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The
Ethiopia Eritrea No War No Peace Situation has to
End
The
Horn of Africa is the most conflict ridden region
in the world. The people and the land are
devastated by endless wars. The de facto no war no
peace policy that has persisted between Ethiopia
and Eritrea for the last 13 years affects the
lives of millions in both countries and the
stability of the whole region. Bringing this
conflict to a peaceful resolution is of paramount
importance.
The
devastating 1998 - 2000 war between Ethiopia and
Eritrea cost billions of dollars in infrastructure
damage, missed investment opportunities and lost
aid, claimed about 100,000 lives, and dislocated
millions of
people. Instead of the end of the war bringing
peace, for the last fourteen years the policy of
both countries has been “no war no peace.”
As bad as open war is, an endless no war no
peace situation is insufferable.
I.
The evils of no war no peace
1.
Under the no war no peace policy, direct military
confrontation is replaced by proxy wars. Both
the Ethiopian and the Eritrean regimes are
flagrant in their use of proxy wars. Both states
openly provide financial and material support to
dissident ethnic and multi-ethnic organizations in
each other’s country. They both let their
territories be used as training and launching
grounds for subversive activities. Both regimes
support these forces not because they sympathize
with their grievances or support their goals and
objectives but simply because they are cheap means
to destabilize their enemy. Their support is
turned on and off at their whim, they neither
forward the cause of the opposition nor do they
deliver what they the perpetrators want. Proxy
wars are instruments of distraction not
transformation.
Proxy
wars have been used by all the regimes in the Horn
of Africa, to leverage their interests or outright
to oust regimes. The meltdown of the Somali state,
which decades of international direct and indirect
intervention have failed to heal, was fostered by
proxy war between Ethiopia and Somalia.
From
2005 to 2006, proxy war entangled the current
Ethiopian and Eritrean regimes in the Somali civil
war. Eritrea supported the Union of Islamic Courts
(UIC) which ousted the warlords supported by the
US in Mogadishu and declared an Islamic state.
Ethiopia, with the support of the US, invaded
Somalia in December 2006. It ousted the UIC and
instated the internationally supported, but
defunct, Transitional Federal Government (TFG). A
radical youth branch of UIC, Al-Shabaab, waged
armed struggle to oust Ethiopia. It was able to
win back most of the Somali territory and gained
prominence over the other Somali factions. It
later declared its affiliation with Al-Qaida.
Ethiopia withdrew in 2009 and reinvaded Somalia
November in 2011 when the African
Union mission on Somalia (AMISOM) forces
were unable to hold back Al –Shabaab’s
offensive. Ethiopian and Kenyan forces are now
indefinitely in Somalia as part of AMISOM.
Human
tragedy followed Somali state’s meltdown:
hundreds of thousands lives perished in
internecine warfare; hundreds of thousands of
people died of famine because relief couldn’t
reach them; millions are still languishing in
squalid conditions in refugee camps; piracy sprang
up which required mobilization of international
fleets; and the country became the staging ground
for Al-Qaida affiliates.
The suffering wrought by past and present
proxy wars in Somalia should have been enough
warning against predatory efforts to foster
destabilization in the region. Can Horn of Africa
afford another failed state?
2.
The no war no peace policy has frozen all trade
and economic relations and barred human mobility
between the states. Even during the long
liberation war period, the people’s mobility and
economic flow, while hindered, was not totally
severed. The people-to-people relationships and
cultural affinity were strong. Large numbers of
Eritreans and Ethiopians have fond memories of
life on both sides. No war no peace is an
estrangement that is destroying the fraternal
relationship of the two peoples. Both states have
committed acts of state-sponsored ethnic cleansing
for mere tactical advantages. They rounded up and
deported peaceful citizens—Ethiopians and
Eritreans—simply because of their ethnic
origins. Parents and children were separated,
their properties plundered and their businesses
confiscated without compensation. This act hacked
at the roots that tied together these fraternal
peoples. These relationships are strong
geo-economic and political assets that should not
have been traded for short-lived tactical gains.
Presently
Ethiopia is giving Eritrean refugees preferential
treatment and allowing many of the Eritrean youths
in refugee camps opportunity to complete their
education in Ethiopian institutions. This act is
highly commendable but is only a band aid. Mending
fraternal relationships requires ending the no war
no peace policy, normalizing relations and
re-instituting free mobility of the people.
3.
Politically, no war no peace means diplomatic
games where one side tries to undermine or isolate
the other. Ethiopia and Eritrea competed to be
allies of the US. Since Eritrea and Ethiopia were
in conflict, the US had to choose one. The US
chose the larger and more amenable Ethiopia.
Ethiopia is awarded generous economic and military
aid while Eritrea is slapped with sanctions.
Ethiopia and Eritrea cooperated in 1996 to form
the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
in Eastern Africa, and then Eritrea withdrew over
differences on Somalia policy. Now Eritrea wants
to come back, but Ethiopia is making sure the door
remains shut.
4.
No war no peace necessitates both states to
maintain bloated armies at huge cost. Scarce
resources, which should have been used to free
their respective people from poverty, are being
wasted on military expenditures. This allocation
of resources is atrocious when one takes into
consideration that in both countries the average
person earns less than two dollars a day.
5.
Both countries have amassed hundreds of thousands
of troops at their border. This tense standoff
could flare up at any time into another
devastating war as a result of miscalculations or
acts of desperation.
6.
No war no peace has only losers and no winners.
Eritrea is strongly affected because of its
smallness, internal political vulnerability and
amateurish political leadership. The people have
to live under a state of constant military
service, shoulder economic hardships because of
bloated military budgets, sanctions and
disincentive for economic investment.
Ethiopia
is less affected by the no war no peace policy
because of its size and because its leaders played
their political cards well to inspire a generous
flow of international aid. However, Eritrea’s
loss has not become Ethiopia’s gain because
there is no tangible goal or objective to be
gained by no war no peace policy. Yet both states
could gain huge economic advantage by peaceful
coexistence and peaceful cooperation.
II
The source of the conflict.
1.
Border demarcation. The main trigger for the
conflict is supposedly the ill-defined border
between the two states. After a savage and
senseless war, on December 2000 in Algiers, the
two belligerent states were steered by the
international community to agree on cessation of
hostilities and to agree to binding arbitration by
an international body. In
2003, When the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary
Commission (EEBC) finally ruled Badme in favor of
Eritrea, Ethiopia reneged.
The
boundary between the two countries, which
stretches about one thousand kilometers, is
ill-defined because the colonial boundary was
poorly marked and because when Eritrea was under
Ethiopia, the administrative boundary was changed.
However, this border issue shouldn’t have been a
major cause of a violent conflict because the
point of contention stretches only a few
kilometers to this side or the other. It is a
desolate area of no significant economic prospect
to either side to warrant so much human and
capital sacrifice. Badme, which is a focal point
of the contention, is a town inhabited by a few
hundred people. In Meles’s own words:
It
is some godforsaken village. So it’s not about
territory. According to the latest rendition of
the Boundary Commission, Badme would be 800 metres
inside Eritrea. What’s 800 metres in a country
as big as Ethiopia? What’s 800 metres compared
to what we willingly and happily gave up as
Eritrea? It’s nothing. But it’s 800 metres
which we are told is something it has never been,
and something that it will never be. That’s the
point. That’s the crux of the matter.[i]
Meles
failed to answer his own question: if it is not
about territory, what is it about?
2.
Ethiopia’s landlockedness and the port of Assab
It
took remarkable foresight and stamina for the
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
(EPRDF) under Meles’s leadership to accept
Eritrea’s independence with the resulting loss
of the ports of Massawa and Assab, rather than
continue the war that has ravaged both sides for
thirty years. Many doomsayers predicted that
Ethiopia would choke without Assab and Massawa.
Meles’s decisive leadership turned this
setback into a triumph. Over the past two decades,
without the use of Assab and Massawa, Ethiopia has
registered the fastest economic growth in her
history. Even though she is rising from a very low
level, Ethiopia is one of the fastest growing
economies in the world. This is the peace
dividend. Had the EPRDF continued on the path of
military conflict, in place of economic advances,
Ethiopia would have suffered an economic debacle.
The Ethiopian government has unequivocally
expressed that regaining Assab is neither the
objective of the 1998 - 2000 savage war nor the
cause of the stalemated border demarcation.
"Well,
talking about Assab the Ethiopian Government has
repeatedly stated that Ethiopia has no wish
whatsoever for forcefully occupying Eritrean
territories. The question of forcefully occupying
Assab is against international law. It is also
against the principle and belief of the Ethiopian
Government. So this is beside the point.”[ii]
However,
the issue of Assab port has an important bearing
in the minds of many Eritreans and Ethiopians.
Eritreans in general feel the loss of Assab would
be tantamount to dismemberment of the state of
Eritrea and abrogation of their hard won
independence, and they believe that this is
Ethiopia’s main agenda. On the other hand, they
are fully aware that these two ports could reach
their full potential only if used by both Ethiopia
and Eritrea together. Eritrea’s People's Front
for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) has declared both
ports “free ports” and has expressed its
willingness to grant Ethiopia full access. It is
EPRDF, on the other hand, that has declined to
come to terms and use the facility, lest Eritrea
gain some economic advantage.
For
certain segments of Ethiopian intelligentsia,
mainly hyper-nationalistic opposition groups and
mainly centered in the diaspora, regaining
sovereignty over Assab is talked about as
Ethiopia’s primary goal. Pride rather than
political and economic reality seem to drive their
sentiments.[iii]
Most of them realize that Ethiopia has no peaceful
means to regain sovereignty over Assab. Direct
military invasion is very costly and non-feasible
and using a proxy-war strategy by instigating
ethnic Afar to rise is a double edged sward.
The only feasible approach is to attempt a
win-win solution where both countries peacefully
cooperate and utilize the ports to their capacity.
The
landlockedness issue has less substance than it
appears at first glance because, even when
Ethiopia had control over Assab and Massawa, a
good percentage of Ethiopia’s exports and
imports have always gone through Djibouti because
of their better transportation and port
facilities. Of late, the EPRDF leadership has
become highly dependent on Djibouti. This has
emboldened Djibouti to raise its already high port
fees and add conditions that contravene the
Ethiopia-Djibouti 2002 agreement. The
port facility in Djibouti is congested. Such
concentration on one facility heightens
Ethiopia’s venerability to terrorist sabotages.
Ethiopia
has ample opportunities and good economic reasons
to use ports in Mombasa, Kissimiue ,Mogadishu,
Hargeisa, and Port Sudan in addition to Djibouti,
Assab and Massawa. Owing to the huge land mass of
Ethiopia, each of the ports listed above can serve
the different regions of Ethiopia in unique
economical and advantageous ways. The port fees
that Ethiopia would pay these different countries
would be far less than what it would spend if it
were to build and maintain its own ports for all
shipping purposes. Particularly when one takes
into consideration the huge land mass of Ethiopia,
the cost of shipping to a few centralized ports
instead of the closest port could be significant.
Ethiopia’s ability to use all these ports not
only gives Ethiopia economic advantages but makes
her an anchor state in the region.
As
regards the argument that other countries will
jack up port fees and tariffs they way that
Djibouti did is counterintuitive.
If ports from several countries are used,
they have more to gain by competing for
Ethiopia’s business.
Ethiopia has unnecessarily put long term
economic constraints on itself for no discernable
reason. Ethiopia has opportunity to use the
Eritrean ports which are declared free ports and
Eritrea could make this available to Ethiopia at
favorable terms hence incentivizing Djibouti to
match its fees.
It
makes no economic or political sense in the long
or short term for Ethiopia to borrow three to four
billion US dollars from Turkey and China to build
a new port at Tajoura in Djibouti and a railway to
connect it to its future potash mine in the
Danakil depression over 671km, when Ethiopia, in
agreement with Eritrea, could build a port
facility on the Red Sea which is less than 100km
away. Moreover, both countries could share the
cost of building the port to develop their
potentially large potash mines which are adjacent
to each other.
Ethiopia could use the existing port of
Assab, which is much closer than build one from
scratch at Tajoura in Djibouti. Such overhead and
future operation costs make the mine less price
competitive as well as unnecessarily burden future
Ethiopian generations.
3.
Rivalries
Ethiopians
and Eritreans share a long common history; their
cultural and psychological ethos is both
positively and negatively shaped by it. This
common history has a fundamental bearing on the
development and resolution of this crisis. Both
states are combative, ego driven and
Machiavellian. Like two chess players who follow
the same strategies, they are stalemated. (For a
lengthy treatment of the psychological
underpinning of the issue read my article.)[iv]
Eritrean
People Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigrai
People Liberation Front (TPLF) leaders, who are
the core of the present ruling circles in both
states, have a couple of decades of both alliance
and rivalry. The internal struggle over policies,
ideologies, personalities during their united
front against the Derg became external after their
victory. The 1998 - 2000 infamous war is partly a
settling of these old scores.
In
the early years of the alliance, EPLF was the main
partner and TPLF the junior.
After the fall of the Derg, however, power
shifted in favor of the TPLF. TPLF represented a
younger generation of leadership and inherited a
humongous powerbase, while EPLF was diminished by
the long duration of their armed struggle and the
loss of its best and brightest.
For all its sacrifices, EPLF gained a tiny
powerbase.
In
both countries the powerbase is shifting. In
Ethiopia, power is shifting geographically south
and demographically a generation not involved in
the armed struggle is ascending to power. In
Eritrea, the core of Eritrean leadership is
languishing in prison or withering in exile.
Isaias, the lone leader, is 67. In both countries,
the transfer of power by default or design is
inevitable.
Although
this power shift bodes well for the resolution of
this conflict, full transfer of power will take a
long time. Concerned
people cannot let the no war no peace policy to
continue until power changes in both countries
takes place. Due
to the damages this policy causes, time is of the
essence in resolving the situation. If this
conflict is not resolved now, it could endanger
the orderly, constructive and internally driven
changes in both countries.
III.
The parties to the conflict
There
are four parties to this conflict: the Ethiopian
and Eritrean people, the Ethiopian government, the
Eritrean government and the US government. The
Ethiopian and Eritrean people have mutual
strategic interests in peaceful coexistence and
cooperation but they lack a voice because they
lack civil liberties. The US is motivated by
regional and mainly global considerations. The
Ethiopian and Eritrean leaders are motivated by
tactical and short term gains and losses rather
than long term or strategic interests. However,
these parties’ interests could be bridges that
induce the parties to agree on one peace frame
work that addresses all their underling interests.
1.
The Eritrean government.
So
far, by design or default, president Isaias has
benefitted from the no war no peace situation. He
has suspended the constitution, suppressed the
people’s human rights and imposed a one man
rule. He deflects economic stagnation and the
hardships the people are suffering as caused by
outside forces determined to undermine their
hard-won independence. Even though Isaias had
constructed the foundation for his dictatorship
long before independence was gained, the
Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict enabled him to instate
this without much meeting resistance. He has
fettered the Eritrean youth through indefinite
military service. The political and economic
situation has become so entangled as a result of
Eritrea’s internal vulnerability and the
overarching Ethiopia Eritrea conflict that the
hapless people are choosing to flee the country
rather than stage concerted opposition. Hence the
global issue of Eritrean refugees.
That
is why amateurish bellicose rhetoric spews from
the Eritrean media in place of calls for sensible
diplomatic efforts. If Isaias’s recent interview
on Eritrean television[v]
can be
taken seriously, Isaias is adamant about staying
the course no matter how the economic and
political situation is deteriorating in Eritrea.
However, as dissatisfaction is seeping into the
higher echelons of the civilian and military
circles, Isaias is likely to be motivated to seek
a settlement which will serve as face saving.
Some
Eritrean opposition leaders and members of the
international community, concerned with the human
rights situation in Eritrea, might oppose
normalization of relations on the grounds it would
prolong Isaias’s authoritarian rule. On the
contrary, normalization would create favorable
conditions for raising issues of governance, civil
rights and economic policies. Different factions
in the Eritrean community could engage in
political discourse about their future without
this extraneous circumstance clouding the
atmosphere.
2.
The Ethiopian government.
Since
the death of Meles Zenawi, the leadership in
Ethiopia has been constrained by lack of consensus
and vision as how to proceed with the no war no
peace policy. Hence they would rather let the
status quo continue than take bold initiatives.
The latest statement from Ethiopia’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs on the issue reiterates the same
old rhetoric.[vi]
EPRDF
under Meles deftly played its political cards. On
the one hand, Meles sidelined his rival Isaias and
on the other hand, he enabled Ethiopia to reap
massive economic and military aid as a strategic
US ally against militant Islam. Meles was a
reluctant warrior. Around 2000 His leadership was
threatened on two sides: on one side, the
intransigence of PFDJ and on the other side, the
opposition from inside his organization and
nationalist opposition outside his organization
who used Eritrea’s independence as trump card
against him. He knew that protracted open military
conflict would undermine his shaky power base,
while peace would be interpreted as capitulation
to EPLF/PFDJ. By reneging on the binding
resolution of the EEBC, he chose the no peace no
war option. He
knew that in a situation of stasis, time is on the
side of the larger state.
After
the 2010 election, EPRDF control of power in
Ethiopia has become unassailable.
The opposition has waned. This had created
a window of opportunity to take bold initiatives
to peacefully resolve the conflict. Unfortunately,
the untimely death of Meles created a power
vacuum. None of the current leaders has the
boldness and vision of Meles. There is no urgent
situation that would push the resolution of this
conflict into the top of the agenda of the current
leadership.
This
is where the international community could play a
significant role in nudging the Ethiopian leaders
to resolve the conflict. The US and its allies
give Ethiopia close to three billion dollars in
aid every year.[vii]
If this is not sufficient leverage, what is? The
EPRDF leaders could enhance their international
stature by taking earnest steps towards peaceful
resolution of this conflict.
3.
The US government.
On
January 02, 2009 I wrote an op-ed on American
Chronicle, entitled The Bush Administration's
policy towards the Horn of Africa: Is it abating
or aiding the spread of terrorism. In
it, I wrote
By
making the war against terrorism the cornerstone
of its policy towards the Horn of Africa, the Bush
administration is ignoring the fundamental issues
that have beset this region with conflicts and
human tragedies. By superimposing the war on
terrorism on local existential conflicts, the Bush
administration is elevating them into global
crisis. Regional instability is the cause and the
spread of terrorism symptom of the crisis. If the
U.S. acts as an independent arbiter cognizant of
the fundamental issues of local and regional
conflicts, it has a chance to positively influence
the developments in the region.
The
incoherent US policy in the region has contributed
to further complication of the issues and
destabilization of the region. The impact of US
involvement in Somalia under consecutive
administrations has been widely debated. Its
involvement in the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict has
lacked serious discussion.
The
US has descended from an arbiter and guarantor of
the Algiers Agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea
into a party to the conflict. For most of the
eight years of the Bush administration, the only
standing superpower was locked in conflict with
Eritrea, a small prickly state, in a strategically
sensitive region.
In
2008, the George W. Bush Administration declared
Eritrea to be a "state sponsor of
terrorism," thereby triggering US trade,
investment, and travel sanctions against Eritrea
and its leaders for failing to kowtow to the US
policy on Somalia.
Former Assistant Secretary of State for
Africa Herman J. 'Hank' Cohen wrote, “The reason
was the identification of Somali Islamist
extremists attending a Somali political dialogue
meeting in Eritrea. Indeed, this caused the US
Government to become so enraged that the American
Assistant Secretary of State for Africa expressed
the desire to reopen the EEBC arbitration decision
in order to favor the Ethiopian border claims.
This request was not adopted.” [viii]
The
Obama administration continued on the same course
set by the Bush administration. Ambassador Susan
Rice introduced a resolution in the UN Security
Council to impose harsh economic sanctions on
Eritrea. The Security Council passed watered down
economic sanctions on Eritrea for allegedly
transferring arms and fund to Al-Qaida affiliated
Al-Shabaab. According
to the Eritrean government, these are trumped up
charges. Cohen more or less corroborated
Eritrea’s position, in the same article, when he
wrote. “Those of us who know Eritrea well
understand that the Eritrean leadership fears
Islamic militancy as much as any other country in
the Horn of Africa region.”
The
bogged down situation in Somalia, the aftermath of
the Arab Spring and the deterioration in South
Sudan have made some American diplomats—Herman
J. 'Hank' Cohen; Princeton Lyman, a diplomat and
former United States Ambassador to Nigeria and
South Africa and David Shinn, the U.S. ambassador
to Ethiopia from 1996 to 1999—come out and
openly advocate change in US policy towards
Eritrea. They have advocated lifting of sanctions,
normalization of relations between the US and
Eritrea and active engagement of the US to bring
Ethiopia and Eritrea to a mutually agreeable
settlement. This is a welcome change, but whether
their views will lead to a change in US policy is
an open question.
David
Shinn noted the following caveat regarding the
limitations of the US’s role:
Whatever
Washington does in the coming months, its
relationship with Addis Ababa is more important
than the one with Asmara. Although the United
States might decide to try again to improve
relations with Eritrea, it will not do so at the
expense of its ties with Ethiopia. Ideally, the
United States, Ethiopia and Eritrea will
collectively decide the time has come to
normalize/improve relations so that Eritrea can
come in from the cold.[ix]
The
US is right to be concerned with threats of Al-Qaida
in the Horn of Africa. Radical Islam is a
fundamental threat to peaceful of coexistence of
Horn of Africa peoples. However, a cerebral
reaction to threat of Al-Qaida should not cloud
complex regional issues. The US has to stand above
the squabble of the two regimes if it wants to
play a leadership role in containing the threat of
Al-Qaida, for this the US needs to take active
role to lift the no peace no war situation.
4.
The People of Ethiopia and Eritrea
Both
peoples are strongly motivated to see this
conflict end and fraternal relations flourish
again. More
than 60 percent of Ethiopia’s and Eritrea’s
population were born after the two countries were
separated. They have managed to survive as two
independent states for the last twenty years. Both
have made economic progress, albeit from rock
bottom. Still their main enemy is poverty.
Their primary concern is fighting famine,
malnourishment, and disease. Like all people in
the rest of the world, their objective is to
create better education, economic opportunities
and fair governance for themselves and their
offspring. They are well aware that they are more
likely to achieve these goals if they live in a
peaceful environment. They have no interest in
being cannon fodder in any futile wars. No peace
no war is an unwelcome imposition on their lives.
Particularly
the Tigray and Tigrigna are close cousins living
on the adjacent sides of the boarder. For
generations their land has been scorched earth due
to devastating wars.
They would not want to live under the
threat of another catastrophic war.
It
is mainly those people on both sides who were born
and raised during the conflict, who are now in
their sixties and above, who are emotionally
invested in this conflict positively or
negatively. A generation-long violent conflict
that proceeded Eritrea’s independence from
Ethiopia has left bitter resentments and
reinforced cynicism and suspicion about each
other’s motives. This group of people
constitutes less than six percent of the
population on both sides but at this stage is most
vocal as well as influential.
Some
Eritreans of this generation sees Ethiopia as a
constant threat. They are convinced that
Ethiopia’s aim is to dismember Eritrea, to push
her into becoming a failed state. For some on the
Ethiopian side, even after 20 years of separation,
Eritrea’s independence is hard to swallow,
particularly the loss of Assab, and they would
want to reverse this by diplomatic or military
actions. Paradoxically, it is also the members of
this generation who are highly motivated to find
peaceful solutions and reinvigorate their
fraternal relationship to flourish.
As
the democratic rights of the people are suppressed
in both countries, it is hard to gauge public
opinion, however, if Ethiopians and Eritreans were
given a choice between a no war no peace situation
or peaceful coexistence and cooperation, they
would choose the latter overwhelmingly.
It
is in the nature of authoritarian regimes to whip
the nationalist frenzy of the people rather than
engage them in the affairs of war and peace. The
opposition as well as the international community
has also failed to involve the people in the
dialogue. We live in an age of the highest media
penetration and Internet connectivity. There is an
influential Ethiopian and Eritrean diaspora
community spread throughout the metropolitan
centers of the world. If efforts are made, it is
possible to make those people who are directly
affected by this conflict be the force propelling
the main actors towards a lasting peace.
V.
Conclusion
The
no war no peace situation has lasted as long as it
has because the main stakeholders, the people
whose lives have been affected, are shut off from
the political process. It is because the
discussion about war and peace is done in the
halls and back alleys of foreign lands, by
politicians who are concerned about their petty
agendas rather than the good of the broader
masses. It can only be rectified if the broader
public is involved in the discussion and
resolution of this conflict. Even though free
democratic platforms are restricted in both
states, there still exists potent media for
generating discussions and political pressure. VOA,
Deutchevele and etc. broadcasting in local
languages are widely followed by the public in
both countries. BBC and CNN are mainstays of
information for the elite. A large section of the
younger generation is active in social media. Any
discussion on the issues based on the broad
framework of peace can lead to wider participation
and motivate the power elite to address the issues
earnestly. Facilitating conferences and seminars
of Eritreans and Ethiopians in the metropolitan
centers of the world could sift through the
dilemmas and entanglements of the issues.
The
following could be the broad framework for
peaceful resolution:
1.
Ethiopia
and Eritrea should abide by the binding
resolutions of the Algiers agreement and EEBC
resolutions. If either side has any reservation on
these agreements, they should clearly state the
terms and the provisions for the resolution of the
problem to the broad Ethiopian, Eritrean and
international public.
2.
Ethiopia
and Eritrea should stop all proxy wars.
3.
The
US should normalize its relation with Eritrea.
4.
The
UN should lift its sanction on Eritrea.
5.
The
UN should redeploy UNMEE to Ethiopia and Eritrea
border and take control of the disputed areas
including Badme.
6.
Ethiopia
and Eritrea should demobilize and demilitarize the
border.
7.
EEBC
should complete the border demarcation on the
ground.
8.
The
international community should help the coast of
demobilization, resettlement and compensation of
affected people.
9.
Ethiopia
and Eritrea should sign normalization of
relations.
10.
Ethiopia
and Eritrea should agree on terms for using Assab
and Massawa as free ports without constraint for
100 years guaranteed and arbitrated by a
third-party.
11.
Free
mobility of people and goods between the two
countries should be granted.
12.
Free
trade, economic cooperation and integration under
a regional body such as IGAD should be encouraged.
These
steps could lead to peaceful coexistence, peaceful
cooperation and peaceful integration of the
fraternal people.
Tariku
Debretsion
Los
Angeles, 03/13/2014
http://www.irinnews.org/report/46954/ethiopia-interview-with-prime-minister-meles-zenawi
Meles’s interview with VOA on June 26, 2000,
http://www.ethioobserver.net/Time_to-Bring_back_Eritrea.htm
http://asmarino.com/articles/1751--to-solve-the-ethiopian-eritrean-conflict-a-change-in-the-psyche-of-the-
power-elites-is-essential
http://www.frequency.com/video/president-isaias-afwerki-on-peace-with/148823461/-/5-2320
http://africanarguments.org/2014/01/27/bringing-eritrea-in-from-the-cold-needs-real-policy-changes
-by-eritreas-government-
by-the-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-ethiopia
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/ETH.JPG
http://africanarguments.org/2013/12/16/time-to-bring-eritrea-in-from-the-cold-by-hank-cohen
http://africanarguments.org/2014/01/13/time-to-bring-eritrea-in-from-the-cold-but-its-harder-than
-it-sounds-by-david-shinn/
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