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Curbing
Corruption in Ethiopia:
Applying
Democratic
Autonomy at the LocalLevel
Desta, Asayehgn, Sarlo
Distinguished Professor of Sustainable Economic Development
Introduction
Ethiopia
seems to be in a paradox. While its economy has been on a growth
trajectory for the last fifteen years, more recently, Ethiopia’s
landscape has been overwhelmed by deplorable rampant corruption and
massive youth unemployment that has contributed to social upheaval in some
parts of the country. In my earlier research, as a talking point, I
proposed that Ethiopia needs to apply a deliberate use of an economic
model known as “Employer of Last Resort” to fully tackle the existing
youth unemployment. Briefly discussed, the “Employer of Last Resort”
paradigm suggests that governments don’t need to entirely control
employment but should give grants to privately administered institutions
to facilitate and guarantee full employment opportunities to the
unemployed who are ready and willing to work at a minimum wage in
environmentally sensitive projects (Desta, 2016 and Baker 1993).
As
part of a series of wide civil services, the Government of Ethiopia’s
Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission established Proclamation No.
235/2001 to curb the prevalent corruption. Furthermore, in line with the
general agreement of the 2005 UN’s convention against corruptions and to
receive bilateral and multilateral aid, Ethiopia set the most
comprehensive corruption Proclamation
(433) in 2005 and established ‘Watchdogs’ or anti-corruption agencies
to detect and prosecute corrupt acts throughout the country. In hand
sights, it has been found that the anti-corruption agencies established
throughout the country have been ineffective. Transparency International
data shows that Ethiopia was ranked 111 out of 177 countries, with a score
of 33 on the scale where 100 means very clean and 0 means highly corrupt
on the 2015 Corruption Perception Index (2016). According to Global
Financial Integrity (GFI), the country has lost close to 12 billion
dollars since 2000 to illicit financial outflows (McKenna, 2013).
As
briefly mentioned above, corruptive acts have become one of the major
burning issues in Ethiopia. As stated by Gebru (2016) in
Ethiopia’s economic transformation, corruption has become a way of life
because instead of sticking to their pledge of honor, some of the
leadership of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
(EPRDF) succumbed to temptation to pursue personal wealth by using public
offices for personal gains and self enrichment. Endorsing this type of
argument Selam (2016) indicates that instead of setting good example for
others to follow, the EPRDF leadership has now admitted that the demand
for good governance, lack of effective and quality service delivery,
social upheavals and corruption are very cardinal to the challenges that
the current Ethiopian polity is facing currently.
More
specifically, in Ethiopia petty types of corruption, such as giving gifts
on festive occasions to government officials and religious leaders, is
systemic and common. Currently, corruption occurs when businesses obtain
permits and licenses due to the existence of complicated bureaucracy.
Facilitation payments and bribes are often demanded from businesses when
they deal with land-related issues. As a result, corruption seems to be
institutionalized in land distribution. In the administration sector,
public procurement, tender processes are generally awarded to people with
close connections to the government and ruling party. Recently, more than
50 high profile people including government officials, businessmen, and a
minister have been arrested in Ethiopia for corruption (McKenna,
2013).
Corruption
is ill-gotten gains. Generally, government employees become involved in
corrupt activities when their salaries are less than their market wage. An
impediment to an efficient government, corruption can destroy the
functioning of vital organs. As pointed out by Olken and Pande (2012),
corruption “can be quite severe, as corruption may raise the marginal
tax rate of firms, decrease business activity, raise the marginal costs of
public funds…[and] undo the government’s ability to correct
externalities, leading to inefficient outcomes.” In addition, Amundsen
(1997) argues that corruption depilates and erodes the cultural,
political, and economic fabric of society. At the extreme,
corruption even contributes to state collapse (Khan 2006).
Given
this determinate issue of corruption, if
the Ethiopian government doesn’t have the political will to uproot from
its base, the rampant corruption in the country will adversely
erode Ethiopia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), affect capital
accumulation, lower the quality of education, infrastructure, and health
services, and may contribute to the political destabilization of the
country. Corrupt activities could also contribute to the gradual erosion
of foreign investors’ desire to invest in Ethiopia, and somberly
minimize the amount of foreign aid that Ethiopia could receive from the
United States, European Union and other bilateral and multi-lateral
agencies. Therefore, given the negative effects of corruption, in order to
strategize good governance in developing countries the World Bank,
International Monetary Fund, Organization
for Economic Co‑operation and Development (OCED), and the
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) have separately launched
anti-corruption programs for a number of developing countries to tackle (Olken,
2011).
However,
due to the poor nature and implementation of anti-corruption programs,
corruption has remained a deep-rooted problem in Ethiopia. It has
precipitated an increase in social unrest and engendered violent
anti-government protests of domestic and foreign investments.
As a result, the violent acts in Ethiopia pose a threat against
infrastructures, foreign investments, and civilians. Ordinary law
enforcement procedures are not able to properly handle the situation; now,
the Federal Government of Ethiopia has invoked Article 93 of the 1994
Constitution. That is, effective October 10, 2016, the Ethiopian
Government has declared a six-month-long state of emergency. As narrated
by Schemm, the state of emergency declared primarily deals with anti-peace
domestic elements that have allied with foreign forces and are
jeopardizing the peace and security of the country. In addition, the
demonstrators have attacked domestic firms and mobbed the Nigerian and
Turkish enterprises in Ethiopia. More specifically, as stated by the
former Government spokesman Getachew Redda, to effectively implement the
state of emergency in the country, the government is committed to the
suspension of the due process of law. In some cases, the Ethiopian
Government has also implemented curfews (Schemm, 10, 2016 and Alijazeera,
10, 2016).
Being
so complex, and in some cases specific to Ethiopia, a contextual analysis
of the state of corruption in Federal Ethiopia’s landscape is
worthwhile. More specifically, to combat the state of corruption in
Ethiopia, a careful examination of the complexities of the centralized
federal governance system is very pertinent. Instead of focusing on the
conventional rent-seeking that involves the demand (i.e. public sector)
and the supply side (i.e. private sector) of wealth-seeking behavior, this
study more broadly explores the acts of corruption that include the
exercise of official powers against public interest and the abuse of
public office for private gains (Shah, 2006).
More
specifically, the core issue of the study is: Why has corruption with the
formation of constitutional federalism in Ethiopia perpetuated? The major
tenet of this study is to ascertain the relationship between federalism
and the level of corruption. The central purpose of the study is to
investigate the factors that have contributed to the spread of severe
corruption in the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Given this, the
remainder of this article proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews
some major studies and explores the factors that contribute to the root
causes of corruption. Section 3 explores some of the strategies that could
be used to curb corruption. Section 4 assesses the connection between
corruption and federalism. Section 5 briefly details the formation and the
effects of federalism in Ethiopia. Section 6 explores if government
devolution and the presence of directly elected local officials reduces
the acts of corruption.
Literature
Review
As
mentioned before, corruption entails a complex, multifaceted phenomenon
with multiple causes and effects. Generally, corruption describes an
ailing economy that is a result of ineffective governance. As narrated by
the Transparency International,
“corruption is one of the greatest challenges of the contemporary world.
It undermines good government, fundamentally distorts public policy, leads
to the misallocation of resources, harms the private sector and private
development, and particularly hurts the poor” (1998). On the other hand,
the working definition forwarded by the World Bank points out that
corruption is the abuse of public power for private benefit (Amundsen,
1999).
Stated
differently, in contradiction to the rules of the game, a government
official could use a nation’s public
office for personal gain or acquiring wealth. That is, in addition
to his (or her) salary, a public official could use his (or her) office to
accept, solicit, or extort a bribe to accomplish his (or her) duty.
Private agents may also actively offer bribes to circumvent public
policies and processes to gain competitive advantage and profit. In
addition, it is possible that a corrupt official could abuse his (or her)
office for personal benefit through patronage, nepotism, the theft of
state assets, or the diversion of state revenues for personal, kin,
partisan, or other narrow interest that benefit him (or her) instead of
the relevant public (World Bank, 1997, and USAID, 2005).
As
persuasively discussed by Aidt (2003), three conditions have to exist in
an organization in order for public official to effectively use his (or
her) position for attaining corruption. That is corruption could be
institutionalized because: 1) the public official may have discretionary
power to seek rent; 2) the discretionary power of the state official may
enable the public official to extract rent beyond duty of services; and 3)
the non-existence of transparency and accountability may enable government
officials to harvest rent.
Though
the causes and classifications of corruption are obscure, Shah (2006)
generally divides the manifestation of corruption activities into the
following four categories: a) Petty corruption, b) Grand corruption, c)
State or regulatory capture corruption, d) Patronage or team player
corruption, and systemic corruption. Petty corruption includes when a
citizen pays small amount of bribes (grease money or kind) to a public
official in order to have things done for him (or her). These could be
payments to lower taxes, avoid fines, obtain water, electricity, or
telephone connections, get customs clearance, or obtain building permits.
Grand
corruption refers to bribes paid by businesses or interest groups to
government officials or administrative elites in order to gain favorable
influence in decision-making. State or regulatory corruption entails
collusion of public officials and the private sector in order to set up
loopholes to bypass existing rules. For instance, due to bribery paid to
government officials, certain individual businesses may be allowed to pay
lower taxes and win low-level procurement contracts. Patronage
or team player types of corruption involves misuse of resources or acts of
favoritism by an official to give special assistance to family members,
friends, or clients coming from the same origin or geographical location.
Finally, systemic corruption uses holidays as a camouflage to give gifts
or bribes to government officials. In general, systemic types of
corruptions are not viewed negatively. Depending on culture and tradition,
systemic gifts are generally prevalent at all levels of society throughout
the world (see Montesh, 2016).
The
anecdotes and theoretical perspectives that support the functional and
dysfunctional attributes of corruption can be explained as a confluence of
the structural problem of economics and politics with cultural and
individual moral problems. Conventional
economics uses rent-seeking behavior interchangeably with corruption. For
example, Holden and Sobotka (1996) narrate rent-seeking as a rational
response to the incentives faced by both private and public officials.
Economists operationalize rent-seeking behavior “as the ability of
individuals or entrepreneurs to extract uncompensated wealth for
non-productive activities from others over the marginal cost of the
product view corruption as a lubricant or grease for circumventing tedious
bureaucratic procedures and administrative restrictions. More
particularly, in some developing countries that have cumbersome
regulations, corruption is purposely used as hedge against bad policies
and gives relief against time-consuming queues. Additionally, in some
countries, corruption is purposely tolerated in order to entice
better-qualified staff to civil services jobs because the salaries in
public sectors are very low. For instance, while Rijckeghem and Weder
(1997) argue that low salaries in public offices are supplemented by
taking bribes, Reisman (2000) extends the argument that corruption has a
multiplier effect on the GDP of a country and can positively facilitate
for an open and competitive economy. Thus based on this argument, some
economists pinpoint that when used as an incentive system, corruption
could create structural and economic change and promote meritocracy. That
is, an institutional mix of rewards and monitor, could deter corruption
(Nasir, 2006, Bohara,et al., 2004). On the other hand, Acemoglu and
Verdier (2000) argue that “because government intervention designed to
correct market failures requires the use of bureaucrats to make decisions,
it will create opportunities for these employees to be corrupt and demand
bribes for their services.”
According
to political scientists, corruption connotes the manner in which decisions
are made by various rulers to aggrandize their own interest by deviating
from their duties. As defined by Amundsen (1999: 7), political corruption
is the manipulation of the political institutions and the rules of
procedures. Political corruption influences the institutions of government
and political system and frequently leads to institutional decay. From a
political science point of view, the focus of corruption seems to be on
the causes of political spectrum. Generally, political corruption is
understood “as one of the deliberate strategies for enrichment and
power-aggrandizement employed by authoritarian power-holders” (Amundsen
(1999). Thus as suggested by the World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund, and the Organization
for Economic Co‑operation and Development (OCED), corruption
could be curtailed by getting rid of rent-seeking politicians and
bureaucratizes through “downsizing of the state” and the privatization
of government owned institutions.
Using
anecdotal and unsystematic studies, Amundsen (1999) declares that
in Russia, other formerly communist countries, and one party regimes in
Sub-Saharan Africa, with economic liberalization, the level of corruption
in these countries has increased to unmanageable proportions. Yet, using
rigorous research, a number of studies indicate that the level of
corruption decreases with the existence of: 1) democratic open societies
that has checks and balances systems for revealing corrupt officials; 2)
competitive multi-parties; 3) greater civic engagement that lead to closer
monitoring and exposure of corrupt civil servants and politicians; 4) free
elections that could encourages the voting out of corrupt officials from
office; and 5) freedom of the press that enables journalists and public
interest groups to expose abuse (See for example, Shabbir and Anwar 2007).
Based
on these premises, political scientists suggest that for curbing
corruption, nations that are
entangled with corruptive behavior need to subscribe to democratic
political institutions, good governance, the freedom of press,
transparency, accountability, civic engagement, and render to autonomous
federal sovereignty states. Subscribing to cultural and religious factors,
anthropologists argue that corruption needs to be assessed contextually
and needs to be narrated historically because it is embedded in local
culture and norms. For example, gift-giving and repaying are obligatory in
certain contexts since it connotes human sentiments. Also, from the
socio-cultural perspective, corruption can be viewed as a social problem
because it constitutes a threat to the survival of a society and hinders
development as it could minimize growth of any nation. Having explored some of the ways in which corruption damages the social
and institutional fabric of a nation, we now turn to some optional reforms that could
reduce corruption and mitigate its effects.
Anti-corruption
Strategies
As
the global movement pushed countries to launch anti-corruption drives in
the 20th century and in order to silence social media critics
and civil society activists, as well as to fulfill the political
conditionality aid donors, many developing countries drafted
anti-corruption strategies and set up offices to undertake the necessary
efforts to curb corruption (See for example, Kaufmann, 1999).The
perception-based measures are less accurate in measuring corruption.
Nonetheless, in order to have access to borrowing and foreign assistance,
a number of developing countries have been using either the World Bank’s
(2000) “multipronged” anti-corruption conditionality model,” the
World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index or the Handbook designed by the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), known as tools
for Assessing Corruption & Integrity in Institutions (August 2005).
The
tools prepared by the World Bank and USAID are very instructive.
Nonetheless, the World Bank’s tools strongly focus on economic aspects
and are not tailored to the conditions of individual countries. In short,
the anti-corruption strategies developed by the World Bank seems to: 1)
lack capabilities and have very lax corruption enforcement mechanisms; 2)
be based on opinions of elites that are chosen to administer the
corruption enforcement mechanism; 3) have limited knowledge related to
causes, effects, and cures of corruption; 4) include some elites who run
the anti-corruption offices who may be deeply involved in corrupt
behavior; 5)be composed of anti-corrupt officers or administers who may
lack either the desire or motivation to run the anti-corruption institute;
and finally 6) may have the motivation to hide corrupt acts rather than
telling the truth, since both the giver and receiver are guilty. They
should be required to return the pocketed bribe with interest and be
convicted and sentenced for their criminal activities.
In
addition, the World Bank’s anti-corruption techniques could be less
effective in curbing corruption activities in a number of countries
because its conceptual framework fails to systematically integrate that
significant corruption: 1) occurs up-stream, at higher places, and not
downstream; 2) occurs when money is generally deposited abroad; 3) leads
to promotion, not imprisonment; and 4) affects millions of poor people and
destitute rather than members of the well-to-do classes (United Nations
Development Programs, 2014). Finally, because of the undemocratic nature
of the country in question, there is a possibility that the administrators
might be half-hearted in fully implementing the anti-corruption act.
Given
this argument, it might be pertinent to explore if democratic federal
governance structure curtails corruption effectively. More specifically,
the following questions need to be explored. These are: 1) Do
decentralized systems of federal governance curb corruption? 2) How much
political will do federal systems of governance need to have to curb
corruption? 3) How much do federal governments invest in setting up
policies and task forces, and in providing sufficient funds to curb and
implement corruption? and4) With the establishment of anti-corruption
strategies, do federal systems of government set up sound diagnostic,
evidence-based monitoring, and review the system to ensure its
sustainability?
Anti-corruption
Evaluation Tools
The general policies espoused by national governments and
international organizations to evaluate corruption seem to be similar
across countries (Asongu 2013). However, since corruption is different to
different cultural groups, the words used to describe corruption in any
country have to be chosen carefully and the judgment must be made
precisely and objectively (USAID-IRIS 2005).
More
precisely, when evaluating the status of corruption in any country, it is
essential to make sure that the criteria used is self-explanatory and the
evaluation system is not only pertinent but is within the cultural value
setting of the country (Matei and Matei, 2011). In other words, the
corruption evaluation criteria needs to be, as much as possible: relevant
(is in line with the objectives and consistent with the overall goals
of the project); effective (the
intended objectives of the project are achievable); efficient (the project is cost-efficient and is achievable on time);
impactful (positive, negative,
intended, and unintended results of the projectneed to be clearly
identified; and sustainable
(the benefits of the project are likely to continue).
For
example, as shown in Appendix 4,
the anti-corruption strategy techniques used by a number of Asian
countries were designed to include: a clear Vision (goals will be achieved or accomplished in the mid-term
& the long-term future); Mission
(objectives to be achieved immediately); Objectives (the
fundamental building blocks for strategic
planning); Strategic Process (steps
and tools that are needed for achieving objectives); and Monitoring
and Controlling Tools and Techniques (such as benchmarking,
tracking, reviewing, and revising the evaluation system) to ensure that
the project creates the desirables in accordance with the objectives (See
the United Nations Development Programs, 2014).
Given
the conceptual framework for assessing anti-corruption programs in Asian
countries, we need to explore if democratic federal governance structures
are necessarily effective to curtail corruption. That is: 1) Does a
decentralized structure of federal governance inhibit corruption? And 2)
how much political will does a federal system of governance need to have
in order to curb corruption?
Federalism and Corruption
Federalism is a
form of governmental and institutional structure designed by the will of
the stakeholders to maintain unity within an overarching political
spectrum. If implemented properly, federalism contributes to efficiency
and preserves diversity through shared rules (Odion, 2011, Elazar, 1987).
A review of the literature, however, indicates that the political
and ideological
stalemate of federalism has produced polarizing perspectives in assessing
the impact of corruptive activities.
Proponents
of state-centered or regulated federalism argue that corruption is an
outcome of a weak state administration. State-centralized form of
federalism may be democratically interlocked, but it may not alleviate
tensions of division among its constitutes because a state-centered or
regulated management system doesn’t adequately redistribute political
power between the center and the periphery. Stated differently, a
regulated or centralized form of federalism is grounded in a democratic
form of government in which the party (or coalition of parties) with the
greatest representation (majority) in the parliament (legislature) forms
the government (Strom, 2000). Nevertheless, being centrally regulated, an
aggregative type of federalism structure might have regulatory hardware to
curtail corruption but may lack the software necessary to effectively
implement and mitigate corruptive activities.
On
the other hand, scholars that espouse a democratic autonomous self-ruling
type of federalism are skeptical about the viability of a centralized
federal state because it is not accompanied by a shifting process. That
is, the proponents of democratic autonomous self-ruling type of federalism
forcefully argue that in order to practice the principal linguistic and
cultural values of its national communities, foster a democratically
induced self-ruling form of government, and implement the designated
federal sub-units, federalism needs to be demarcated and allowed to
exercise dynamic workable levels of autonomy. In other words, supporters
of multi-regional autonomous federalism governance strongly argue that
federalism need to be indispensable for self-rule, encourage shared
governance, and give each region or area the opportunity to enjoy a
proportional share of political power to control any type of
mal-administration issues that involve corruptive activities.
An empirical research undertaken by Banfield (1979) indicates
that a decentralized form of constitutional democratic federalism empowers
greater civic engagement, enables local residents to vote corrupt
officials out of office, and discourages local officials from having
discretionary powers to exert corruption within their communities. Using
this premise, Baldalau (2012) strongly argues that decentralization
(federalism) accords greater responsibilities for managers and reduces
hierarchical control and supervision from the center. The World Bank also
indicates “decentralization reforms grant local governments new powers
and responsibilities in three dimensions, political, administrative and
fiscal. These three dimensions provide discretionary space to local
governments (2008). Freille (2008) also reaches a conclusion that
decentralized federalism is associated with lower levels of corruption.
The relationship between autonomous
self-ruling type of federalism and the level of corruption is not robust.
Howeve, after a thorough review of the literature, Bohara et al. (2004)
strongly argues, “Citizens’ repetitive participation in competitive
election increases the control of corruption.” In contradiction to the
basic tenets of federalism espoused and implemented in Ethiopia in 2005,
we will review why corruption has become a way of life in Ethiopia.
The Depth of Corruption in Federal Ethiopia
After
the Ethiopian Peoples’ Republic Democratic Front (EPRDF) ousted the
Derg’s dysfunctional political authoritarian rule in 1991, it embarked
to radically transform the Ethiopian political system through federalism.
In the transitional national conference of July 1991, about thirty
different groups of all ethnic-based and other opposition parties that
were created overnight on the eve of the conference adopted a provisional
national charter. Upon the creation of an eighty-seven member Council of
Representatives, the EPRDF spearheaded a multiethnic coalition and formed
the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE). Consequentially, ignoring
the complex and disputed historical origins of the various ethnic groups,
with little or no diversity to represent the voices and the will of the
majority of the people of Ethiopia, using the interest of the Tigraian
People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and Oromio Liberation Front (OLF), the
EPRDF redefined the political landscape. Ethnic boundaries were recklessly
drawn to restructure the state into the contemporary Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia (See Desta, 2014 and Africa Review, 2009).
In
the EPRDF’s primary decision-making, organizational principles and
discourse reflect the Leninist principles of democratic centralism and the
central committee party members are in charge of all major decisions.
Allowing the integration of political units with secessionism makes
Ethiopia’s federalism unique in this era because it is the only federal
nation that has integrated political pluralism with the right of secession
of its constituents after the dissolution of the USSR in 1985 (See Africa
Report, 2009).
In
December 1994, a constitutional assembly ratified a new constitution that
came to full implementation in 1995. Instead of allowing the various
political and ethnic groups to voluntarily join together and form a
federal system that stands for equal rights, the EPRDF redrew the
political map and adopted an ethnic-based political map of Ethiopia.
Using
Tigray as its microcosmic model, the EPRDF spearheaded the formation of
nine asymmetrical ethnic-based regional states.
The five single ethnic states groups are Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somali,
and Tigray. The four multi-ethnic regions are Benishangul-Gumuz, Southern
Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples, Gambella, and Harari. In addition,
though considered as regions, the Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa cities were
designated as federally administered city-states (See Article 47 of the
1994 Constitution). Overall, starting August 21, 1995, the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia was structured into federal, regional (kilil)
zones, woredas and kebeles.
As
stated in article 50(4) of the 1994 Constitution, the Ethiopian Federal
system was supposed to devolve from the center to the local units in order
to improve the effectiveness of the state in public service delivery and
advance the democratization process by creating conditions that would
allow the system of checks and balances to work better. As stated by
Negussie (2006), and Assefa (2015), Article 50(4) of the Ethiopian
constitution requires the regional states of government to give adequate
power to the lowest level units of government to ensure direct
participation of the local people. As a result, the EPRDF embarked on the
devolution of power to further empower the woreda,
or lower level of administration. More emphatically, whereas the
1991 manifestation of decentralization was aimed at creating and
empowering national and regional states of governments, the second phase
of decentralization extended the devolution of powers to the woreda
or the lowest level of subunits.
Ethiopia
was on the brink of a colossal failure both during the centrist feudal
monarchy and the unitary military dictatorship. After the implementation
of ethnic-based federalism, Ethiopia has remained generally politically
stable. More recently, however, youth unemployment has flared up. In
addition, the level of corruption has increased substantially. Corruption
is seen as a source of additional income for some government officials,
making it very difficult to mitigate.
As
a result of unemployment and corruption, social unrest has recently
mushroomed in some parts of country. Thereby, the Ethiopian Federal
Government has been forced to impose a state of emergency to arrest the
glaring social upheavals. The central purpose of the study is then to
examine and trace the reasons why the level of corruption has intensified
in Federal Ethiopia. The specific questions of the study include:
1)
Is the
depth of Ethiopia’s corruption caused as a result of weak state
administration nor due to the lack of redistribution of political power
between the center and local units?
2)
Do local
public officials in Federal Ethiopia have discretionary powers to
exerttheir power in their localities?
3)
Do
local residents in Federal Ethiopia have the power to rule themselves and
vote corrupt officials out of public offices?
An Assessment
As
stated above, to
ensure national consolidation, the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary
Democratic Front (EPRDF) vigorously
redefined Ethiopia’s political landscape into ethnic federalism and
restructured the Ethiopian state into the contemporary Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia.
To further assure self-rule and ascertain confidence in
the nation and the peoples of Ethiopia, each woreda
or subunit state was assured autonomy and was allowed to practice
self-rule at the grassroots level.
More
recently, a number of regional governments in Ethiopia have been stepping
up the assessment of their management strategies to mitigate the
mal-administrative practices and discrepancies. For instance, to curtail
some of the mal-administrative practices riddled with the dramatically
flourishing of corruption, the Tigraye, Oromia, and Amhara Regional States
summoned a regional conference to assess the serious administrative
challenges and systematically evaluate the implementation of the agendas
for good governance. Concomitant to this conference, the Prime Minister of
Federal Ethiopia, Haile Mariam Desalgne, declared the Year 2015/16 as the
“Year of Good Governance in Ethiopia.”
Prime
Minister Haile Mariam has recently identified that the core problems of
Ethiopia rests on the lack of effective democracy, corruption, and youth
unemployment. To stabilize the social unrest that has gotten out of hand
in the country, the government has declared a state of emergency for six
months. In the meantime, the Prime Minister has reshuffled his cabinet
ministers. The Prime Minister has already allocated about $500 million (10
billion birr) to mitigate the
rupturing youth unemployment. Also, realizing that his quasi-governmental” Kitchen
Cabinet Ministers” have knowingly or unknowingly contributed to the
duplication of work and was unproductive and costly, the Prime Minister
had the courage to dissolve the most powerful and trusted “ Kitchen
Cabinet Ministers ”who had remained firmly in the driving seat,
sometimes setting governmental policies with little approval of the
appointed portfolio cabinet ministers.
It
is too early to assess the impact and effectiveness of the proposals
initiated by the Prime Minister. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister’s
proposals seem to be superfluous and amount to nothing substantive to give
respite to existing problems. Transformative solutions are needed to
resolve the underlining youth unemployment and curb corruption levels.
Therefore, if basic structural changes were expected, the government needs
to: 1) allow democracy with multi-parties to prevail in the country; and
2) devolve that genuine and legitimate power be exercised
at the grass roots or woreda
levels.
Establishing
a Multi-party Democratic System: A
cursory look at the state of affairs that the country now faces clearly
indicates that the EPRDF politicians and bureaucrats have been ‘playing
with the rules rather than playing by the rules.’ As
the saying goes ‘absolute power corrupts absolutely.’ Instead
of following
the 1994 Constitution that allowed full checks
and balances and rendered autonomy
to each sub-unit,
it is possible
that the EPRDF might have been ruling the country with an iron fist.
As
explained in detail in my book “Economic Dependency and Stagnation to
Democratic Development State …” (2014), the developmental state model
that Ethiopia borrowed from South Korea and Malaysia presumes that the
developmental state has to be manned by highly disciplined non-partisan
professional government functionaries. However, most of the public
bureaucrats in Ethiopia are not recruited on meritocracy to fulfill the
implementation of the country’s development plan. By and large, the
civil servants in Ethiopia are recruited to fulfill the whims of the EPRDF
and are primarily members of the ruling party. Therefore, as it stands now
the EPRDF elites enjoy the upper hand over processes of decision-making,
either directly or indirectly. In addition, while the EPRDF ruling party
constantly argues that it is applying democratic rules, good governance,
and fair judicial practices, in retrospect members of the political party
are openly admitting to the Ethiopia public that they were not prudent
enough to listen to public concerns.
It
is possible to argue that a mono-party country can have full control of
the government structure, but also it could also deform the legal system.
The judges in the Ethiopian court system have been generally assigned to
the court bench not because their training and experience warrant them,
but to fulfill the country’s ethnic quota system. Thereby, instead of
making decision on their legal merits, the judicial apparatus in Ethiopia
delays justice through absenteeism and indefinitely prolonging the
execution of cases to get kickbacks.
It
is rather sad to note that the Ethiopian developmental plan has not been
effectively implemented. Private businesses are rarely involved in setting
the plan. It was either obstructed or unduly delayed because the civil
servants are, by and large, recruited to serve under the control of the
Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) Party.
Rent-seeking behavior has become a way of life in Ethiopia because the
EPRDF is reluctant to reconcile democracy and government (Aria (2013). For
instance, more recently some of the existing government functionaries were
caught red-handed for receiving kickbacks and attempting to use their
public offices to maximize their utilities by capturing a large share of
the nation’s income through their rent-seeking agendas. Actually, a
number of state-owned companies in Ethiopia were auctioned below the
market prices. As a result, the watchdog of the Federal Ethics and
Anti-Corruption Commission (FEACC) is busy investigating the cases of
so-called corrupt officials. Nonetheless, it needs to be made clear that
the application of anti-corruption techniques is very tricky in practice
because as claimed by Olken and Pande (2012), corrupt officials have the
ability to substitute to alternate forms of corruption and might have the
ability to adapt to policy changes and punishment.
Moreover,
the country has not been willing to provide a multiparty electoral system
that could promote political choice and guarantee the democratic rights to
all the citizens of the country. For example, the opposition political
parties that are allowed to exist in Ethiopia have complained of
harassment and intimidation. As ascertained by the Africa Development Bank
(2009), the nominal opposition parties that exist in Ethiopia perceive
that there is an absence of a level playing field and they attribute the
outcome of the electoral process to the narrowing of the democratic space.
Therefore,
as suggested before (Desta 2016), if basic transformative changes are
expected to arise in Ethiopia, the existing mono-party (EPRDF) system has
to give way to multiparty systems. Elections need to be held fairly in
every locality, without restrictions, that could facilitate the
implementation of a constitutional democracy. Thereby, the distribution of
political power would also minimize corruptive acts in Ethiopia. In short,
Ethiopia needs to rethink of redesigning its form of federalism and
practice predictable and transparent democracy with adequate checks and
balances that could empower its local citizens.
Rethinking
Democratic Autonomy at the Local Level:
As mentioned
before, the hallmarks of
decentralization system in Ethiopia needs to rest on the devolution of
real power from the center to local units.
By transferring political authority to local governments through
the establishment of democratically elected local governments that ensures
direct citizen participation of local accountability, the existing power
structures will be radically altered. In other words, political discretion
of local elected officials needs to rest on the desire to meet the demands
and needs of citizens. In short, public offices need to effectively
represent, be held accountable, and respond to deliver services in line
with the demands of all citizens.
Actually,
the magnitude of corruption in Ethiopia would have declined with an
effective democratization process in place. As pointed out by Asongu
(2013), “the relevance of (vice) and accountability in the fight against
corruption decreases as the corruption-control is taking more seriously by
the power that be. It logically follows that the tools of government
quality is more effective at the early stages of the fight against
corruption than at the later stages.” In addition, it is stated by
Asongu (2013) that a number of African countries have established
corruption mitigating policies; ”however,
their implementation and enforcement is another issue and remains a matter
of political will.” Local public officials generally collect rent in the
name of their public offices in order to fatten their pockets. Also, in
centralized federal governmental systems, a typical source of local
government corruption and collusion involves drafting tender documents in
ways that unfairly benefits one contract over others. In Ethiopia, instead
of building governmental offices, it is has become more lucrative to rent
properties because government officials have been harvesting kickbacks
from property owners. Also, it has created a dream for a number of
employment seekers to get employment at least for a year with the Customs
Department or taxation department, Municipality, Construction, Courts,
etc. because it does not take them very long to get rich as a result of
the kickbacks that they can get from their customers and vendors. The
turnover rate of employees from these lucrative offices is very rampant
because the employees prefer to snatch their money and run away before the
anti-corruption watchdogs notice their behavior.
As
mentioned before, converting
Ethiopia from a centralized system or unitary military dictatorship into
the current, federal structure in 1991 was a move in the right direction.
As it started, the decentralized federalism system allowed the inhabitants
of the federal states to enjoy self and shared rule. As a result, the
majority of Ethiopians highly value federalism because it gave them the
illusion that the government will protect all forms of human rights.
Stated differently, as a result of the formation of ethnic federalism in
Ethiopia, the established regions were promised to have the opportunity to
develop, promote, and preserve their languages and culture.
As
time passed, however, a number of inhabitants of the Federal Ethiopian
States felt that they were denied economic and political rights by their
various governments in power. As a result, they are demanding for Ethiopia
to be restructured to accommodate the disenfranchised. They are also
insisting that each woreda needs
to have a number of municipalities run by community elected mayors and
council members. In addition, they uttered that by having a strong social
base, each municipality could have control over social services (i.e.,
education and health services), raise its own revenues, make investment
decisions, etc.
As
discussed by Desta (2016), the formation of autonomous self-ruled woredas
with local self-governance encourages local units to have a say in
selecting their own administrators to bring about political stability.
Local units will also be able hold these administrators accountable for
their decisions. As proposed in 2001, the democratic self-rule of woredas
would have served as the organizational structure for the New Federal
Ethiopia and become the means of achieving effective bargaining for civic
society in Ethiopia. The formation of democratically decentralized
geographic systems, such as the proposed “woredas”
for Ethiopia, have helped states in India, South Africa, Switzerland,
Canada, etc. attain political stability (See Desta,2016).
Similarly,
as discussed by Keller (2003) the Ethiopian Federal Government has set up
a devolved system of administration that could usher government closer to
the people and has created an environment conducive to peoples’
empowerment, at least on paper. If decentralized federalism is a license
to self-rule and is also an effective structure that enables for shared
rule with enough assurance of checks and balances, predictable and
transparent democracy would have been practiced at the local level. In
Ethiopia, the subunit levels or woredas
are supposed to be the main representative body at the local level.
All decisions taken are supposed to directly affect the welfare of
citizens and local communities. However, as reported by the Africa
Development Bank (2009), in Ethiopia, the local autonomy is rarely
respected. The needs and interest of the communities are undermined,
limited or impeded because the accountability of local communities are
relegated to secondary in some cases to central federal level.
For
instance, in current Ethiopia, in any woreda,
or locality or municipality, local residents are hardly empowered and
they have not been able to participate meaningfully in selecting their
representatives. The local people are not actually given the right to
choose their leaders due to sham elections. In name, the local units are
supposed to be autonomous. But, as practiced, the ruling party carefully
chooses zone governors, mayors, and killel
leaders from the hard-core cadres. As a result, the party selected
official or cadres are held accountable only by their higher up political
leaders instead of the local residents.
As
discussed by Desta (2016), for example, during the last election in 2015,
some of the EPRDF members never went to their localities to campaign
because they were assured by their party leaders that they would be
elected, provided they remain loyal to the ideological of their party. To
add insult to injury, some of the nominal candidates never cared to listen
to some of the concerns that their constituents had. Therefore, after the
candidates were proven faithful and accountable to their political party,
the constituent units were told to elect the party nominated cadres
because the Party endorsed them.
However,
as discussed by Asongu (2013), in Hong Kong and Singapore, the
effectiveness and success of anti-corruption institutions are directly
related to their degree of autonomy. Decentralization
(federalism) accords greater responsibilities to locally elected authorities
and allows citizens’ repetitive participation in competitive election.
Therefore, it is most likely that autonomous decentralization reduces the
political discretionary power of local officials and can effectively
control the level of corruption (Baldalau,
2012, Freille 2008, and Bohara
et al. 2004).
Ethiopia’s
journey towards autonomous democratic federalism can therefore become a
reality if the government in power has the political power to sub-divide
the existing regional states into manageable geographic regions (for
details see Desta, 2016).The effective implementation of working democracy
at the local level would empower local citizens to have the full right to
call back corrupt officials from their offices and would also help to
crack down on the level of corruptive activities that have threatened the
basic foundations of the country. With the dismantling of the creeping
corruption, Ethiopia’s legitimacy would be restored and thereby would
give assurance to domestic and foreign investors.
Conclusion
Over
the last decade, Ethiopia’s economy has flourished. While labeled as a
poor country during the Derge’s era, Ethiopia has ascertained itself as
an emerging economic powerhouse and has attempted to develop its
infrastructure. More recently, the weak state administration has
flourished corruption. Contrary to the 2001 announcement of decentralized
federalism in Ethiopia, there is lack of political power devolution from
the center to local subunits. The political cadres of the existing mono
EPRDF Party have complete discretionary power to exert their power to
their localities and spread corruption. As of the result of the Ethiopian
government being unmanageable and ineffective, youth unemployment and
corruption have contributed to disruptive social unrest.
Stated
differently, Ethiopia’s political landscape seems to be dragged into a
bottomless grave by the EPRDF political cadres. Ethiopia is governed under
a centralized form of government. The citizens of the country are not
allowed to democratically elect their representatives. Local people
don’t have the power to rule themselves or vote corrupt officials out of
public offices. Socially, the undesirable corruptive behavior is rampant
in the country. As a result, corruption is ailing the country’s economy.
Corruption undermines the income of the country and fosters rewards for
unproductive private and government employees. Being short in its capacity
for fair law enforcement and judicial process, the country’s court
system has become an obstacle in the promotion and protection of human
rights. It is heavily engulfed with injustices and delays in dispensation
of justice.
If
the Ethiopian government turns a deaf ear and refuses to treat the
symptoms of the rampant corruption and youth unemployment that have
sparked social unrest, the current flourishing economy will likely be passé
and not sustainable. The current government’s propositions to reduce
youth unemployment and the mitigate corruption in the country are very
superficial and if implemented will produce marginal results. Thus, we
suggest the following economic and political strategies that could result
in substantial changes, provided they are integrated into the governance
structure.
Economically,
Ethiopia’s policy makers need to relinquish the existing reactive mode.
It is a passé. Instead, they need to focus on proactive strategy and
examine the Employer of Last Resort (ELR) economic model. As stated by
Desta (2016), the “ELR stimulates productivity, lowers unemployment,
arrests inflation, and it plays vital role in stabilizing the economy by
reducing fluctuation.” Politically, the regime in power and those who
have a stake in Ethiopia need to engage in fruitful discussions to: a)
reform the Ethiopia’s political system; b) democratically redress and
revise the existing constitution (no political reform can succeed in
Ethiopia under the current constitutional crisis); and c) redefine the
ethnically-based regional states into a autonomous federation of Ethiopian
subunits or woredas (that is, current ethnically designed regional states must
be subdivided into manageable units).
If
working democracy is effectively implemented at the Ethiopia’s local
level, citizens can be empowered to have the full right to call back,
through a vote of no confidence, the corrupt officials from their offices
without worrying about retaliations. This kind of democratic right
accorded to citizens will help to crack down on the level of corruptive
activities that have threatened the basic socio-economic and political
foundations of the country. In short, the level of corruption in
Ethiopia will be reduced with the existence of democratic rights that
would encourage free election, incorporate a system of checks and
balances, and allow citizens and public interest groups to be involved in
civic engagement that could encourage them to fully expose abuses,
monitor, and reveal corrupt officials and politicians.
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