top policy interest and had not staked out any strategic space there. Italian commitment is rather an obsessive sentiment derived from history and played out in domestic politics."<sup>70</sup>

Italy has already provided money in support of an African Union peacekeeping force in Somalia, and may be willing to provide more monetary aid to the situation if needed.

## United Nations

Historically, the UN is the most involved organization in Somalia. Direct participation in Somalia began with the passage of Resolution 733 by the Security Council, which authorized the formation of the UNOSOM I in 1992.<sup>71</sup> The United Nations also placed an embargo on all weapons entering Somalia; however, Resolution 1744 in 2007 declared that the embargo did not apply to the AU and other peacekeeping forces in the country.<sup>72</sup> While an embargo is still in place for all other groups, "the UN security council's [sic] refusal to lift Somalia's arms embargo...looked only impressive on paper. Mogadishu is awash with weapons."<sup>73</sup>

United Nations forces have been present in the country since the intervention in 1992. However, the UN peacekeeping force in Somalia has been dramatically reduced over the years since UNOSOM II. This is primarily the result of AU forces taking over for UN peacekeeping forces. Resolution 1744 applauded the removal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia and the introduction of AU troops to Somalia.<sup>74</sup> However, "African governments have so far promised only 4,000 of

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<sup>69</sup>David Rawson, *The Somali State and Foreign Aid*, U.S. Department of State (Arlington, Va.: Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Dept. of State, 1993), 100-01.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, 92.

<sup>71</sup>United Nations, "Resolution 733," ed. Security Council (1992).

<sup>72</sup> United Nations, "Resolution 1744," ed. Security Council (2007).

<sup>73</sup> "Somali Tycoons Are Biggest Obstacle," *Africa Analysis*, Sep 9 2005.

<sup>74</sup> United Nations, "Resolution 1744."

the 8,000 soldiers needed,”<sup>75</sup> and due to this inadequacy, the forces on the ground in Somalia are unable to contain the situation.

Over the past fifteen years, the United Nations has continued to call on the international community for monetary and humanitarian support, as well as emergency rehabilitation and economic development programs. The Secretary-General has continuously requested that the international community support the AU mission in Somalia “including its disarmament, demobilization and reintegration aspects.”<sup>76</sup> Furthermore, the UN has argued that the developments made in the country must be “incremental and should be based on the outcome of discussions with the government.”<sup>77</sup> The UN has not taken any military action since UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II and continues to pursue strictly peacekeeping and humanitarian aid operations.

The United Nations strongly believes that international support for political reconciliation efforts would lead to “improved security and, thus, humanitarian access.”<sup>78</sup> Also, the UN states that improved access will allow more aid agencies to reach areas in need.<sup>79</sup> It is clear, however, that security has not increased for aid agencies and other organizations. During the incremental reduction of troops involved in UNOSOM II, a number of non-governmental organizations pulled out of Somalia and very few have returned in recent years.<sup>80</sup> The UN continues to encourage the international community to help alleviate the humanitarian and political crisis in Somalia, but no dramatic steps have been taken towards a large UN intervention; indeed, the UN continues to cut back its force in Somalia.

## United States

The United States’ general foreign interests include: “defense of the realm and its inhabitants, access to oil, secure lines of communication and the stability of trading partners.”<sup>81</sup> In 1992 the US became involved in UNOSOM I in which the United Nations attempted to provide humanitarian aid to the people of Somalia trapped in civil war. The United Nations then requested United States intervention via Operation Restore Hope to contain the famine by securing food deliveries and distribution points.<sup>82</sup> After the failure of Operation Restore Hope, the United States pulled out of Somalia and UNOSOM II took over. It is clear that, for the US, “plenty went wrong in Somalia.”<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>75</sup>“It Isn’t Nearly over; Somalia,” *The Economist*, February 10 2007.

<sup>76</sup> United Nations, “Press Release Sc/8225,” in *Security Council, in Presidential Statement, Says Enhanced UN Role in Somalia Must be Incremental, Based on Discussions With New Government*, ed. Security Council (2004).

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> United Nations, “Sc/8662 ” in *Security Council Reaffirms Commitment to Comprehensive Somalia Settlement; Welcomes ‘Aden Declaration’, First Session of Transitional Parliament*, ed. Security Council (2006).

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> Jonathon Stevenson, *Losing Mogadishu : Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia* (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 107.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid., 148-49.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., 43.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid., 137.

Somalia is in no way a direct threat to the United States. Therefore a large-scale US intervention attempt is not probable. United States involvement in the early 1990s , “became a classic Post-Cold War case of how, why and when an intervention should not be conducted.”<sup>84</sup> In short, the United States is hesitant to become involved in Somalia because of its failure in 1993. United States involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan contributes to possible US hesitance to intervene in Somalia. While US foreign interests are not threatened by Somalia, the United States may be morally compelled to intervene because, “internationally, the United States’ moral concerns comprise securing human rights, maintaining the integrity of borders and extending humanitarian aid.”<sup>85</sup> It is apparent that human rights violations in Somalia are extensive, Somalia’s sovereignty is in question and the Somali people are in desperate need of humanitarian aid. Thus the, “United States is in an odd position.”<sup>86</sup> Morally, the crisis in Somalia demands US attention, but realistically, intervention is not likely. Other important questions pertaining to United States intervention are whether the US could avoid protracted involvement, and if US participation could expedite a peaceful solution.<sup>87</sup> The situation in Somalia is anarchic and the Somali government is in need of assistance, so United States intervention may well lead to peace in the region.

The United States has far-reaching influence and access to the resources needed for any type of intervention. As a world leader, the US can and should be able to intervene on moral and humanitarian grounds. US foreign interests are not threatened in Somalia but several ethical questions present themselves in the crisis. As one observer has remarked, “[t]his means that the United States may often have a duty to help another nation, even if refraining from doing so would not adversely affect a ‘core interest’ .”<sup>88</sup>

## **Policy Recommendations**

The immediate concern for the Somali peace process is the negotiation of a multilateral ceasefire. If a majority of the warring factions agree to a ceasefire, then any remaining group opposing the ceasefire can be dealt with by intervention forces and government troops. The withdrawal of all Ethiopian and Eritrean troops from Somalia will contribute to the success of the ceasefire. These troops are a source of resentment by some factions in Somalia and only serve to foment more instability.<sup>89</sup> With these factions out of Somalia, a definitive peace dialogue can begin. This should involve all parties, including the Islamists, tribal leaders, and representatives from Somaliland, Puntland and the TFG.

The peace process will necessitate UN involvement. Thus member nations must begin lobbying the UN for increased involvement. The UN will not only need to be involved to set up this peace conference but also in maintaining the peace. UN observers should be deployed to ensure the withdrawal of Ethiopian and Eritrean troops and adherence to the ceasefire. The current AU

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<sup>84</sup> Lester H. Brune, *The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions* (Claremont, California: Regina Books, 1998), 34.

<sup>85</sup> Stevenson, *Losing Mogadishu : Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia*. 149.

<sup>86</sup> Stevenson, *Losing Mogadishu : Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia* 149.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, 152.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, 154.

<sup>89</sup> Alisha Ryu, "Somalis Skeptical of Peace 'under Occupation'," *VOA News*, June 14 2007.

force in Somalia should be incorporated into a larger UN mission. If the US provides logistical support for the expansion of AU force, then more countries, specifically AU nations, can deploy into Somalia. Also, if the mission operated under UN auspices, then troops from nations outside of Africa could be incorporated into the peacekeeping force.

To ensure that the UN mission has the troops it requires for a sustainable intervention, it is our recommendation that private military firms be contracted to provide security for the NGOs, the government and the Somali infrastructure. Similar organizations should also be contracted to train, organize and equip the new Somali police, armed forces and coast guard. These companies are able to provide sustainable, reliable forces in both the short and long term. Unlike some countries, private military firms would be able to stay for a long period of time to ensure that Somalia is a stable, functioning nation. The neutrality of the contractors should be a great asset in a country where negative memories of UN and US forces still linger. Lastly the cost efficiency and the specialization of the contractors means that countries can send fewer troops and the U.N. mission will not be jeopardized if a nation chose to withdraw.<sup>90</sup>

Essential to the success of this peace process is the willingness of nations to fund the mission and ensure loans are available to the Somali government so that the government has capital with which to operate. It would also be prudent to gradually increase the pace of infrastructure and nation building once the security situation has been stabilized. One idea that could jump start the Somali economy would be a micro loan program, in which small loans are offered to unemployed people so they may start businesses, or improve farms.

## **Recommendations for Immediate Action**

- Nations troubled by Somalia's problems should begin lobbying and pledging support for a UN mission to Somalia.
- A multi-national coalition must immediately mediate a ceasefire for all parties involved, preceding the arrival of the UN and the increase of the AU's forces.
- The international community should bring about the complete withdrawal of all Ethiopian and Eritrean forces, using threats of sanctions if necessary.
- Once the UN mission is established in Somalia, it should announce an open conference on creating a new government in Somalia, which involves all internal factions.

## **Recommendations for Intervention**

- The U.N. must establish a series of missions to Somalia to bring about a peaceful solution.
  - Mission One – Send a series of observer teams to the country to monitor the ceasefire and status of the Ethiopian and Eritrean withdrawal.
  - Mission Two – Develop a UN led force, including AU soldiers, to support the transitional government in creating a permanent government and ensuring the peace and the status of the ceasefire.

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<sup>90</sup> P.W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2003).

- Nations and organizations should begin to provide money to contract private military firms to operate alongside the UN mission, providing support and training the new Somali army and police.
- The US should provide logistical assistance from its base in Djibouti.

### **Recommendations to Ensure Stability**

- Member nations need to ensure that the World Bank is willing to provide loans to the new Somali government; a multi-national organization should be created to provide micro loans to people.
- Using government sponsored organizations, such as USAID, CARE, and the Peace Corps, and military units like Civil Affairs Teams in conjunction with NGOs, limited infrastructure improvements should be instituted. For example, water purifications, school establishment, and road building are projects that can have quite a significant impact for a limited cost.

## VII. The Humanitarian Crisis

Humanitarian aid groups need to respond in innovative ways to the current crisis in Somalia. In particular, aid groups need to confront the rampant malnutrition and the deteriorating social framework that is disturbing Somalia's domestic patterns. In order to be effective, any humanitarian aid must be delivered via armed convoy.

### The Need for Aid

The interrelated physical and psychological factors that define the Somali climate necessitate humanitarian intervention. Within the region, inconsistent weather patterns ranging from drought to flood disturb the domestic habits of the Somali people. In addition to the disruptive meteorological conditions, civil war and clan rivalry have contributed to the adverse psychosocial climate.<sup>91</sup> The extreme circumstances of the nation have severely inhibited the production of crops, major sources of sustenance for the Somali populace. Malnutrition is among the repercussions of the chaotic atmosphere.<sup>92</sup> Dietary insufficiencies dictate the need for humanitarian relief and focused medical attention.<sup>93</sup> The effect of the Somali climate is manifested both physically and mentally, malnutrition and hysteria being among the observed ramifications.

### An Innovative Approach

The current state of Somalia, as noted in *The Need For Aid*, serves as an appropriate illustration of the complexity of the present crisis. In order to address the complicated situation it is necessary for aid agencies to evaluate the diversity of aid needed and taking a creative approach to the problem.

Malnutrition is one of the most obvious and pervasive medical conditions in the region. A modified approach, which will increase the efficiency of the current methods of treatment, will require medical aid agencies to work proactively and develop new ways of food distribution. Rather than dispensing food that lacks the nutrients essential to treating malnutrition through food banks, it will be more effective to treat malnutrition through the "therapeutic feeding centers" pioneered by the Mèdecins Sans Frontières Organization (MSF).<sup>94</sup> Specialized outpatient feeding centers have made treatment more efficient through the use of medicinal food. In examining the MSF organization's proficient handling of rampant malnutrition we believe that it would be beneficial for aid agencies to adopt the MSF model of treatment.

Mental health care is another facet of the Somali crisis which calls for the urgent attention of medical aid groups. The instability which characterizes Somalia mirrors the psychosocial

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<sup>91</sup> Helen McKenzie, *Dramatic End to Somalia Drought* (2006 [cited July 4th 2007]); available from [www.bbc.co.uk/weather/world/news/20052006news.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/weather/world/news/20052006news.shtml).

<sup>92</sup> Paul Reynolds, "Somalia- 'a Depressing Prospect'," BBC.com, [news.bbc.co.uk/go/em/fr/-/2/h/Africa/665526/stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/em/fr/-/2/h/Africa/665526/stm).

<sup>93</sup> Edmund Sanders, "Somalis Wait as Militias Slow Delivery of Aid," in *Los Angeles Times* (2005).

<sup>94</sup> David Michalski, *Somalia: The Need for Independent Humanitarian Aid* (2007 [cited July 4th, 2007]); available from [www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/openletters/somalia\\_01-17-2007.htm](http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/openletters/somalia_01-17-2007.htm).

instability that must be remedied to facilitate the creation of a more workable environment for humanitarian aid workers and improve the quality of life for the Somali people. According to Martín Beristain, when dealing with a war torn people, “[a] psychosocial approach should be based on a realistic analysis of the problems and needs of the population and an ability to adjust the aid to the specific situation.”<sup>95</sup> Aid agencies that focus on providing medical relief must first assess the mental vulnerability of the affected population, noting the needs and perspectives of the populace. After evaluation, aid agencies must provide access to mental treatment. Treatment should be administered through the normal health centers where medical workers may combine individual attention with cooperative methods of healing through mutual mental and physical recovery. Aid workers must work to neutralize divisions within the afflicted populace with an approach to peace based on the integration of conflicting peoples influenced by the socially unstable atmosphere. Aid workers that aim to mend the social framework by providing psychotherapeutic treatment will ultimately generate conditions more suitable for humanitarian action and restore the social framework for the Somali people.

## **The Impediments to Aid Dispersal**

The current climate in Somalia does not welcome the continued application and extension of humanitarian aid. Volatile conditions thwart the efforts of aid organizations. Yet, the desperation which defines the region calls for continued, consistent humanitarian action. Two obstacles for aid organizations are imperfect information and hostile conditions that inhibit their liberty to supply aid. To facilitate the accurate administration of humanitarian aid, aid agencies must “work closely with national medical professionals and cooperate with other aid organizations.”<sup>96</sup>

## **The Value of Information**

Before discussing plans to distribute humanitarian aid, it is essential to first establish the importance of information. The success of our plan hinges on aid agencies sharing information cooperatively to ensure that accurate facts and figures reach the outside world and that adequate supplies reach the people in need. As David Michalski observes, “[m]any times information is distorted while published and cannot be validated by the actors themselves as they are not in the field.”<sup>97</sup> Politicians and military officials need correct on-the-ground information to produce workable solutions for political problems, while workers on the ground need information to help the afflicted. Not only should aid organizations work together to improve the quality of the information, but also to broaden their understanding of the situation. According to *Médecins du Monde*, an international volunteer-based, humanitarian group, “[o]nce the team is in the field, the intensity of the medical work it faces prevents it from making a true analysis of the society in which it is operating, of the surrounding conflict, its roots, or its impact on a national and

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<sup>95</sup> Martín Beristain, *Humanitarian Aid Work* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 144.

<sup>96</sup> *About Us: What Is Doctors without Borders/ Medecins Sans Frontieres?* ([cited July 3rd 2007]); available from [www.doctorswithoutborders.org/aboutus](http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/aboutus).

<sup>97</sup> Michalski, *Somalia: The Need for Independent Humanitarian Aid*.

regional scale.”<sup>98</sup> While in the field, relief workers need to be aware of their social and political surroundings in order to adequately address the situation.<sup>99</sup>

### **Effective Transportation**

The biggest challenge facing humanitarian aid workers is theft. As Andrew Natsios, administrator of the US Agency for International Development, asserted:

Food imported through the relief became an enormously attractive objective of plunder by merchants, by common working people without a source of income, by organized gangs of young men, and by militia leaders in need of the wealth represented by food aid which they would use to purchase more weapons and keep the loyalty of their followers.<sup>100</sup>

Without any protection, aid cannot reach the people who need it desperately.

In order to solve this problem, a UNOSOM II-based effort is needed. UNOSOM II is the best option because it was given the mandate to use force not only in self-defense but also in pursuit of its goal.<sup>101</sup> It is this flexibility that needs to be utilized for aid transportation. In order to reach the people, humanitarian convoys need a working protective force with the ability to return fire in combat situations.

There needs to be a stable umbrella force available to actively protect aid transportation. This protection should first be supplied by the African Union, as it has already committed troops to the area.<sup>102</sup> If that force becomes overextended, private military firms should be hired. The UN should not be a leading actor because AU troops can more quickly respond.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), warns that “using force to protect humanitarian assistance may compromise the foundation of those activities, since the actual use of force, by its nature, will not be neutral.”<sup>103</sup> Many prominent aid organizations like MSF and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) want to be independent from local and global politics. While we recognize these concerns, the need to protect the aid supplies is greater than these organizations’ need to remain neutral.<sup>104, 105</sup> The military convoys are agents of protection, not foreign policy.

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<sup>98</sup> “A Case by Case Analysis of Recent Crises Assessing 20 Years of Humanitarian Action,” (Medecines du Monde, 1999), sec.2.b.

<sup>99</sup> Sarah Kenyon Lischer, *Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 144.

<sup>100</sup> Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, *Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

<sup>101</sup> Samuel M. Makinda, *Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993).

<sup>102</sup> Alisha Ryu, “Somalis Skeptical of Peace ‘under Occupation.’” VOA News, (June 14<sup>th</sup>, 2007)

<sup>103</sup> UNHCR, “Handbook for Emergencies, Second Edition,” (1999), ch.24, par 20.

<sup>104</sup> Michalski, *Somalia: The Need for Independent Humanitarian Aid*.

<sup>105</sup> Lischer, *Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid*, 154.



### **The International Distribution**

Due to the intense clan divisions in Somalia, it would be unwise to ask for clan help with aid distribution. Earlier humanitarian interventions have exposed problems with local aid delivery:

The “guards” threatened to halt food distribution unless they were paid seven times the agreed amount. “Forget about the starving,” was their line, “why don’t we get enough?” [...] There was no sense of community, no sense of easing a human crisis- just *me*, and what goes into *my* pocket. In the end, the ICRC had to triple their pay.<sup>106</sup>

In the cases where the hired local aid workers actually did distribute aid, it was along clan lines: “... the environment in Somalia puts such a pressure from the [local aid] employee’s clan to favor their own kin that it is almost impossible and frequently dangerous for people to resist.”<sup>107</sup> Under such constraints, international aid workers instead of local clan members are needed to give out aid equitably and selflessly.

### **Concluding Recommendations**

- Humanitarian agencies in Somalia must organize conferences in order foster cooperative communicative ties.
- Medical agencies should adopt efficient methods of treating malnutrition.
- Humanitarian/medical organizations must address the psychosocial obstacles in order to create an environment favorable to humanitarian relief efforts.
- The AU should establish a UNOSOM II- based model to protect the humanitarian workers and their aid. (Private military firms can accomplish the same goal if the AU cannot.)
- International aid workers, rather than local people, should distribute aid to ensure the supplies are allocated fairly.

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<sup>106</sup> Scott Peterson, *Me against My Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 33.

<sup>107</sup> Michalski, *Somalia: The Need for Independent Humanitarian Aid*.

## VIII. Political Solutions

“There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized peace.”-Woodrow Wilson.<sup>108</sup>

For the past two decades, organized rivalries have overrun Somalia. Now, it is time to make greater efforts to establish an organized peace. The restoration of peace, security, and stability in Somalia is difficult due to the government’s current inability to negotiate and cooperate with the opposition. The prompt replacement of Ethiopian troops, the main military protection of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), with a substantial African Union (AU) coalition is crucial. With a truly representative Somali government backed by peacekeeping forces, the majority of the insurgency will be quelled.

As long as Ethiopia has a presence in Somalia, there is a major stumbling block to any efforts for true peace in Somalia.<sup>109</sup> Yet if Ethiopia were to withdraw from Somalia without another force to promptly replace it, the TFG could fall.<sup>110</sup> In the event of full Ethiopian withdrawal, another group must step up to keep the peace. We recommend that this new force be a multilateral peacekeeping force made up of AU troops. Out of the 8,000 that they thought necessary, the AU has pledged approximately 4,000 troops to the peacekeeping efforts in Somalia. Of those 4,000 promised troops, only 1,700 -all Ugandan- have been deployed in Somalia. Other countries that have promised troops are struggling to actually send them due to legislative reluctance.<sup>111</sup> Some countries are not willing to send their troops because there is no clear enemy or goal. The AU must become more decisive; the sooner an AU force can enter Somalia the sooner Ethiopian forces can leave.<sup>112</sup>

We recommend that the international community fund small contingents of private military firms to take up peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Somalia. Few states are ready and willing to send troops to Somalia, whereas private military contractors should be able to produce quick results which will encourage more countries to deploy their troops.<sup>113</sup>

Once the AU stations a small, multilateral peacekeeping body in Somalia, they will remove the economic strain of troop deployment from Ethiopia and transfer it to the TFG. However, President Abdullahi Yusuf’s and Prime Minister Mohamed Gedi’s views for Somalia are too myopic and uncompromising to achieve any stability in the short term, let alone the long term. They refuse to talk to even the most moderate of the Islamist opposition figures.<sup>114</sup> Unless the government can spread its power and cease to be so exclusive, tangible results are unlikely. The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) does have a militant Shabaab wing, a non-negotiating jihadist branch, but the moderate Sufi Muslims’ wing and nonviolent Salafists’ wing are often

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<sup>108</sup> Lou Dobbs, "Lou Dobbs Tonight," (2003).

<sup>109</sup> Alisha Ryu, "Somalis Skeptical of Peace 'under Occupation'," (Mogadishu: VOA News, 2007).

<sup>110</sup> David Shinn, "David Shinn on Somalia," in *The Reporter* (2007).

<sup>111</sup> Kenneth Menkhaus, "The Somali Catastrophe: Bigger than the Horn—and Not Over Yet," *Current History*: 7, (2007).

<sup>112</sup> Shinn, "David Shinn on Somalia."

<sup>113</sup> P. W. Singer, "Peacekeepers, Inc.," *Policy Review*, no. 119 (2003).

<sup>114</sup> The Economist, "International: No Peace, More Terror; Somalia," 383, no. 8531 (2007).

overlooked. These moderate wings should be included in the government.<sup>115</sup> Dr. David Shinn, former U.S. ambassador to Ethiopia and expert on Somalia, says “It [the Transitional Federal Government] particularly must engage disaffected moderates, including some that it now considers its enemy, in an effort to bring them and their supporters and followers into the political process and even be made part of the government itself.”<sup>116</sup>

The government is presently attempting to organize a National Reconciliation Conference, but this may not be effective because of the government’s inability to cooperate with opposing prominent Somalis. Although roughly 1000 members are set to attend the conference that was postponed to July 15<sup>th</sup>, 2007, it appears that many individuals of the Hawiye clan, the primary supporters of the UIC, will be excluded from the talks as a penalty for their failed coup.<sup>117</sup> The government is clearly failing to reach out to all Somalis with even the most basic of gestures and thus failing to establish a government that is truly representative. A parliament with representation designated by clan affiliation as opposed to geographic location is the best way to begin integrating different factions into a strong Somali government. As this government becomes more inclusive, it should be given more international support.

If the peacekeeping forces are truly going to be effective, they must quickly establish and adhere to the wishes of a powerful central government of Somalia. This being said, the peacekeepers must have the support of a majority of the Somali people. As Shinn asserts, “No number (of troops) is adequate unless all significant Somali factions agree that a force from the AU is in their interest.”<sup>118</sup> This need for support is also applicable to any additional troops that may be added by the international community. Even if a force that is many times greater than the AU force were in Somalia, it would not be successful if the Somali clans did not approve of its presence. The dissenting clans will most likely resort to what has been the currency of Somalia for the last fifteen years: violence. However, if a preliminary acceptance of AU peacekeepers is established then it becomes the gateway for military support from the international community, perhaps even an incentive for the United Nations. As long as there is public support for the peacekeepers, they can squash the remnants of extremists who may seek to derail the entire process.<sup>119</sup> This would be the beginning of a truly effective peacekeeping force, modeled after the former UNOSOM II plan, having a similar mandate but not constrained by the same basic framework of self-defense and allowed to combat the extremist minority.<sup>120</sup>

## **Somaliland and Puntland**

Another problem in Somalia is the border dispute between Somaliland and Puntland. Currently, there is some limited fighting between the two over the regions of Sool and Sanaag. Somaliland

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<sup>115</sup>Kenneth Menkhaus, "The Somali Catastrophe: Bigger than the Horn—and Not Over Yet," *Current History*: 7 (2007).

<sup>116</sup> Shinn, "David Shinn on Somalia."

<sup>117</sup> Mohamed Olad Hassan, "Somalia's Reconciliation Conference Delayed Again, This Time until July, Top Organizer Says," in *San Diego Union Tribune* (2007).

<sup>118</sup> David Shinn, "Somalia: Politics: David Shinn on Somalia." *The Reporter* (2007).

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

<sup>120</sup> Samuel Makinda, *Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993).

claims the territory because the territory was part of British Somalia. Puntland claims ownership of the land because the inhabitants belong to the Puntland-based Harti clan. Both regions have disputed the area for many years. This conflict has the potential to spiral into a full-scale war.<sup>121</sup>

We recommend international pressure for an immediate ceasefire between Somaliland and Puntland. International troops should be deployed to keep the peace and try to demilitarize the area. Once secured, the people in the disputed area should vote on whether they want to join Somaliland or Puntland. We strongly encourage the use of an impartial institution, such as the Carter Center, to observe the elections. If the inhabitants of the disputed area are not happy with the results of the election and wish to move, we suggest that a nongovernmental organization help those people move to the region of their choice. We believe this way is the best way of ending the dispute between Somaliland and Puntland.

While there are strong arguments for immediately granting Somaliland and Puntland their independence, we propose the regions of Somaliland and Puntland remain a part of Somalia while the government in southern Somalia is rebuilt. In the words of former U.S. ambassador Dr. David Shinn, “It is necessary first for Somalis in former Italian Somalia to put their house in order. When this is accomplished, then Somalis in former Italian Somalia and former British Somaliland can sit down and discuss their relationship.”<sup>122</sup>

There is some support for the immediate recognition of Somaliland. The main claim for Somaliland’s independence is that it has been fundamentally different from southern Somalia since colonization. There is also a belief that if Somaliland were part of Somalia, the differences between clans could eventually lead to fighting. Our belief, much like David Shinn’s, is that the international community should work on Somalia as a whole, then move on to the question of independence. Our power is limited, and we must bear this in mind when deciding which issues take priority. Instead of trying to do many different things at once, we need to concentrate on the most pressing issue.

We propose that the question of independence for Somaliland should be revisited after the government of southern Somalia is elected and able to conduct negotiations with Somaliland. One reason for putting off the question of Somaliland’s independence is to wait until the border dispute between Somaliland and Puntland is resolved. Somaliland could base its decision, at least in part, on the state of the government of Somalia. If Somaliland secedes because of some failure of the Somalia government, the international community has a responsibility to recognize Somaliland. Egypt has been the largest opponent of Somaliland’s independence, because they fear that it would lead to growth of the United States’ power in the area. In order to address Egypt’s skepticism, we propose that the US agrees not to establish a foreign military base in Somaliland.

Puntland is an easier case in terms of independence. The constitution of Puntland state that it is a part of Somalia, and the current government has said that it would like to remain part of

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<sup>121</sup> Alisha Ryu, “Somaliland Troops Clash with Puntland Forces,” *US Fed News Service* (2007).

<sup>122</sup> David Shinn, “Somalia: Politics: David Shinn on Somalia,” *The Reporter*, (2007).

Somalia.<sup>123</sup> It is the goal of Puntland's government to be the most prosperous, hence most powerful, region in Somalia when there is a successful national government in place. It is this tempting idea of potential power that keeps Puntland attached to southern Somalia. In the event of an efficient government in Somalia, Puntland will be able to evaluate its options and determine its own future: as a part of Somalia, a semi-autonomous region, or an independent country.

## **Recommendations for Actions**

- Prompt withdrawal of Ethiopian troops coinciding with the deployment of more than the 4,000 promised AU forces.
- Peacekeepers should operate under a mandate similar to that of the UNOSOM II plan but with a new framework of self-defense and rules for engagement concerning the extremist minority
- Willing parties should employ the private military industry to protect aid shipments and workers and to act as peacekeepers in the event of further violence.
- The international community must pressure the TFG to reach out to opposition groups, moderate Islamists, excluded clan factions, and other ignored key figures.
- The international community must pressure the TFG to begin open talks amongst all Somali components, starting with the National Reconciliation Conference.
- A second wave of peacekeepers should be deployed in Southern Somalia by the international community, especially the United Nations, after a coalition government is formed from all major Somali factions. Also, a contingent of troops should be deployed to the provinces of Sool and Sanaag to enforce a ceasefire.
- Internationally observed elections should occur as soon as the coalition government has been fully functional for one year.
- An immediate ceasefire should be enforced in the regions of Sool and Sanaag, and between Somaliland and Puntland.
- When violence comes under control, the people of the disputed area should be allowed to decide which region they wish to be a part of through elections. If there are people who are unhappy with the results of the election, the UN or another organization should protect them while they move.
- Independence of Somaliland and Puntland should be considered once the southern Somali government is fully functional.

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<sup>123</sup> Aweys Osman Yusuf, "Somalia: Puntland to Attend Somalia's NRC as a Regional Administration," *Allafrica.com*, (2007).

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