Interview
on contemporary Ethiopia
January 17, 2012
Ethioobserver
has conducted a comprehensive interview on major
issues and current affairs pertaining to
Ethiopia with Dr. Ghelawdewos Araia, and while
we are pleased to present a discussion forum to
our subscribers, we also like to extend our
deepest gratitude to the interviewee for his
cooperation and his time.
Part
I: On History
Ethioobserver:
You have written many historical accounts on
Ethiopia in the past. What is your view on those
who say the three thousand-year-old history of
Ethiopia is a myth?
Dr.
Ghelawdewos:
Well, all societies, in one form or another,
incorporate some myth in their oral tradition
and/or historical anecdotes. But, to dismiss
Ethiopian history as myth is to misunderstand and
debunk history itself. If we rely on
historiography, brushing aside oral tradition for
the time being, we will explore abundant
archeological and documentary evidences that prove
beyond the shadow of the doubt that Ethiopian
history stretches back to three thousand years.
Mind you, from the golden ages of Aksum to present
alone, the historical timeline covers slightly
over two thousand years. Put otherwise, before
Aksum there was Yeha and before Yeha, now we know
that there was one other civilization that thrived
in a place called Gobedra, just seven kilometers
(about four miles) outside the city of Aksum. This
was substantiated by an archeological finding of a
ceramic and pottery-making community and was dated
to circa 3,000 BCE. If we begin with Gobedra,
thus, the history of Ethiopia would then cover
5,000 years. Ethiopia indeed is a very ancient
land. Ethiopian historiography is not mythology;
it is rather an authentic historical account that
helps us understand significant junctures in the
Ethiopian experience.
Ethioobserver:
So
what do you say to those people who claim that
Ethiopian history is just a century old?
Dr.
Ghelawdewos: I
will bluntly say, �Take a history lesson!�
This silly notion of �one hundred year old
nation� perhaps refers to modern Ethiopia, but
those people who advance this argument forget that
modern Ethiopia, in turn, is a continuation of
medieval Ethiopia and the latter a direct
descendant of ancient Ethiopia. We are the
continuation of our forebears who live in this
land for several millennia!
Ethioobserver:
Are
you then saying that Ethiopia, as we know it
today, was in existence without interruption for
the last 3,000 years?
Dr.
Ghelawdewos: This
question embodies two important component parts:
1) ancient and modern Ethiopia, and 2) continuous
existence of a state. In order to answer the
question, thus, it is important to underscore the
context of the component parts. No, I am not
saying that Ethiopian history continued without
interruption. There were intermediate periods
characterized, for instance, by the Gudit (Yodit)
period in ancient times; the Ahmed Gra� sixteenth
century Jihad wars; and the civil wars (also known
as Era of Princes) between 1769 and 1855. The
state was interrupted (political vacuum occurred)
several times, but it did not vanish. With respect
to modern Ethiopia, I would not say it is a
replica of ancient Ethiopia, but I would argue
that it is its torch bearer because the legacy of
ancient Ethiopia (culture, artifacts, literature,
music, religion etc) are very much alive in modern
Ethiopia today.
Ethioobserver:
How
about the controversy over ancient Ethiopian
civilization as an implanted South Arabian
culture?
Dr.
Ghelawdewos: As
you know South Arabia, which is essentially Yemen
today, is only 12 miles away from Djibouti on the
Gulf of Eden side. Therefore, it is not surprising
that the two lands on either side of the Red Sea
could have made cultural exchanges in ancient
times. But the claim that Arabs civilized the
African Ethiopians is a sinister inverted logic
that attempts to justify that Africans were
recipients and not givers of civilization. I have
argued on many of my writings that Ethiopia and
Yemen were connected in history and that there
were trade, cultural, and diplomatic relations
between the two countries. However, the Ethiopian
civilization of antiquity was much closer, in many
respects, to the Nile civilizations of Nubia and
Egypt rather than to Yemen. The names of the kings
and queens who reigned long before Askum emerged
were similar to those of ancient Egyptians; the
stele of Askum are similar to the Egyptian
obelisks; the Ethiopian calendar of thirteen
months is identical with that of Egypt, except
that the Ethiopian calendar consists of four
season with 3 months each and that of Egypt was
three seasons with 4 months each; either way we
have 12 months plus the short thirteenth month
with 5 days in both calendars. With Yemen, the
Sabean letters and names of places such as Hawzen,
Mereb, Saba etc could be the connection. Other
than that, neither Aksumite mint coins
(Aksum/Ethiopia was the only kingdom that had its
own currency in Africa) nor the unique Geez
alphabets (quintessentially Ethiopian letters) are
to be found in Yemen. On top of this, historical
documents testify that ancient Ethiopians
exercised hegemony over Southern Arabia during
Aphilas in the last quarter of the 3rd
century AD and during Kaleb in the first decade of
the 6th century AD. At present, the
official historical account of Yemen admits that
the country was a colony of Ethiopia in ancient
history.
Part
II: On Politics
Ethioobserver:
What
is your view on the current regional states of
Ethiopia that have been restructured along ethnic
and language lines?
Dr.
Ghelawdewos:
The question of nationalities in Ethiopia, which
was one of the foremost slogans of the Ethiopian
Student Movement during Haile Selassie, has been
addressed and answered by the EPRDF. But,
demarcating territories in order to forge states
based on language and ethnicity is wrong. The
states should have been demarcated based on
history, geography, and political expediency. For
instance, Tigray used to accommodate the Tigrigna,
Agaw, Kunama, Saho, and Afar nationalities. These
nationalities could have stayed in the original
setting and yet enjoy self-determination. The same
logic applies to Wollo, which also had
accommodated several ethnic groups throughout the
history of Ethiopia. I think the one regional
state that comes close to my idea of demarcation
is the Southern Ethiopian Peoples region, in which
a cluster of different linguistic groups have
decided to live side by side in the same region
and still use Amharic as their lingua franca for
communication, business, and education.
The
one other pitfall that emanated from the new
structure of the regional states is the fact that
Ethiopians from all over the country could not
relocate and invest in any respective state other
than theirs. For instance, it is not easy for a
Tigrayan merchant to relocate to the Oromia region
and conduct business as s/he wishes, unless s/he
opts to settle in Addis Ababa. This kind of
constraint is perhaps the unintended or unforeseen
consequences of the regional formation EPRDF
style.
I
personally was very much worried vis-�-vis the
ethnic/language divide because I thought it could
foment animosity and even conflict among the
plethora of ethnic groups of Ethiopia (and there
were ethnic clashes several years ago), but it
looks that Ethiopians don�t seem to foster
ethnic conflicts and on the contrary they seem to
like to celebrate their diversity (their
respective cultures) together.
Ethioobserver:
In
relation to the ethnically demarcated regional
states, there is some controversy surrounding
Wolkait and the Woldia-Alamata areas, lands
apparently taken from Gondar and Wollo
respectively and were made part of Tigray. How do
you analyze this controversy?
Dr.
Ghelawdewos: There
is no doubt that it is controversial, but a part
of the Ethiopian opposition in the Diaspora is
focused on the taking of land and incorporation
into Tigray, and not on the politics of
self-determination. I have yet to hear from
Ethiopians in the Diaspora raising their voice
with respect to the role of the people. They
should inquire whether the Ethiopian people have
had a voice in the making of the regional states.
Were these regional states formed by political
fiat or by a referendum in which the Ethiopian
people have spoken out? The former reflects the
reality of the newly restructured Ethiopia and we
all know that there was no referendum regarding
territorial demarcation. The only one referendum
that Ethiopians witnessed was the referendum on
Eritrean independence, and ironically Ethiopians
were not invited to voice on the fate of Eritrea.
It was, again, decided by political fiat and only
Eritreans were allowed to vote and vote for
independence only.
Going
back to the Wolkait controversy, however, I like
to shed some light on the evolution and history of
this region. One could make reference to the
history of Tigray and figure out whether Wolkait
was administered by Tigray or not. Tigray had
always been the northern most region of Ethiopia,
and as part of Ethiopia it administered proper
Tigray, present-day Eritrea, and Wokait on the
western frontier and the Alamata-Woldia area on
the southern (Alwaha Milash). In the middle of the
17th century AD Dejazmach Galawdewos of
Shire administered Wolkait and in the early 20th
century, both Wolkait and Tselemti were paying
tribute to Ras Gugsa of Tigray, whose power was
terminated in 1930 when the Prince Regent Ras
Tafari was crowned as Emperor Haile Selassie of
Ethiopia. Consequently, Tselemti and Wolkait were
gradually incorporated (1930-1957) into the Gondar
area. If scholars are interested to know more
about the geographical extent (area) of Tigray in
the early 17th century, they could
refer to a book entitled �Tractatus Tres
Historico-Geographici� (Portuguese) or �A
Seventh Century Historical and Geographical
Account of Tigray, Ethiopia� (English) authored
by Manoel Barradas in 1634, translated into
English by Elizabeth Filleul, and edited by
Richard Pankhurst in 1996. The map of Tigray in
this book covers Alwaha-Milash in the south,
Lemalimo in the west, the Afar depression in the
east, and the Dahlak archipelagos in the northeast
(these are islands on the Red Sea, now in
Eritrea). Tigray in the 17th century
was four times the size of the present regional
state of Tigray.
Ethioobserver:
How
about the question of dominant nationality in
Ethiopia at present? Some Ethiopian observers, in
particular the Diaspora Ethiopian opposition,
believe that the TPLF is the dominant party in the
ruling EPRDF party and hence the Tigray
nationality is a dominant nationality and
therefore Tigray is the most privileged regional
state. What is your answer to that?
Dr.
Ghelawdewos: The
question of dominant nationality and dominated
nationalities in Ethiopia is over, not because the
EPRDF came with a policy of devolution of power to
nationalities but because the Derg, the preceding
military regime, had already demolished the old
system of national domination. However, even under
the old system of Haile Selassie, as I have
indicated in one of my essays, compared to other
nationalities the Amharas were privileged
especially in terms of culture and language
dominance, but we know for a fact that the
majority of the Amhara people were poor, and some
were even destitute. The same reality applies to
Tigray and it does not logically follow that the
people of Tigray would be exceptionally privileged
just because the TPLF is a Tigrayan and dominant
party. In the same essay, I have also indicated
that ones destiny in a certain nationality is
purely accidental; one could not choose to be born
in this or that nationality. Some Ethiopians,
then, used this phrase, as a clich� without
acknowledging its source, but that really does not
matter. What matters is that we Ethiopians should
begin to understand that it does not really matter
to which nationality individuals are born or
belong to; what matters is the cognitive ability
to forge an overarching pan-Ethiopian identity
that could, in turn, enable Ethiopians foster a
greater pan-Ethiopian agenda.
Ethioobserver:
But,
the opposition in the Diaspora has repeatedly
argued that Tigray is amassing wealth at the
expense of the rest of Ethiopia. Is there any
grain of truth in this?
Dr.
Ghelawdewos: This
portrayal of Tigray taking advantage of the rest
of Ethiopia is an inverted and backward thinking;
it impugns the reality in Tigray. There is no
doubt some development projects, institutions, and
public services hitherto nonexistent have been
installed and established. But, similar projects
and institutions have been established in other
regional states as well. Nowadays, a visitor to
Ethiopia could witness changes not just in Mekelle
but also in Bahr Dar, Adama (Nazareth), Hawasa,
and Harar etc. The opposition in the Diaspora does
not talk about these changes that took place or
are in the making in other parts of Ethiopia,
other than Tigray. If the opposition could prove
to me that more has been done in Tigray than in
other parts of Ethiopia, I would be the first to
oppose the discrimination policy of the
government. But I very much doubt if they could
offer any concrete evidence.
Ethioobserver:
Lets
digress from the nationality-related questions and
ask you about the policies and practices of the
EPRDF. What kind of party is the EPRDF? How do you
think it managed to capture state power? Do you
think the 2005 and 2010 elections were free and
fair? What is the policy of the EPRDF toward the
opposition in Ethiopia? Do you think we will make
a democratic transition under the EPRDF?
Dr.
Ghelawdewos:
Let me briefly address the questions in right
order. The Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary
Democratic Front (EPRDF) is a coalition of the
Tigray People�s Liberation Front (TPLF), the
Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), and
the Oromo People�s Democratic Organization (OPDO).
In this coalition, the dominant party is the TPLF,
but the ANDM and the OPDO also exercise
significant power and authority. In fact, the TPLF
could have not possibly governed the country
without the two parties in the coalition. We must
bear in mind that the military prowess of the
TPLF, the cooperation of the ANDM and OPDO, the
collapse of the Derg military in the late 1980s
and the weakened position of other opposition
forces like the EPRP during the same period, gave
rise to a new political scenario in Ethiopia. By
1989-90 it was fait accompli because the military
confrontation between the TPLF/EPRDF and the Derg
was in its final stage and the former won the day.
That is how and why the TPLF/EPRDF managed to
capture state power.
I
don�t believe the 2005 and 2010 elections were
free and fair. In order for an election to be free
and fair, the people in general and the opposition
parties in particular should have the right to
freely express themselves, travel freely
throughout Ethiopia, and they should be immune
from intimidation and imprisonment. This did not
happen in 2005 and 2010. On the contrary, the
ruling party unleashed unnecessary force against
the opposition and demonstrators were killed in
2005; the 2010 election, by contrast, was peaceful
but it was not free and fair either, if we
critically examine the way the electoral process
was handled; there was some semblance of fairness
in the pre-election period, manifested, for
instance, in the debates conducted amongst the
contesting parties but in the end the election
process was dominated by the EPRDF and the
opposition did not have same privileges like the
ruling party. However, it is also important to
recognize that the EPRDF was not simply
manipulating the election process; it had made
necessary organizational tasks in mobilizing the
electors in its favor while the opposition was
neither united nor able to mobilize the people.
The
policy of the EPRDF toward the opposition is
pretty obvious. The EPRDF, and in particular the
Prime Minister, Ato Meles, have told Ethiopians
many times that they would not tolerate the
opposition forces and will not hesitate to take
necessary action against them if they organize
public demonstrations and challenge the status
quo. This is unfortunate, because I always had
faith in my generation and after the butcher
regime of Mengistu Hailemariam was done away with,
I thought Ethiopians would enjoy at least a
modicum of democratic rights, tolerate one
another, and build a new Ethiopia together.
The
overall trend and political atmosphere in Ethiopia
does not seem to favor democratic transition.
Democracy in Ethiopia, I believe, is forestalled
at least for now. However, if the EPRDF reconsider
and its present stance and permit genuine
contestation for local, regional, and national
powers and allows, constitutionally and
practically, multi-parties to operate, then it
would be possible that Ethiopia will make a
transition to democracy. Both the ruling party and
the opposition must understand that politics is
inherently contestable, but power (the unit
currency of politics) operates in relationships
and interactions amongst divergent parties and it
could also be shared, for instance, as in a
coalition government. I am implying here the exact
opposite of zero-sum politics and appeal rather to
what I call �mutual constitution�. However, in
the final analysis, democracy does not flourish by
the whim or decree of a given regime or because we
simply wish it to happen. It can flourish, and
Ethiopia can make a genuine transition to
democracy only if we wisely come up with
alternative forms of discourses in which
Ethiopians construct some sort of permutation in
their thinking. Simply put, Ethiopians must adjust
their psychological makeup to tolerate one another
and lay the foundation of a political culture in
which democracy thrives.
Ethioobserver:
Do
you think the opposition in Ethiopia is viable?
Dr.
Ghelawdewos:
whenever we address the opposition we must
differentiate between the genuine and fake
opposition parties or organizations. By the way,
there are at least four dozens of political
parties, save the civic organizations, in Ethiopia
today. Some of them are a one-man party with
virtually no political program; others are
prefabricated for an occasion, as for instance the
registration of new parties during the pre-2010
elections; still others pose as opposition but
they operate in full accord with the ruling party.
Just few weeks ago, a new political organization
named Blue Party (whatever the color blue
signifies) has been heralded. The only genuine
opposition party is the Ethiopian Federalist
Democratic Forum (EFDF) or simply Forum (Medrek)
as it is popularly known in Ethiopia. In all
probability, Forum is going to be viable because
it has a clear agenda and political program as
well as mass support from Ethiopians at home and
the Diaspora, but it is struggling against all
odds and its success in politics is not going to
be easy.
Ethioobserver:
How
about Meles Zenawi? Is the characterization
or more specifically the negative portrayal of
Meles by the Diaspora opposition palatable to you?
Dr.
Ghelawdewos:
some individuals and groupings of the opposition
in the Diaspora are sensible and their political
agenda and the concern they have for
Ethiopia should be appreciated. The
majority, however, are angry charlatans and as a
result they were unable to focus on substantive
issues and seize the moment. Whether it is by
design or by default, these charlatans seem to
have opted to attack the person of Meles and not
his ideas. Instead of opposing Meles on his
policies, they condemn him because of his stature
or his physiognomy, and some of them condemn him
simply because he is Tigrayan; others even go
further and curse him because, they say, he is
�of peasant background�. This is really a
shame and I sometimes wonder how low can a person
get! If we oppose Meles, we must oppose his ideas
or outlooks and not his looks.
Ethioobserver:
Do
you know Meles personally and can you evaluate him
on his merits?
Dr.
Ghelawdewos: Yes
I know Meles. I know him since the days of Haile
Selassie University (now Addis Ababa University).
He was clever then as he is clever now, but I know
the younger Meles who joined the University from
Wingate; I also knew him between the time he
joined the TPLF and the time the EPRDF captured
state power. Frankly I don�t know the present
middle-aged Meles and I am not qualified to
evaluate him. I would not pretend to be a
psychologist and undertake �observed behavior�
and even that would not help us understand the
complex Ethiopian politics, but it could distract
us from pressing issues.
However,
as I have stated earlier, it is important to
evaluate Meles on his merit and demerit (and all
of us have those qualities) and not on his looks
and class background. Incidentally, Meles is not
of peasant background; for all I know, he is an
urbanite originally from Adwa and later Addis
Ababa. But even if he has a peasant background,
there is nothing wrong in it.
Doesn�t Ethiopia constitute 80% of
peasant population? Don�t we know that there
were peasant revolutions in history? Have we
forgotten that the most successful peasant
revolution in history was that of the Peoples
Republic of China? Are we ignoramus of the fact
that peasants are in many ways uncontaminated by
the ills of an urban setting, seemingly �modern
and civilized�?
Ethioobserver:
What
is your advise to Meles Zenawi and the EPRDF
regarding the overall governance and politics in
Ethiopia?
Dr.
Ghelawdewos: My
advice could be two-penny worth, but it is at
least clear and simple. Meles and the EPRDF should
completely change (if they could) their exclusive
domination of state power and accommodate
opposition parties like Forum; they should allow
multi-party democracy; permit other opposition
parties from the home country and the Diaspora to
officially register in Ethiopia and participate in
elections; invite Diaspora Ethiopian intellectuals
and professionals irrespective of their political
outlook so that they could participate in the
development of Ethiopia; and last but not least,
my personal message to Ato Meles is: �Do not
forget our university days when we had to flee for
our lives in the face of government troops who
would aim at us with their shotguns as if we were
ducks!�
Ethioobserver:
What
is your advise to the opposition at home and in
the Diaspora?
Dr.
Ghelawdewos: The
home and Diaspora opposition forces are important,
but it is the home opposition that would play a
crucial and pivotal role in making a difference in
Ethiopian politics and bring about change; the
Diaspora opposition can only cushion the home
opposition in terms of policy-related issues and
also in terms of material support in the form of
funds. My advise to both the home and Diaspora
opposition organizations ranges from having a
clear political and ideological perspective to
demonstrating effective organizational tasks
(including diplomatic works that could bridge the
Diaspora with the US Department of State and the
major actors in Europe such as Germany, France,
and the UK), and further more to fostering a
pan-Ethiopian agenda, and also to have the courage
to recognize the EPRDF and initiate dialogue with
it. I have proposed this idea of dialogue in the
context of national reconciliation that I wrote in
the form of essay in the past. It is in the nature
of politics to enter dialogue with a contending or
opposing party, and Ethiopia will benefit if the
opposition and the government could talk on a
round table. What we have now, especially in the
Diaspora, is oppose and oppose only, but what the
Diaspora did not realize is that making noise from
outside the political arena, in the end, would be
a defeatist strategy; operating and struggling
within the political arena (even if the EPRDF does
not allow it), on the other hand, would be a
correct political strategy toward achieving the
goals of political parties.
Part III: On
Economics
Ethioobserver:
What do you think of the overall economic
conditions in Ethiopia?
Dr.
Ghelawdewos: Ethiopia
is potentially a rich country, but in terms of
overall political economy analysis, it is one of
the poorest countries in the world and this is
simply because the country was unable to
meaningfully exploit its potential and implement
development programs that could overhaul the
Ethiopian economy.
Ethioobserver:
But
commentators who support the government claim that
Ethiopia has made a double-digit economic growth
in the last decade; they say the current economic
growth shows 11% GDP growth. What is your take on
that?
Dr.
Ghelawdewos: The
11% growth is a fabrication and it is provided in
sketchy accounts by commentators, and the
government does not officially endorse it. That
percentage is scored by countries like Botswana in
Africa and China in East Asia. Ethiopia is
probably growing at 4-5% per annum and the World
Bank, the IMF, and UN agencies like United Nations
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) and the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP), world institutions that provide
reliable data from relatively dependable sources,
have not supported the 11% growth claim. Besides,
if Ethiopia is growing at 11% per annum, why do we
then have widespread unemployment, abject poverty,
and famine in the country?
Ethioobserver:
What
is your view on the economic policy and
development programs of the EPRDF? Do you think
the current government has scored some
achievements in development?
Dr.
Ghelawdewos: Let
me begin with the last question. The EPRDF
government has indeed scored some achievements in
the expansion of schools and universities and in
infrastructure such as roads, bridges, and dams.
Compared to Mengistu Hailemariam�s Derg that was
enmeshed in war economy and Haile Selassie�s
government that was dormant, the EPRDF�s
achievements in infrastructure (especially roads)
are impressive. With respect to economic policy
and overall development programs of the EPRDF,
however, I have a major reservation. EPRDF�s
frenzy on cash crop in order to garner hard
currency would ultimately hurt Ethiopia. The
country ought to give priority to food crop and
manufacturing industry and learn from the High
Performing Asian Economies (HPAEs) such as Taiwan,
South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and
Thailand. Moreover, the government must change its
policy of literally selling all Ethiopian products
(ranging from eggs to cows) abroad for the sake of
amassing hard currency. By doing so, it disturbs
the supply-demand nexus in the domestic market,
and that is why market prices for commodities and
other consumer items have skyrocketed in Ethiopia.
Currently, a hen costs 80 Birr; sheep/goat 700
Birr; and cow/oxen range between 10,000 and 12,000
Birr. These exorbitant prices have effectively
emasculated the purchasing power parity (PPP) of
an average Ethiopian. The cost of living is simply
unbearable and the Ethiopian people are hurting.
If
Ethiopia can afford to rent or lease huge tracts
of lands to Indian and other foreign investors for
price plantation, it should be able to grow food
crop and feed its people. Our slogan should be
�Food First; the Ethiopian People First!�
Incidentally, India does not permit its farmers to
sell rice outside India because it has to feed its
one billion people. Ethiopia must learn from
India.
Ethioobserver:
What
is your view on the Ethiopian Growth and
Transformation Plan (GTP)?
Dr.
Ghelawdewos: I
don�t mind the GTP in its conceptual framework,
but the practical dimension of the Plan could
altogether be different. For instance,
constructing dams is part of the GTP program, but
I personally would have preferred labor-intensive
micro dams to gigantic capital-intensive dams like
the Millennium Dam. In order to realize the latter
project, Ethiopia would have to generate billions
of dollars, and even after it is complete the
country would still have to generate millions of
dollars to ran and maintain it. Ethiopia, of
course, could make revenue out of the dams by
selling electricity (as it is now intended) to
neighboring countries, but the return income could
be far less than the cost for the construction and
maintenance of the dams. Moreover, there is no
guarantee that Ethiopia would remain the sole
generator of electricity for its neighbors; the
latter could also initiate similar projects to
satisfy domestic energy and eventually discontinue
electricity service from Ethiopia.
I
don�t mind dams; I even supported the completion
of the Gilgel Gibe III Dam despite protestation
from some green movements. However, if Ethiopia
gives priority to micro dams (and the country is
blessed with major and minor rivers as well as
tributaries), it could transform its agriculture
potential with irrigation and mechanized farming.
Then and only then could Ethiopia triumph over
famine and reduce poverty meaningfully. Just to be
fair, in some of the regional states earth dams
and irrigation schemes have been initiated and
Ethiopians would be better off if the government
augments these initiatives without being
distracted by the major dams.
Ethioobserver:
Can
we really have transformation in Ethiopia in the
foreseeable future?
Dr.
Ghelawdewos: Why
not? But, this requires the suggestion I have made
earlier. The government should open up,
accommodate the opposition, attract Ethiopian
professionals, and rethink its cash crop obsession
and give priority to food crop and manufacturing
industry. As a passing remark, I also want to
comment on the word �Transformation�, as it is
currently used by the Ethiopian authorities and
the ordinary Ethiopian alike; they all say
�transformation� in English as if there is no
equivalent or substitute word in Amharic. They
could have said �Meseretawi Lewţ� so that
the average Ethiopian citizen understands it.
Ethioobserver:
In
concluding the interview, we like to direct one
final question to you. How do you think you
personally can contribute in the transformation of
Ethiopia and what do you say to other
intellectuals like you in the Diaspora in this
regard?
Dr.
Ghelawdewos: That
is a fair and good question. We all have
responsibilities for our country and we can be
successful only if we work together and
collectively strive for the development of
Ethiopia. I have reiterated this idea of
gregarious undertaking of development projects
many times in the past. I personally am committed
to contributing my expertise for the development
of Ethiopia irrespective of the different outlook
and political stance I have with the EPRDF. Our
contribution to the development of Ethiopia has
nothing to do with EPRDF, which is going to pass
anyway; our contribution is going to be a legacy
for future generations of Ethiopians and for a
country that is going to stay and if we are
engaged in the salvage and development of
Ethiopia, we will remain in history; if not we
will become spent forces. Above all, we contribute
for the development of Ethiopia not because we
want to please this or that person or group, but
because we love our country and we are concerned
with the welfare of the Ethiopian people. However,
unless the EPRDF government exhibits a more
liberal and tolerant policy of accommodation, the
hopes of Ethiopians who would like to make a
difference will be dashed. We should also not
easily give up if we try and fail in our
willingness and efforts to contribute to the
development of the motherland. For instance,
several months ago I sent a proposal via the
conventional mail on �how to end famine once and
for all in Ethiopia� to the Minister of
Agriculture of Ethiopia, but I did no get any
response. I will not give up and if the worst
comes I will seek other means and ways to realize
my dreams. I personally have no ambition other
than see Ethiopia being respected and treated on
equal footing among the nations of the world and
this could happen only if the country proves to
the world a status beyond the threshold of the
middle-income countries. And the latter would not
happen unless all of us try!
And if we try in unison, not only do we
invoke the proverbial �united webs can tie a
lion�, but also channel economic development and
democratic transition, as in correlation of
growth, and create an overarching structure for
Ethiopia. Therefore, my appeal to my fellow
Ethiopian intellectuals and professionals is quite
direct: Lets chip in and play our part in the
development of Ethiopia and the concomitant
structural change and transformation will follow
suit.
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