|
There is No Alternative to
National Reconciliation and Dialogue in Ethiopian
Politics
Ghelawdewos Araia, Ph.D July
3, 2020
The
purpose of this article is to critically examine
the current complex and complicated Ethiopian
politics in the context of conflict and conflict
resolution methods and/or strategies, but this
essay will also address two inputs, one endogenous
and the other exogenous; the former is the peace
initiative by the Ethiopian Inter-Faith Council,
the Elders, and the Abba Gadas; the latter is a
briefing by the International Crisis Group (ICG)
entitled “Bridging the Divide in the Ethiopian
North”.
However,
before I delve into the main and central thesis of
this essay, by way of giving some background, I
will first discuss what I have critiqued and
proposed in my previous articles; most
importantly, I will first define the two
significant concepts of ‘reconciliation’ and
‘dialogue’.
‘Reconciliation’
in its very simple and literal sense means
‘ironing out differences’; ‘resolving
conflicts’, or ‘managing diametrically
opposite ideas’; and if we apply the above
definitions to a given real world, we might define
reconciliation “as a process through which a
society moves from a divided past to a shared
future”
as Bloomfield aptly put it.
‘Dialogue’
literally can be defined as a conversation between
two people or two characters in a drama or movie,
but in the context of this article, however, and
as a matter of course, it must involve
conversations between two individual persons or
two groups of people in order to resolve problems.
In the final analysis, thus, the combined concepts
or principles of ‘reconciliation’ and
‘dialogue’ entail peaceful negotiation in
order to attain a more stable, orderly, and
peaceful larger society, and this attainment, in
turn, becomes the precondition for positive and
constructive social change, transformation, and
development.
Reconciliation
and dialogue must be institutionalized in order to
yield a more effective and permanent solution to
seemingly irreconcilable differences of ideas,
principles, policies, as well as interests. For
instance, in discussing ‘reconciliation’,
‘conciliation’, ‘integration’, and
‘national healing’ in Zimbabwe, Oswell
Hapanyegwi Chemuru argues “why it is necessary
in the final analysis to reconstitute the Organ
for National Healing Reconciliation and
Integration.”2 That
is to say, reinstalling a preexisting institution
of reconciliation in the case of Zimbabwe, or
establishing a new one in the case of Ethiopia, or
regenerating traditional conflict resolution
institutions across the board in the African
continent.
Furthermore,
Bloomfield elaborates on his reconciliation
theory, as “an overarching process which
includes the search for truth, justice,
forgiveness, healing and so on…It means finding
a way to live alongside former enemies…to
coexist with them…to develop the degree of
cooperation necessary to share [our society] with
them, so that we all have better lives together
than we have had separately.”3
Africa
as a whole was endowed with traditional
problem-solving mechanisms and resolution
institutions, although the continent was snatched
dreadfully of its legacy of reconciliation and
dialogue by the slave and colonial eras, twin
forces that systematically eradicated African
institutions. Even Ethiopia that was never
colonized had to share the brunt of what the
continent encountered, but the African genius of
reconciliation was not completely extinguished and
some institutions like Bito (grassroots
parliament) of Tigray; the Shimagle of the Amhara
(which is also shared by Tigray and is popular for
its intervention in problem-solving); the Joka and
Kiche systems of the Gurage for administration and
reconciliation, just to mention some.
In
South Africa, the concept of ubuntu (essence of
being human) played a major role in reconciliation
and dialogue. In the post-apartheid period,
following ubuntu, a joint Tutu-Mandela initiative
established a formidable institution of conflict
resolution known as Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC), and like Bloomfield argued
above, the South African Blacks were told “to
live alongside with their enemies”, their former
White tormentors. It is like swallowing a bitter
pill in order to heal the larger South African
society, and this can happen only when both the
tormentor and the victim, the oppressor and the
oppressed, the exploiter and exploited are
liberated mentally and attain some sense of
humanity or ubuntu. Bishop Tutu, to his credit,
championed the very essence of ubuntu and told the
world that his ubuntu or method of reconciliation
is “a quality that includes the essential human
virtues; compassion and humanity; of the very
essence of being human…then you are generous,
you are hospitable, you are friendly and caring
and compassionate. You share what you have. It is
to say, ‘my humanity is caught up, is
inextricably bound up, in yours.’ We belong to a
bundle of life.”4
The
South African initiative of TRC had a worldwide
impact and influence, and as a result many
well-meaning grassroots leaders, who in one form
or another, attempted to change their respective
societies via reconciliation and for the better. A
good example of the latter initiative is the
formation of TRC in Greensboro, North Carolina,
USA. Spoma Jovanavice discusses the 1979 massacre
of Black marchers in Greensboro, and twenty-five
years after, in 2004, he says, “Greensboro
residents inspired by the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) to take public testimony and
examine the causes, sequence of events, and
consequence of the massacre. The TRC was to be a
process and a tool by which citizens could feel
confident about the truth of the City’s history
in order to reconcile divergent understanding of
the past and current city values, and it became
the foundation for the first Truth and
Reconciliation Commission in the United States.”5
With
the above definitions and ‘thick description’
(to use Clifford Geertz words) of reconciliation
and dialogue, we can move on to the current
Ethiopian political reality that must be examined
with extreme care and that requires an extensive
critical social thought and investigative
discourse for an agenda to heal the present sickly
Ethiopian society. Although this is not the first
time I have devoted some space to national
reconciliation and dialogue, the present article
is perhaps destined with a more daunting task,
given the current precarious, fragile, and
frightening Ethiopian reality on the ground.
Back
in 2001, I contributed an article entitled “The
Exigency of National Reconciliation and Legitimate
Consensus in Ethiopia” and the essay thoroughly
examined the rift or schism that occurred within
the TPLF in the wake of the Algiers Agreement, and
subsequently ended up in cleavage that created a
splinter group, a faction within the Party. In
that article that was published nineteen years
ago, I stated, “The fear of mine, I gather, is
of course the concern of all Ethiopians who love
their country without prejudice to ethnicity and
particularism. Some cynics may altogether dismiss
the crisis within the TPLF as an internal problem
that has nothing to do with the overarching
national interest. This is naivete par excellence.
I, for one, do not subscribe to politics based on
ethnicity as I have indicated several times in
many of my writings; I am in favor of a
pan-Ethiopian agenda, and I have always been, but
I do acknowledge the TPLF’s role in the making
and shaping of contemporary Ethiopian politics. It
is with this in mind that I want to urge
Ethiopians to see beyond narrow interests and try
to figure out the gist of the political phenomena
that may have had an exogamous element.”6
And
I further argued, “the schism that has enveloped
the TPLF, therefore, has to do with the Ethiopian
government policy on Eritrea, the handling of the
Ethio-Eritrean war, and the post-Algiers
rapprochement between Eritrea and Ethiopia and the
subsequent formation of the United Nations
Temporary Security Zone (TSZ).”7
Interestingly,
both of the above quotes reflect ethnic politics
and Eritrea’s involvement in Ethiopian affairs
respectively, which are still considered as a
major problem of subterfuge that, in turn, fuel
the fire in Ethiopian politics. At any rate,
additionally, I argued in the same paper, “once
opposing ideas, or ideas different from the
established norm are respected, then we won’t
have problem reconciling difficulties and we can
even adapt…relationship patterns”8
that can resolve disputes, but I was wrong; two
decades after I wrote that article, Ethiopia is
still bewitched by an even greater problem that
requires massive infusion of reconciliation and
dialogue to overcome.
Again,
back in 2010, I contributed another article
entitled “National Reconciliation and National
Development in Ethiopia” with the sole purpose
of inviting “well-meaning Ethiopians including
scholars and professionals, civic organization
leaders, Ethiopian community leaders, advocacy
group and activists, political parties, and
coalition organizations”9 to sit on a
round table and discuss matters surrounding
conflict and conflict resolution. In the same
article, however, I attempted to formulate the
nature and characteristics of a ‘negotiating
regime’: “First and foremost, the principle of
negotiation demands and requires equal footing of
the negotiating parties, if at all it is going to
have genuine fruitful result. It is in this spirit
that I like to suggest to the Ethiopian government
to initiate dialogue with the opposition,
especially with the Diaspora and home patriotic
opposition.”10
At
a time when I wrote the above article, while I
appreciated and admired EPRDF’s initiative to
enter dialogue with the Ogaden National Liberation
Front (ONLF), I found it paradoxical that the
EPRDF-led government was unwilling to sit in a
round table and negotiate with the opposition
parties in Ethiopia. Despite this irony, however,
I tried to underscore the viability of negotiation
by opposing parties: “The politics of both
parties could be at variance or situated at the
extreme sides of the continuum, but both must
understand that divergent perspectives, enriches a
society in transition and brings meaningful and
enduring transformation.”11
Ten
years after the above article was written,
Ethiopia is still enmeshed in a terrible conflict
precipitated by the conflicting groupings that
also includes the present regime of Abiy Ahmed, a
government that is far from resolving problems,
disputes, and confrontations in a peaceful way. On
the contrary, the present regime seems to
facilitate rather than mitigate or halt discordant
politics that has now afflicted much of Ethiopia.
With
the above backdrop, which I believe gives some
semblance to the reader of the intriguing
Ethiopian politics, I now turn to the endogenous
and exogenous inputs, mentioned above, for
Ethiopia’s peaceful resolution of conflicts. The
exogenous input is that of the International
Crisis Group (ICG), and it came up with a proposal
of “Bridging the Divide in Ethiopia’s
North”. By ‘Ethiopia’s North’ the ICG
meant the Amhara and Tigray regional states, but
conflicts have now engulfed the entire Ethiopia,
and we must indeed reconcile all Ethiopians and
not just the Amhara and the Tigray regional
states. The ICG’s briefing, “Federal leaders
should provide incentives to Tigray’s ruling
party to the table” and “urge Tigrayan and
Amhara faction to temper provocative stances and
explore compromise” is palatable to me, but
“The parties could consider…in which Tigray
guarantee political representation and language
rights to minority population in the disputed
territories”12 is embedded in a
misperceived and misconceived reality. There are
no minorities that seek identity and/or language
rights in the so-called disputed territories. In
point of fact, all Tselemte, Wolkait, Tsegede, and
Raya do speak Tigrigna, and time and again the
residents in these districts have reaffirmed their
Tigrayan identity.
While
ICG’s seemingly balanced solution to the
conflict between the two regional states is
reasonable, its assertion of Amhara’s claim of
lands from Tigray suffers a serious deficit of
knowledge of the political history of Ethiopia.
“In this dangerous climate,” states ICG,
“federal officials and elders should encourage
influential regional actors to eschew provocative
stances, so that the two regions’ leaders can
hold talks in a more temperate political
atmosphere. To kick start such a process, federal
officials should mend ties with Tigray leaders,
perhaps first by offering guaranteed
representation institutions and involving them
fully in discussions about the election delay.”13
This ICG proposal is very constructive, and if
applied could serve as a very effective mechanism
in conflict resolution, and also in bringing
plethora of opposition parties to the negotiating
table.
Nevertheless,
as already noted above, with respect to the Amhara
claim of territories from Tigray shows that the
ICG is either ill-informed or deliberately
ignoring the hard facts on the ground. Here is how
the ICG puts it: “The Amhara… want these lands
returned. Specifically, they assert that the TPLF
should return the districts of Welkait, Humera,
Tsegede, and Tselemte in West Tigray and North
West Tigray zones, as well as the Raya-Akobo [Kobo]”14
In
regards to the above claimed territories, as noted
above, the ICG lacks the correct information, but
the elite leaders of the Amhara Regional State,
who were allies of the TPLF when the latter was
predominant in Ethiopian politics, became
irredentist bravados in the wake of the
dissolution of the EPRDF, although in the past
they raised the question of Welkait and adjacent
lands and claimed them as theirs. Now that they
have become comrade-turned-foe when it comes to
their relations with the TPLF, they have become
more jabbering in their claim of “their lost
territories”. Their irredentism, however, could
ignominiously falter for the following reasons:
1.
History will stand against
their claim, because Tselemte was part of Tigray
until it was given as a gift to Empress Taitu by
her husband Emperor Menelik after the Battle of
Adwa and it was joined to Begemdir and Semien (now
Gondar within Amhara State);
2.
Welkait was part of Gondar
during the entire period of the reign of Emperor
Haile Selassie and the rule of the Derg military
regime, but during the formation of the regional
states, it became part of Tigray on the basis of
language and identity that also applied to all
other regional states. Welkait was also part of
Tigray in the early 17th century when
Dejazmach Gelawdewos of Shire also governed over
Seraye (now in Eritrea) and Welkait; the same
Welkait was also part of Tigray as testified by a
Portuguese missionary by the name Manoel Barradas,
who lived in Tigray and also authored a book in
1634 with a map of Tigray. The title of his book
is A
Seventeenth Century Historical and Geographical
Account of Tigray.
It is imperative to read Barradas’ map of
Tigray in order to understand the extent of Tigray
(four times the size of its present size) in the
early 17th century. See map in appendix
at the end of notes.
3.
Parts of Raya, including
Alamata, Korem, and Kobo were given as a gift to
Prince Asfaha Wossen in 1948 by his father Emperor
Haile Selassie and was joined to Wollo province
(now part of Amhara). While Alamata and Korem were
restored to Tigray during the restructuring of
Ethiopia into regional states, Kobo remained with
the Amhara state because the predominantly
Amharic-speaking residents took over the land
during the course of Kobo’s annexation to the
former Wollo province. This hard fact is not only
part of my research and studies on some
documentary evidence, but it is also endorsed by
an eyewitness account who was an official in Haile
Selassie’s bureaucratic empire; his name is
Fitewrari Muuz Beyene and he is still alive.
But
when it comes to political demarcation of
territories and borders, the most important factor
is not land fragment, which can shift positions
according to circumstances and change of
governments from time to time; the most important
factors are the cultures and languages of people
who are residents in the so-called disputed
territories and how they view themselves in terms
of identity; and all these areas, without
exception, speak Tigrigna and they identify
themselves as Tigrayan Ethiopians.
The
endogenous input comes from the Ethiopian
Inter-Faith Council, led by Patriarch Abuna
Mathias; the Elders, and the Abba Gadas are also
part of the mission; they travelled to Mekelle on
the second week of June to broker peace between
the TPLF and the Prosperity Party (PP) of Abiy
Ahmed; they met with the leaders of the TPLF and
presented their peace proposal to them; and the
TPLF, after receiving the peace delegation gave
them an answer that was written in Amharic, the
original document I read first, but for the
purpose of this article, I will use what was
reported by Addis Standard, which incidentally
captured it perfectly with a title “Debretsion
Calls for a National Dialogue involving All
Political Parties”.
The
peace delegation to Tigray said, “The leadership
of Tigray regional state and the federal
government should immediately sit at a round table
and calmly discuss about national consensus as
well as discuss on ways of solving global and
national challenges together.”15 In
response to the peace proposal, Dr. Debretsion
Gebremichael, head of the regional state of
Tigray, said, “If there is a need to have a
platform for dialogue, it should be a national
dialogue involving all political parties and
Ethiopia’s nations and nationalities.”16 Moreover,
“Debretsion has criticized the silence hitherto
of the Inter-Faith Council for other crisis that
plagued the country, such as blockages of roads
leading to Tigray region, the use of public media
by the ruling party to wage the rhetoric of war
against Tigray for its decision to hold elections;
Prosperity Party’s complacency with Eritrea’s
President Isaias Afwerki to sidelining the Tigray
region and its people as well as PP’s actions in
working with other external forces against the
interest of its own people.”17
I
strongly believe that there is no alternative to
national reconciliation and dialogue in resolving
conflicts, societal problems, disagreements, and
many other social issues surrounding enigma and
political riddle that could baffle citizens. The
crux of the matter is, Ethiopia can achieve a
sensible, peaceful, stable, and lasting conflict
resolution mechanism only by involving all
Ethiopians at all levels, in a major conference or
series of conferences of national reconciliation
and dialogue.
In
regards to the above analysis, the TPLF’s
proposal of inclusive and broader pan-Ethiopian
agenda is on the right track, and Ethiopia could
redeem itself from its current debilitating mess
by becoming more inclusive and transparent, rather
than limiting the peace, reconciliation, and
dialogue agenda to the TPLF and the PP only; it
would also be short of a national agenda if the
reconciliation process limits itself to the elite,
intellectuals, and political parties, and if the
grassroots Ethiopians are rendered a spectator
status.
To
be sure, Ethiopia’s problems are compounded and
the stakeholders in the post-conflict period are
many and highly diverse, and as such we must
carefully observe and analyze the Ethiopian
reality on the ground: The Sidama and Wolita
questions on self-determination, in which the
former enjoyed its rights with trials and
tribulations, and the latter has yet to find
answers for its quest of internal sovereignty; the
Qimant self-determination even for a zone autonomy
has yet to be realized and/or fulfilled in
northwest Amhara region; the continuous war-torn
Wellega case and the disturbances in other Oromia
State like Shashemene, Arsi, Negele-Borona, and
Bale must regain peace and stability; the highway
blockage leading to Tigray has yet to be resolved;
the peoples support of the Federal system and the
constitution that guaranteed the
self-determination of nationalities and/or
regional states vis-à-vis the ambition of the
present regime and its supporters to restructure
Ethiopia by installing a unitary state has to be
reconciled as well. The two could be
irreconcilable, but sitting on a round table for a
dialogue on the two political agendas is by itself
conciliatory and cultured, but it when it comes to
my personal views, I believe that the federal
structure has a viable and strong reconciliation
tool in its package and reviving so-called
geographic demarcation of a centralized Ethiopia
could altogether eradicate the relative gain of
self-determination of the Ethiopian people
attained during the EPRDF rule.
Finally,
it should be understood that national
reconciliation and dialogue can take place and
effectively implemented, only if there is peace
and stability in Ethiopia. Peace is not only a
precondition to virtually everything in social and
political life, but its dividend also could foster
development and progress; and though it may sound
ironic, peace itself can be attained via
reconciliation and dialogue as well. The question
of peace, however, remains abstract and devoid of
realistic and doable agenda unless it is linked to
what Ethiopia has encountered in the last three
decades. In this regard, I am of the opinion that
Ethiopia’s political culture has dramatically
changed in the context of self-determination and
ethnic consciousness, and also the inability of
successive Ethiopian governments to lead Ethiopia
to make transition into a democratic culture and
the inability of the regimes to fulfill basic
democratic and constitutional rights. With respect
to self-determination and ethnic consciousness,
this is what I have argued twenty-five years ago:
“The TGE’s policy of Kilil
and self-determination is commendable, but the
consequence of fragmentation as a result of new
wave of ethnic political consciousness, and the
inability of some minority nationalities to become
economically and politically viable, would
ultimately preoccupy Ethiopians to otherwise
unforeseen problem.”18
The
‘consequence of fragmentation’ and
‘unforeseen problem’ that I saw twenty-five
years ago in my debut book, are the politics that
have been reflected in Ethiopia in the last five
years, and that, in turn, have effectively
emasculated the Ethiopian nation-state. On the
other hand, even the little gains that Ethiopians
have enjoyed during the rule of the EPRDF are now
threatened and undermined by the present regime,
not to mention the complete loss of rule of law
and constitutional parameters. Abiy should have
done better given the readymade paved road of
governance, but on the contrary his regime does
not even allow Ethiopians to go to the polls and
vote and the scapegoat apparently is COVID-19;
countries around the world, including Malawi in
Africa, have recently conducted elections
successfully in the midst of the Corona virus
pandemic and I have critically examined the
necessity of election in my recent article, but
non-Ethiopian observers like CNN’s Fareed
Zakaria also remarked on the postponed Ethiopian
election. “The erosion of democracy from
Ethiopia to Hungary,” remarks Fareed and reports
that “Ethiopia’s fragile democracy is under
threat” and “the Ethiopian parliament has
extended the office term for the Prime
Minister.”19
Notes:
1.
Ricahard Bloomfield, Reconciliation:
An Introduction, 2003
2.
Oswell Hapenyangwi-Chemhuru,
“Reconciliation, Conciliation, Integration, and
National Healing: Possibilities and Challenges in
Zimbabwe”, Accord,
AJCR 2013/1
3.
Bloomfield, op cit.
4.
Bishop Tutu is an Anglican
religious leader from Cape Town who relentlessly
and indefatigably struggled for the release of
Nelson Mandela and the dismantlement of the
apartheid system.
5.
Soma Jovanovic, Democracy, Dialogue, and Community Action in Greensboro, 2012
6.
Ghelawdewos Araia, “The
Exigency of National Reconciliation &
Legitimate Consensus in Ethiopia,” East African
Forum, April 10, 2001
7.
Ghelawdewos Araia, Ibid
8.
Ghelawdewos Araia, Ibid
9.
Ghelawdewos Araia, “National
Reconciliation and National Development in
Ethiopia”, www.africanidea.org/national_Reconciliation.html
2010
10.
Ghelawdewos Araia, Ibid
11.
Ghelawdewos Araia, Ibid
12.
International Crisis Group (ICG),
Briefing No. 156/AFRICA 12 June 2020
13.
ICG, Ibid
14.
ICG, Ibid
15.
Addis Standard, Bilah Jelen
reporting, June 16, 2020
16.
Addis Standard, Ibid
17.
Addis Standard, Ibid
18.
Ghelawdewos Araia, Ethiopia: The Political Economy of Transition, University Press of
America, 1995, p. 166
19.
Fareed Zakaria, CNN GPS, July
5, 2020; see also Ghelawdewos Araia, “Postponing
the Ethiopian Election could derail Hitherto
Accomplished Achievements and Paralyzing Future
Worthwhile Democratic Institutions,”
www.africanidea.org/Postponing_the_Ethiopian_election.html
Appendix: 17th
Century Map of Tigray: From
Manoel Barradas, A
Seventeenth Century Historical and Geographical
Account of Tigray, Ethiopia (1634); translated
from Portuguese into English by Elizabet Filleul
and edited by Richard Pankhurst (1996)
All Rights Reserved Copyright
© IDEA, Inc. 2020 Dr. Ghealwdewos Araia can be
contacted for constructive and educational
feedback via dr.garaia@africanidea.org
|
