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Beyond
Ethnocentric Ideology and Paradigm Shift for a
Greater Ethiopian Unity
Ghelawdewos
Araia, PhD
April 20, 2016
This
essay intends to address the current Ethiopian
affairs in the context of ethnocentric politics
and Ethiopian unity, twin themes that I have
discussed numerous times in my previous works, but
it will also respond to some critics pertaining to
my VOA interview on Wolkait-Tsegede district of
Ethiopia. The latter, though it unnecessarily
stirred controversy especially among the
disgruntled and misinformed Ethiopian groupings,
it is very much relevant to the kernel of this
paper.
As
indicated above, I have addressed the issue
surrounding ethnic politics and Ethiopian unity
several times in the past, and my first article
entitled “Nation Building Beyond Ethnic
Nationalism” was published in The
Ethiopian Mirror in 1992.1 The
central thesis of this article was straight
forward and clear: Ethiopians to transcend ethnic
nationalism and embrace rather a pan-Ethiopian
agenda. My recommendation then had resonated among
the Ethiopian Diaspora because, unlike today,
Ethiopians were not inoculated with the virus of
narrow and sectarian ethnic nationalism.
I
also had endorsed the self-determination of
Ethiopian nationalities with some caveat in my
debut book, Ethiopia: The Political Economy of Transition, and this is how I put
it then:-
The TGE’s policy of Kilil and self-determination is commendable, but
the consequence of fragmentation as a result of
new wave of ethnic political consciousness, and
the inability of some minority nationalities to
become economically and politically viable, would
ultimately preoccupy Ethiopians to otherwise
unforeseen problem.2
However,
to my chagrin and dissatisfaction, twenty one
years after I predicted the new wave of ethnic
political consciousness, a fragmented Ethiopian
society has been brewing for some time now. It is
apparently clear that Ethiopians in the Diaspora
especially have created respective ethnic enclaves
on their own volition, and what is paradoxical is
that they seem to enjoy the primordial
clan-cum-tribal affinity in contradistinction to
an Ethiopian unity in diversity. This, of course,
is dangerous to Ethiopia and we may need to revise
the principle of self-determination and regional
politics and seriously consider an overarching
pan-Ethiopian agenda.
I
personally endorsed the right of
self-determination of Ethiopian nationalities, not
in response to the EPRDF proclamation but because
I supported it in principle during the heyday of
the Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM) when I was a
political science major at Haile Selassie I
University (now Addis Ababa University), and
continued to uphold the same principle when I was
with Ehapa, a prominent Ethiopian political
organization, that also endorsed
self-determination in the context of question of
nationalities, a legacy of the ESM. Incidentally,
Ehapa was the only party in Ethiopia that had
members from virtually all Ethiopian
nationalities. In terms of number, the party had
an overwhelming Amhara and Tigrayan nationalities
but other nationalities also sought membership in
the organization because they were enlightened
during recruitment periods that the Party’s
program was designed on purpose to be an inclusive
all-Ethiopia political program, and that the Party
also promoted an international world outlook while
at the same time underscored the right of
nationalities to self-determination. Ehapa, in
brief, was microcosm Ethiopia.
With
the above background, thus, I continued to write
on both ethnocentrism and Ethiopian unity, but
with emphasis on the latter. In 2001, I
contributed an article entitled “The Historical
Significance of Ethiopian Unity” and, by and
large, the content of this article is reflected in
the following extract:
Ethiopia, like other Third World countries, did not create a uniform
national culture, but the pan-Ethiopian agenda can
be attained if the various ethnic groups that make
up Ethiopia transcend their “nationality”
boundaries and think in terms of Ethiopia first.3
Three
years after the above article, I wrote another
article titled “Ethnocentric Politics and
Reinforcing Psychology in the Ethiopian Context”
and I like to share the basic tenet of this
article with my readers. As I have discussed in
this article, ‘group identification based on a
shared emotional tie’ exhibited by a given tribe
or nationality is quite natural, but when
ethnocentric values are manifested in the form of
bias, prejudice, and hatred toward other people,
they could have a hostile edge and subsequently
destroy the very fabric of Ethiopia. In point of
fact, when I wrote this article, I tried to
critically examine the possible negative scenario
that Ethiopia could encounter as a result of the
extremities of ethnic politics and therefore
pleaded then to all Ethiopians to revive Ethiopian
nationalism and play a positive role in salvaging
Ethiopia:
If we want to save Ethiopia from the dynamism of disintegration (the
negative implication of ethnic politics), as a
matter of historical necessity, we must diagnose
the larger picture of ethno-nationalism without
limiting ourselves to the standard repertoire of
accusations leveled against the regime in Addis
Ababa. While there is so much talk about ethnic
politics EPRDF-style, there is almost no analysis
and reflection made on the history, psychology,
and current practices by the broad masses,
including the elite and the opposition …On top
of transcending the psychology of ethnocentrism,
the Ethiopian opposition forces have an obligation
to undertake a massive campaign and/or informal
education pertaining to a pan-Ethiopian program
directed toward all Ethiopians. In a nutshell,
well-meaning Ethiopians and political groups must
advocate, with some intensity, the accommodation
of cultural diversity as foundation for national
political integraton.4
The
main themes of the above paper were again
presented to an Ethiopian audience at Harvard
University when the Ethiopian Students Association
at Harvard (ESAH) sponsored a panel on
“Ethnicity and National Identity in Ethiopia”
on November 12, 2006. I was with the afternoon
session that also included Asefa Jelata and Sarah
Vaughan. The latter presented a paper that was
more or less an anthropological study on the
plethora of Ethiopian ethnic groups, ranging from
big to tiny, but she was too emphatic on the
differences among Ethiopian nationalities; Asefa
argued for the secession of Oromia from Ethiopia
Eritrean style and I confronted him by saying that
his recommendation is a dream that will never be
realized, although I reassured the audience that I
support the cause of Oromo and their right to
self-determination.5
So
that the reader can get a gist of my presentation
at Harvard, instead of offering my own summary, I
like to present an objective report made by the
Debteraw Blog. Here below is the report:
“In
comparison to Asefa Jalata, Ghelawdewos looks to
the audience as an Ethiopian patriot. His main
points are:
-
Ethno-nationalism
and Ethiopian nationalism
Highlight the history of Ethiopia from
antiquity to the present
-
Ethnic
groups in Ethiopia have common grounds to stay
together than their differences to force them
to disintegrate
-
Battle
of Adwa and the participation of various
ethnic groups of Ethiopia
His
concluding remarks are:
-
The
need to broader common ground to save the
country
-
Eritrean
model of independence is not acceptable to the
Oromo
-
Bringing
religion to politics is more dangerous than
ethnic politics.6
From
the above report and my own analysis in this
essay, one can easily fathom what my political
stance looks like, and it is abundantly clear that
I have been promoting the pan-Ethiopian agenda
through and through for decades, but, like any
concerned Ethiopian, I always had worries with
respect to the ever increasing ethnocentric
ideology among Ethiopian circles, and in an effort
to yet urge Ethiopians to unite, in 2011, I came
up with another brief paper entitled “Wollo:
Microcosm Ethiopia and Exemplar of Ethiopian
Unity”. I argued that Ethiopians should emulate
the Wollo idiosyncratic phenomenon and this is how
I reasoned then:
The microcosm Ethiopia…must be replicated in all Ethiopia, and the
precondition for the realization of the Wollo
experiment [in] all over Ethiopia, it seems to me,
is a package that includes peace, stability,
democracy, tolerance, visionary and patriotic
leadership, and above all unity of the Ethiopian
people. If the precondition is met, Ethiopians
could perform miracles.7
Now,
let me clarify the essence and intent of my VOA
Tigrigna interview on Wolkait-Tsegede on March 24,
2016. Some people have opposed what I offered to
the interviewer with respect to the history of
Wolkait and its relations to Tigray proper. Some
of the reactions cited in some blogs were brought
to my attention by some friends and quite frankly
I did not know of the existence of these blogs
like Welkait.com, and some that I am familiar with
but that I don’t frequent visiting are like the
Ethiopian Review.
I
have no problem with the above mentioned blogs,
and contrary to their defamation extended against
me, I would welcome their reactions and opposition
to my interview, because in the final analysis, my
interview and the subsequent responses had created
some sort of forum that could potentially be
educational. However, it is also equally important
that I underscore the style, method, and approach
of these blogs. They range from a low-level
stature imbued with scatology (In fact
street-level downright insult) like the one
authored by Achamyeleh Tamiru on the Ethiopian
Review to a relatively ethnocentric but modest,
that appeared on Welkait.com. From all the
opposing statements, the one that I like most and
I appreciated for its contents is the one that was
authored by Ze Addis and posted on Ethiomedia.com.
I salute Ze Addis for his well balanced and
thorough presentation on the controversy of
Wolkait-Tesegede and the credentials he provided.
Nevertheless,
there are missing links on most of the blog-produced
reactions to my interview, for most of them have
cited the Manoel Barradas book only that I have
made reference to during the interview but none of
them have dealt with the bulk of the interview.
There were many other supporting evidences that I
have cited but let me begin with the book of
Barradas for the sake of clarification.
Most
of the bloggers, for instance, cited the area or
size of Tigray reported by Barradas which states
that Tigray is bounded by the Tacasse [Tekezze],
but they did not include what even Barradas
implies as controversial: [Tigray]…the kingdom
has near circular shape; unless we wish to extend,
as some maintain should be done, as far as the
Lamalmon mountain range…”
Barradas’
mention of ‘Lamalmon’ [Limalimo] as the border
of Tigray is subject to interpretation and it
could be controversial, but in my interview I have
not depended solely on the book by Barradas. I
have additionally stated that just beneath the
Limalimo, there is a place called Mai Liham, and
east of Mai Liham on the main road there is Ade
Arqai and below Ade Arqai on the same road there
is Mai Tsebri, all Tigrigna names; the capital of
Wolkait, deep in the interior of the district,
itself is Addi Remets, another Tigrigna name and I
argued that these names could not be mere
coincidences unless they were part of Tigray, and
even if we ignore the names of these places, how
could it be possible to dismiss an entire Tigrigna-speaking
people as non-Tigrayan? I
am not implying here that a Tigrigna-speaking
Wolkait should necessarily be part of Tigray; on
the contrary, I have always maintained that any
given linguistic group should determine its fate
(if necessary via referendum) and if the majority
of Wolkotot want to rejoin Gondar (now under
Amhara Regional State), their wish should be
respected.
All
I have argued was that Wolkait, a Tigrigna entity,
by all measure, would not be surprising if it
becomes part of Tigray. On top f this, some
activists may have plans to take advantage of the
secession clause of Article 39 of the Ethiopian
constitution, but they may not be aware of the
preconditions for secession incorporated in the
Article. Secession will take place only if
two-thirds of the members of a region demand
secession; when the federal government has
organized a referendum which will take three years
to effectuate; when the secession is supported by
a majority vote; when the Federal Government will
have transferred its powers to the council of the
seceding region; and when the division of assets
is effected in a manner prescribed by law.
On
top of this language-based historical analysis
that I mentioned in the interview, I have also
mentioned that Degezmati (Dejazmach) Gelawdewos of
Shire ruled over Wolkait and Seraye (now in
Eritrea) during the early 17th century.
What this shows is that territorial polities
sometimes could expand and sometimes could shrink,
and yet even when Ethiopia was divided among the
regional lords during the Era of Princes
(1769-1855), one powerful prince by the name Ras
Michael-Suhul, a Tigrayan, ruled over Tigray and
Gondar from his court at Gondar and not from
Tigray. Almost at the end of the Era of Princes,
when Dejach Wubie ruled of Tigray, Tedla Hailu was
appointed as governor of Wolkait-Tsegede, and some
local historians (depending on oral
tradition/history), stretch back to the reign of
Emperor Iyasu I (1682-1706), and tell us that
Degezmati (Dejazmach) Naizghi was governing over
Wolkait from Addi Remets until he was defeated in
an ensuing skirmish by Dejazmach Mammo. Whence did
Naizghi come from?
The
bloggers also failed to mention and show to their
readers the map of Tigray produced by the editor
of Manoel Barradas’ book. The subtitle in the
map reads: ‘Map of early seventeenth [century]
Tigray showing the places mentioned by Barradas’
and it clearly includes Semen in the west, Danakli
in the west, Hamssien in the north, and Doba
(present-day Alamata-Woldia area) in the south.
The map does not indicate the Tekezze River as the
boundary between Tigray and Gondar.
Some
supporting evidences that corroborate the Barradas
map are accounts of Almeida and Ludolf on 17th
century Tigray and it is suffice to cite one
footnote from the Barradas book:
Tigray, the most northerly province of Ethiopia; Almeida, who described
it as in ancient times ‘the foundation and
head’ of the entire Ethiopian monarchy,
considered it still the ‘best part’ of the
country, while Ludolf later described it as ‘the
best and most fertile’ part of it. The province
began, Almeida says, at the twin Red Sea ports of
Massawa and Hergigo, and extended south-eastwards
along the coast as the tiny harbor of Defalo.
Inland the province was bordered, from east to
west, by the Dankali ‘Kingdom’, Angot, Doba,
Begemdir and Semen. Beckingham and Huntingford, Some
Records of Ethiopia, pp. 14-15; J. Ludolf, A
New History of Ethiopia, London, 1682, p. 13.8
Both Beckingham and Ludolf do not say that
Tekezze is the Western frontier of Tigray, and
Ludolf especially, who had made extensive studies
on Ethiopia, and who is credited as the founder of
Ethiopian Studies, put Wag as one of the 27
prefectures (districts or regions) of Tigray.
We
can go to great lengths on the history and
geography of the regions that make up Ethiopia,
but we would not be able to solve the quandary
and/or conundrum pertaining to the
self-determination of Ethiopian nationalities, and
as I have indicated at the
beginning of this essay, it is about time
to make a paradigm shift and save Ethiopia from
the risk of disintegration. Ethiopia is a great
country with a remarkable civilization of
antiquity; medieval innovations; symbol of
independence, and the seat of the African Union.
We Ethiopians should be proud of our wonderful
country and it should be our solemn duty and
historical mission to preserve the unity,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity of
Ethiopia.
Instead
of being sentimental with respect to Ethiopia as a
country, however, we must acknowledge that
Ethiopia without the plethora of its nationalities
would be a meaningless political entity. The
self-determination of all Ethiopians should be
respected indeed; and this includes the people of
Wolkait, Oromo, and Kemant that recently have come
forward to challenge the current federal structure
of Ethiopia. But, I personally will adamantly
oppose any concealed motive, including agendas
under the guise of self-determination that would
undermine the unity of the Ethiopian people.
I
strongly believe that the current federal system
in Ethiopia should continue as a stepping stone
for a united Ethiopia, but since language alone
should not be the yardstick for a viable regional
state or even a given district, it is about time
to make paradigm shift toward a more inclusive and
multi-ethnic and multicultural regional states.
Ethiopia should make a gradual transition toward
the latter regional state formations by following
the example of Nigeria. I have discussed this
model in the context of devolution of power in my
latest book and it is important that Ethiopian
intellectuals and statesmen seriously consider the
Nigerian experiment. Here is how Nigeria solved
the nightmare of disintegration and preserved the
unity of the nation-state:
Despite Nigeria’s checkered transition from dictatorial military
regimes to relatively progressive civilian rules,
its ‘real political achievements since the civil
war [the Biafra war of 1968/69] has been the
innovation of institutional techniques for
managing ethnic conflict: the multi-state federal
system, the devolution of resources, and power (at
least in statute, if not in reality) down to the
local level; the requirements for the nationality
based, trans-ethnic political parties; the
generation in the presidency of pan-ethnic leader
required to fashion broad national support to be
elected; the mandate to ‘reflect the federal
character’ in national cabinet and other
appointments; and the elaborate ‘zoning’
provisions fashioned by political parties to
ensure a fair and ethnic distribution of key
offices and nominations.9
I
strongly believe that my recommendation of a
transition from a mono-ethnic regional states to
multi-ethnic and multicultural regional states
without disturbing the idea and practice of the
federal system is not only viable and a guarantee
to Ethiopian unity, but it could also forge a
higher form of national consciousness that would
altogether transcend the current sectarian
clannish and/or ethnocentric ideology. The
paradigm shift will also serve as a vehicle to
emancipate the Ethiopian psychology from the
shackles of ethnic politics in general and
liberate (or systematically emasculate) the
relatively obdurate, immutable, and invidious
Ethiopian elements from their toxic activity,
inherent bias and subjectivity, as well as
existential absurdity.
Notes
1.
The
Ethiopian Mirror was published in Los Angeles,
California, but I am not sure whether it is still
in existence or has become defunct.
2.
Ghelawdewos Araia, Ethiopia:
The Political Economy of Transition,
University Press of America, 1995, p. 166; TGE
stands for Transitional Government of Ethiopia
3.
East
African Forum, March 22, 2001; the web
magazine is now defunct
4.
Ghelawdewos Araia, “Ethnocentric Politics
and Reinforcing Psychology in the Ethiopian
Context”, Ethiomedia.com, February 25, 2004
5.
Ethiopian Students Union at Harvard (ESAH),
www.hcs.harvard.edu/ethiohs/events.php
6.
Debteraw Associate Reporter, “Report on A
Harvard Forum”, Debteraw Blog, https://debteraw.wordpress.com/2006/11/16/report-on-harvard-forum/
7.
Ghelawdewos Araia, “Wollo: Microcosm
Ethiopia and Exemplar of Ethiopian Unity”, www.africanidea.org/wollo.pdf
8.
Manoel Barradas, Tractatus
Tres Historico-Geographici (1634): A Seventeenth
Century Historical and Geographical Account of
Tigray, Ethiopia, Harrassowitz Verlag.
Weisbaden, 1996, Footnote 1, p. 1
9.
Ghelawdewos Araia, Ethiopia:
Democracy, Devolution of Power, and The
Developmental State, Institute of Development
and Education for Africa (IDEA), 2013. The
Nigerian experiment was first discussed by Larry
Diamond in his “Nigeria: The Uncivic Society and
the Descent into Praetorianism,” a chapter
contributed to a book entitled Politics in Developing Countries
All Rights Reserved. Copyright © Institute of Development and Education
for Africa (IDEA), Inc. 2016; Dr. Ghelawdewos
Araia can be contacted for educational and
constructive feedback via dr.garaia@africanidea.org
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